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1. General introduction and main findings 
The extent to which economic growth reduces poverty has always been a central 
issue in development economics. Obviously, the extent depends on the distribution 
of the benefits of growth.' Already by the late 1950s, it became apparent that 
growth in "underdeveloped countries" did not trickle down to the population at 
large, but was instead accompanied by massive underemployment and 
unemployment. This "employment problem" implied that growth did not 
necessarily translate into poverty reduction, but rather to increasing inequalities 
between those who remained poor and those who were lucky enough to find 
employment in modern urban sectors. This was consistent with the Kuznets' 
(1955) hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and 
development, according to which inequality would tend to increase in the early 
stages of development. Kuznets (1955) admits that his often cited paper is 
"perhaps 5 percent empirical information and 95 percent speculation, some of it 
possibly tainted by wishful thinking." 
Despite these observations, it took until the 1970s and the work of Adelman and 
Morris (1973) and Chenery et al. (197 4) until the question of income distribution 
within a country explicitly entered the debate. Adelman and Morris ( 1973) even 
reached the conclusion that "development is accompanied by an absolute as well 
as relative decline in the average income of the very poor", although they were 
challenged by Cline (1975) and Lal (1976) that this finding was not borne out by 
their data. Lal (1976) harshly criticized these studies and argued that the "concern 
with distributional issues amongst the international agencies and American 
development economists marks more their acknowledgement of their neglect of 
what a number of Third World governments and many development economists 
have for a long time recognized to be a major area of concern". This assessment 
certainly contained some truth, but these studies had a significant influence on the 
research agenda. Lal (1976) went on to conclude that these studies "may perhaps 
do indirect damage to the prospects of the poor by not emphasizing enough that 
efficient growth, which raises the demand for labor is probably the single most 
important means available for alleviating poverty in the Third World". The latter 
statement illustrates the ideological nature of the discourse between those who 
"emphasized" growth and others who "emphasized" distribution. This is mainly 
owed to the fact that the debate of the 1970s still rested, to stick to Kuznets' 
This introduction focuses on the discourse in development economics with regard to 
and the empirics of the impact of economic growth and economic policies on the 
distribution of income, and hence on poverty. For reviews of the theories of 
development and distribution see Cline ( 1975) and Kanbur (2000). This focus also 
implies that we do not consider the reverse causal relationship from inequality to 
growth. See Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000), Aghion et al. ( 1999) for literature 
reviews and the 2006 World Development report (World Bank 2005a) for recent 
empirical insights. 
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14 INTRODUCTION 
wording, on very little empirical information, a lot of speculation, and possibly 
even more on wishful thinking. 
The emphasis on distributional and poverty issues however was relatively short-
lived. With the arrival of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, the focus of both 
development policy and research shifted towards structural adjustment to current 
and capital account imbalances. As this went along with the arrival of conservative 
governments in OECD countries, the view that development and poverty reduction 
could best be reached through economic growth and free markets dominated. In 
this environment, little research effort was dedicated to resolve the issues raised by 
earlier empirical studies on the relationship between the distribution of income and 
economic development and it took until the early I 990s to put the issue back on 
the agenda.' 
In the late 1980s, concerns were raised that the costs of structural adjustment 
programs, which were implemented in most developing economies, were 
disproportionately borne by the poor (Adelman and Robinson 1989).' In the course 
of the I 990s, this concern was replaced by the worries, in particular voiced by 
non-governmental organizations, that the benefits of globalization would be 
concentrated on the rich in the developing world. In the policy arena, the adoption 
of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, which put poverty reduction at the 
centre of development policies, created demand for detailed micro datasets 
necessary to monitor progress on the poverty reduction goals. Possibly, the major 
reason why income distribution was back on the research agenda is related to data 
availability. Investigators could rely on more data of much better quality, in 
particular on household survey data, thereby dramatically reducing the degree of 
speculation contained in earlier studies.' 
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has significantly improved our 
understanding of the relationship between growth, poverty, and inequality. Today, 
it is widely acknowledged that on average growth is distribution-neutral and hence 
reduces poverty (Ravallion and Chen 2003, Dollar and Kraay 2002). In that sense, 
"growth is good for the poor" (Dollar and Kraay 2002). Ravallion (2001a) 
however suggests that one needs to look "beyond averages", as the impact of 
economic growth on poverty differs substantially across countries. In addition, he 
notes that this impact can also vary among the poor in a given country. That it is 
indeed worthwhile to look "beyond averages" is confirmed by many country 
studies that in recent years have cast light on the very different income distribution 
2 Exceptions include a major research project by The World Bank initiated in 1985, the 
results of which are summarized in Fields ( 1989), and some country studies e.g. on 
Malaysia by Anand (1983). 
3 The UNICEF study "Adjustment with a human face" that examines the poverty 
impact of structural adjustment with a focus on children and other vulnerable groups 
received a lot of attention at that time. See Comia, Jolly, and Stewart ( 1987). 
4 See Deaton ( 1997 and 2003) on data issues. 
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dynamics during growth both across countries and across time.' These dynamics 
vary case by case, which almost makes it impossible to draw any general 
conclusions from this literature, not even by region or confined to a specific time-
period. The only exception is the increase in inequality throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s. Inequality measured by the Gini-coefficient, increased in 6 out of 7 
country cases presented in Bourguignon et al. (2005a) covering the 1980s to the 
mid-l 990s and in 8 out of 14 cases in the OPPG6 project covering the 1990s. 
The differences in country experiences of course raise the question of why is 
this so. It turns out that even more diversity can be found when one attempts to 
identify the drivers of distributional chan9e. The studies in Bourguignon et al. 
(2005a) employ microsimulation methods to decompose historical changes in 
income distributions into "fundamental sources": ( l) Changes in the resources at a 
household's disposal, including human capital accumulated through education, as 
well as socio-demographic changes, such as changes in the area of residence, age 
structure, and households composition (endowment or population effects), (2) 
changes in market remuneration of the factors of production (price effects), and (3) 
changes in the occupational structure of the population, in terms of labor market 
participation and formal or informal sector of employment (occupational effects)." 
The main general lesson from the country studies is that observed changes in the 
distribution of income result from a number of sources, which may offset or 
reinforce each other. Since country experiences differ considerably, only few 
common patterns can be identified. One of these patterns is that price effects, i.e. 
changes in returns to education, were typically inequality increasing. Some 
5 See Christiaensen, Demery, and Patemostro (2003) for a review of a number of Sub-
Saharan cases, the country studies on pro-poor growth in the 1990s in World Bank 
(2005b) and Grimm, Klasen, and McKay (2006), and the collection of East Asian and 
Latin American experiences in Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (2005a). 
6 "Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth" was a joint research program undertaken by The 
World Bank and the French, German, and British donor agencies. The results can be 
found in World Bank (2005b) and Grimm, Klasen, and McKay (2006). 
7 In the tradition of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), poverty and distributional 
changes between two (or more) points in time are decomposed using two (or more) 
cross-sections of households. This is achieved via simulating counterfactual 
distributions on the basis of household income generation models that will be 
described in more detail below. See Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001) and 
Grimm (2005) for further applications of this technique. 
8 It should be noted that this empirical operationalization of distributional drivers 
implicitly reflects the insights from the grand long-term theories of development and 
distribution from Lewis ( I 954) and Kuznets ( I 955) with their focus on intersectoral 
movements out of a traditional subsistence into a modem enclave sector to recent 
models originating from endogenous growth theory where externalities, such as 
parent-to-child human capital or economy-wide technological externalities, drive 
accumulation, growth and inequality dynamics (Kanbur 2000). It also mirrors short-
to-medium term distributional adjustments to external shocks and policy changes that 
can be explained in a simple neoclassical trade model with fixed factor supplies. 
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16 INTRODUCTION 
conditional findings include the distributional effect of increasing female labor 
market participation that is found to be very positive when mainly females from 
poorer households entered the labor market. Increasing informality generally 
contributes to increases in inequality and is shown to very strong impoverishing 
effects on the poor in Brazil. Educational expansion improves the income 
distribution in some cases, but it can also be inequality increasing in the presence 
of earnings that are highly convex in years of schooling despite improving the 
distribution of education. 
These findings illustrate the wealth of insights into the microeconomics of 
income distribution obtained by this type of decomposition analysis. Yet, such an 
approach leaves many questions open. First and foremost, these questions concern 
the factors that explain changes in what Bourguignon et al. (2005b) call the 
"fundamental" sources of distributional change. In other words, which are the 
factors that explain the increase in wage inequality in many countries, the increase 
in female labor market participation, increases/decreases in informality, the 
patterns of educational expansion, and socio-demographic changes? Possible 
explanatory factors can be grouped into phenomena related to socio-economic 
development in general, such as demographic changes and human capital 
accumulation, external shocks, and economic policies. In particular external 
shocks and policies related to globalization, such as increased trade and capital 
flows, the related pattern of technological change, and external liberalization, have 
recently received a lot of attention as possible reasons for the observed increase in 
inequality in many countries. The empirical assessment of these "fundamental 
causes" of distributional change is by no means trivial. It implies to analyze the 
poverty and distributional impact of specific external shocks, economic policies, or 
other relevant events, rather than analyzing the reduced-form relationship between 
changes in the distribution of income and economic growth. Such analyses are 
extremely policy-relevant, in particular when development policies are geared 
towards poverty reduction. 
The chapters in this dissertation therefore address the short to medium run 
poverty and distributional impact of economic policy changes and external shocks 
for three Latin American countries.9 More specifically, chapter 2 examines the 
impact of trade liberalization in Colombia in the early 1990s. Chapter 3 looks at 
the poverty and distributional implications of the gas boom in Bolivia. While these 
two chapters "ex-post" analyze past experiences, the third chapter attempts to 
assess "ex-ante" the possible effects of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty 
and the distribution of income in Brazil. 
The country case studies included in this dissertation hence analyse the "micro" 
impact of "macro" events, which raises the question of the appropriate 
methodology to do so. In the short to medium run, macro policies as well as 
external shocks affect household incomes and consumption primarily through two 
channels; (I) through changes in returns to factors of production, in particular to 
9 The short-to-medium run corresponds to 5 to 15 years. 
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labor, and in employment, and (2) through changes in relative goods prices. The 
empirical challenge now lies in linking the policy or external shock to these 
variables in a first step, in order to assess their impact on household welfare, i.e. 
the distribution of income and poverty, in a second step. In some cases, where a 
clear link between the shock and household welfare exists, this can be achieved 
relatively easily. Tax or price reforms, for example, directly affect real household 
income. Therefore, the distributional impact of such reforms can be evaluated 
relatively simply on the basis of household survey data. 10 
In most instances, however the analysis is complicated by the fact that there is 
no direct link between the shock and real household income. Another complication 
arises from general equilibrium effects that are ignored in the former approach. As 
a result, most analyses of the poverty and distributional impact of policies and 
external shocks have turned to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. 
CGE models based on Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) provide a coherent 
analytical framework for understanding the complex mechanism through which 
economic policies and shocks affect household income distribution. Most CGE 
models applied to evaluate distributional impacts in developing countries are 
extended neoclassical models that incorporate important structural characteristics 
of these countries by assuming (a) limited substitution elasticities in various 
economic relationships and (b) various markets not to work properly.n They can 
be used for ex-ante assessment as well as for ex-post analysis in order to 
disentangle the effects of different shocks." 
CGE models for distributional analysis incorporate different representative 
household groups representing "classes" defined by area of residence (rural vs. 
urban), skill level (unskilled vs. skilled), socio-political factors (organized vs. 
unorganized workforce), or power and wealth (factor endowments, wealth, 
tenancy of land). In terms of distributional outcomes, the main defining features of 
10 See Sahn and Younger (2002) for a short introduction into this approach. Often, such 
analyses do not account for behavioral responses, but this shortcoming could be 
remedied by estimating an appropriate empirical model that could be used to simulate 
behavioral change. 
11 See Robinson (1989). Taking into account these structural characteristics was 
emphasized by the "structuralist" tradition of CGE modelling (see e.g. Taylor 1990). 
Only some "macro-structuralist" (Robinson 1989) features, such as markup-pricing 
and Keynesian multiplier effects did not make it into mainstream CGE modelling. 
The IFPRI (International Food and Policy Research Institute) standard model 
(Lofgren et al. 2002) in the tradition of Dervis et al. (1982) represents this current 
mainstream. Similar models have been applied to a number of countries. See Wiebelt 
( 1996) for a detailed description of such a model for Malaysia. 
12 The first big wave of studies using applied CGE models was motivated by the 
concern about the poverty and distributional impact of structural adjustment 
programs. A series of country studies undertaken by the OCED Development Centre 
tried to assess the impact of actual and (hypothetical) alternative structural adjustment 
packages on the poor (Bourguignon, de Melo, and Morrisson 1991). Sahn et al. 
( 1997) contains a number of country studies from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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these household groups in most CGE model applications are differences in their 
factor endowments and hence the incomes they receive. Possibly, household 
groups also differ in labor supply, consumption, and savings behavior. 
When a shock is applied to a CGE model, sectoral production changes, as do 
resource reallocations, factor and goods prices, as well as real income and 
consumption of the respective household groups. To translate the changes in real 
incomes of the respective household groups into poverty and distributional 
outcomes, one needs to specify the within-group income distributions. Two 
approaches have been proposed in the literature (Lofgren et al. 2002). The first, in 
the tradition of Adelman and Robinson (1978), is to fit ( or to estimate) parametric 
distributions for each household group, e.g. the log-normal distribution that fits 
empirical income distributions reasonably well. This implies to categorize 
households in different groups according to the main sources of income or to other 
important socioeconomic characteristics of the head of the household. The change 
in mean real income of the respective household groups is applied to this within-
group distribution, which is "shifted" accordingly. The within-group distributions 
are finally summed to give the overall income distribution. The second approach 
uses disaggregated household survey data, classifies households according to the 
CGE model household groups, and directly applies the changes in real household 
group income from the CGE to the survey. The calculation of poverty and 
inequality changes is then straightforward. This approach is also referred to as 
micro-accounting." 
The representative household group assumption implies that income 
distribution variations only result from changes between household groups, given 
that within household groups the variance is fixed." Yet, recent empirical findings 
on distributional change indicate that changes within the typical representative 
household groups of CGE models account for an important share of overall 
distributional change." At first sight, an obvious way out of this problem would be 
to increase the number of household groups, or even to incorporate all households 
from representative household surveys. The latter has been done e.g. by Harrison 
et al. (2000) in an assessment of Russia's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WT0).16 They find the differences in price effects between a model 
with 10 representative household groups and a model with 55 000 households to 
be negligible. This finding is not too surprising, as the failure of CGE models to 
capture some of the distributional dynamics is not grounded in the failure to 
account for household heterogeneity in terms of factor endowments and/or 
consumption patterns. The problem is rooted in the fact that CGE models do not 
account for decisions taken at the individual level. These individual decisions, for 
13 See Lay, Thiele, and Wiebelt (2006) for an application. 
14 For a detailed discussion of the problems of the representative household group 
assumption see Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2005). 
15 See again the findings in Bourguignon et al. (2005a) and similar studies cited above. 
16 Cockburn (2006) is another CGE application that incorporates all households from a 
survey. 
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example entry into the labor market, falling into unemployment or switching 
between sectors or occupations, are important drivers of distributional change. In 
other words, the CGE model treats the factor endowments of a household or 
household group as fixed (although these endowments may grow at an exogenous 
rate) and fails to represent individual decisions that may alter these endowments 
dramatically. Of course, CGE models can be extended to include, e.g. 
unemployment and/or endogenous labor supply. Yet, in order to capture the 
income distribution implications, decisions would have to taken by "real" 
individual household members. This implies to introduce individual "fixed effects" 
into the model and requires the estimation of structural labor market models 
(Bourguignon et al. 2005b). 
Two approaches have been proposed to overcome these shortcomings of 
applied CGE models. First, individual behavior can be fully integrated into CGE 
models. There have been attempts to build such fully integrated models (Cogneau 
2001, Cogneau and Robilliard 2001 ), but the results are mixed. In particular the 
formidable identification problems in estimating the structural labor market 
equations cast doubts on the robustness of this approach. Second, traditional CGE 
models have been sequentially linked to microsimulation models based on 
household income generation models that are estimated from household survey 
data. Using this approach, a pioneering study by Robilliard et al. (2002) examines 
the poverty and distributional effects of the Asian crisis. A comparison of the 
results to those obtained under the representative household group assumption 
reveals the superiority of using a microsimulation model. In the sequential 
approach, a shock is first simulated in the CGE model and then the 
microsimulation adjusts micro data so that values for its aggregate variables 
(wages and employment) are consistent with the CGE macro equilibrium. The 
"degree of consistency" between the macro and the micro model however differs 
between applications of the approach, but in a narrow sense a sequential model is 
confined to be inconsistent both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the 
changes, e.g. in wages and employment are driven by relative price changes, 
whereas the microsimulation typically only features a reduced-form representation 
of labor market behavior where prices do not appear as explanatory variables. 
Empirically, problems arise from the large differences in national accounts and 
household data, in particular with regard to labor value added, although some 
authors, e.g. Robilliard et al. (2002), manipulate survey weights to reach 
"empirical consistency". Yet if the analyst were able to reach complete theoretical 
and empirical consistency between the micro and the macro model, why not build 
an integrated model anyway. 
The strength of the sequential approach lies in the combination of a structural 
macro model that allows tracing the transmission channels from macro shocks to 
prices and quantity changes relevant to distributional outcomes and a 
microsimulation model that provides a detailed account of the household income 
generation process. The microsimulation model used by Robilliard et al. (2002) 
follows Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2001) and is similar to the one used 
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in the country studies in Bourguignon et al. (2005a). In this model, household 
income is defined as the aggregation of earnings of individual household members, 
earnings from joint household activities and non-labor income, such as transfers or 
capital income. The econometric specification underlying the income generation 
process is composed of two types of equations, those describing occupational 
choices of the household members and earnings/profit equations. Household 
members typically choose between inactivity, wage employment and participation 
in a joint household activity, depending on individual and household 
characteristics. Decisions by household members are modeled sequentially, i.e. the 
household head's choice and related earnings enter the decision function of other 
household members, whereby the simultaneity of occupational choices within a 
household is taken into account. Of course, simulating poverty and distributional 
changes based on this type of household income generation models is not without 
shortcomings. Typically, the behavioral equations, e.g. those governing 
occupational choices, are estimated from cross-sectional data. It is hence assumed 
that the observed variation in behavior between individuals is used to simulate 
behavioral change of (other) individuals in time." Yet, even if panel data was 
available, constant parameters would have to assumed for the simulation period, 
which apparently becomes an increasingly problematic assumption the longer time 
horizon of the analysis. 
Two of the three country-studies in this dissertation, Bolivia and Brazil, use the 
sequential methodology that links a CGE and a microsimulation model - despite 
its imperfections. Both the CGE and the microsimulation model are adapted to the 
investigated shock as well as to the structural characteristics of the country in 
question. The studies explore the advantages of this innovative approach, but also 
hint at its shortcomings and suggest possible areas for improvements. The 
Colombia study uses a methodology that is similar in spirit. Counterfactual income 
distributions are generated using a household income generation model that is 
shocked by changes in earnings, employment, and relative goods prices. Yet, 
instead of using a CGE model to construct the counterfactual changes in these 
distributional drivers, we rely on other studies and additional descriptive analyses 
to identify the changes that can be related to the trade liberalization shock. 
The issues addressed in the three following chapters are highly relevant and 
hotly debated in the Latin America context, but also beyond this sub-continent. 
Most Latin American countries are known for their very unequal income 
distributions and even the middle-income countries including Brazil and Colombia 
therefore exhibit relatively high levels of poverty. In such an environment, the 
evaluation of the poverty and distributional impact of policies and external shocks 
is key for the design of socially sustainable (and politically feasible) economic 
policies. In the case of external shocks, such knowledge can be important to 
17 Although this assumption seems to be very restrictive, it can be plausibly made e.g. in 
the context of occupational choices, which are explained mainly by individual 
educational attainment, age, and household composition variables. 
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cushion possible adverse distributional and poverty effects. Economists have 
developed adequate tools for informing policy-makers ex-ante, i.e. before 
decisions are taken. The Brazil study contained in this dissertation is one example 
of such an ex-ante policy evaluation. Of course, much can be learned from looking 
at past experiences, which is what the other two chapters do. 
The biggest "external" shock that has hit developing countries undoubtedly is 
globalization. As an integration process, it encompasses increased trade and capital 
flows as well as technology transfer. Eventually, globalization and increased 
interdependence in world markets are triggered by technological change and both 
domestic and multilateral policies, in particular trade and capital account 
liberalization. Hence, globalization has many facets. 
The chapters in this dissertation shed light on the role of some of these facets in 
explaining distributional change. Whether trade liberalization, which is dealt with 
in chapters 2 and 3, is good for the poor and whether it increases inequality has 
been a major concern of many observers of developing countries." The resource 
boom examined in the chapter on Bolivia may not be directly related to 
globalization, but the study's current relevance for many other developing 
countries stems from the fact that the globalization-related economic rise of China 
and India has fuelled world demand for commodities that are often exported by 
poor countries. 
The remainder of this introduction shortly summarizes the main findings and 
major methodological features of the country studies. The following chapter 
examines the impact of trade liberalization in the early 1990s on income 
distribution and poverty in urban Colombia. It first analyzes the effects on the 
urban labor market, i.e. on labor earnings and employment, and relative goods 
price changes. Using a microsimulation model of the type described above, the 
chapter then analyzes how these changes have shaped the distribution of income 
and how they ultimately affect poverty outcomes. Increasing informality is found 
to have rather small effects, although very poor groups are affected 
disproportionately. The increase in the unskilled-skilled wage gap however has 
major negative distributional implications and lowers considerably the poverty 
reduction potential of growth. The relative price shifts for consumer goods have an 
unexpectedly strong positive distributional impact. Finally, the analysis 
demonstrates that two factors related to a non-tradable boom, increasing female 
labor market participation as well as an increase in informal profits, have played 
an important role in cushioning the possible adverse labor market effects of trade 
liberalization, in particular for the very poor. 
The Bolivian chapter addresses the question of whether the gas boom of the 
1990s has bypassed large parts of the poor population, thereby leading to 
increasing inequalities in an already unequal society. The chapter examines the 
18 See Winters et al. (2004) for a very comprehensive review of the empirical evidence 
on trade and poverty. Some recent evidence with a focus on Latin America can be 
found in Harrison (2005). 
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transmission channels through which the large resource inflows related to the gas 
boom, both initial foreign investment in the sector and the subsequent export 
earnings, as well as large public transfer programs affect the distribution of 
income. These transfers may well be interpreted as a means of redistributing 
resource rents. The CGE model explicitly models the gas sector and takes into 
account its enclave character. The focus of the analysis is on the second round 
labor market impacts of Dutch disease type effects, in particular on shifts between 
formal and informal employment and changes in relative factor prices. The 
microsimulation model is specified accordingly. The simulation results suggest 
that the gas boom induces a combination of unequalizing and equalizing forces, 
which tend to offset each other. As net distributional change is limited, growth 
generated by the boom reduces poverty despite increasing informality. 
For the Brazilian case, the next chapter intends to evaluate the poverty effects 
of possible trade liberalization outcomes of the Doha round in the medium run. 19 
This implies to assess the poverty impact of a Doha Round (and a Full 
Liberalization) counterfactual scenario against a scenario that incorporates some of 
the main features of medium run structural change. The chapter thus examines 
whether the effects of trade liberalization, in particular on poverty and the 
distribution of income, are still prominent in the medium run. The main poverty-
relevant transmission channels incorporated in the simulation exercise are changes 
real factor prices and changes in the sectoral composition of the workforce, 
focusing on employment movements between agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. Structural change is driven by changing consumption patterns, 
differentials in productivity growth rates across sectors, educational upgrading of 
the workforce, and, finally, the trade shocks. The methodology combines again a 
sequentially dynamic CGE model with a microsimulation model that takes into 
account educational expansion on the micro level. The analysis suggests that the 
economic effects of the Doha round, even of an "optimistic deep" liberalization 
scenario, are rather limited for Brazil. Accordingly, poverty would remain largely 
unaffected by this trade reform, which does not appear to be biased in favor any of 
particularly poor groups. Yet, through a slight improvement in the urban income 
distribution the Doha scenario has some positive effect on poverty. In contrast, a 
full liberalization scenario that implies drastic domestic tariff cuts causes quite 
substantial welfare gains that are concentrated among some of the poorest groups 
of the country, in particular those in agriculture. Yet, relatively strong contractions 
in manufacturing sectors give reasons for concern. 
19 This chapter forms part a major research program of The World Bank to assess the 
poverty impacts of a possible WTO agreement ("Doha" round). World market price 
changes caused by multilateral liberalization were calculated using a global CGE 
model and then passed to a number of single country cases. The results of all country 
case studies as well as a summary can be found in Hertel and Winters (2005). This 
book also contains a shorter summary version of chapter 3. 
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2. The poverty and distributional impact of "opening-up": 
Urban Colombia in the early 1990s 
2.1. Introduction 
Not only globalization critics are concerned when it comes to the poverty and 
distributional implications of trade liberalization in the developing world. It is 
widely acknowledged today that trade liberalization, at least in the short to 
medium run, may hurt some, possibly poor, economic actors. Its impact depends 
on a whole range of country-specific factors including the structure of protection 
in place and how this structure is affected by liberalization, the resulting price 
changes and price transmission, supply responses, and the functioning of labor 
markets.20 In economies that are not dominated by household-based agricultural 
activities, the labor market acts as the major transmission channel of trade reforms 
on final welfare outcomes, although changes in relative goods prices can also have 
important welfare implications. 
Trade reform triggers labor reallocations across sectors, and may cause 
(temporary) unemployment, or, when this is not an option, labor movements into 
informal employment. What regards changes in the distribution of wages'1, 
Stolper-Samuelson effects were long thought to work in favor of the poor in 
developing countries, as they should have led to real wage gains for (poor) 
unskilled labor. Unskilled labor was considered the factor used more intensively in 
the production of the goods in which developing countries supposedly had a 
comparative advantage. In the Latin American context, a number of reasons have 
been discussed why this story may well be too simple. First, with the entry of 
China into the world economy and in light of Latin America's abundant natural 
resources, the continent's comparative advantage by the late 1980s was not 
necessarily in the production of unskilled-labor-intensive products, as suggested 
by Wood (1997). A related second argument was raised by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1995) who show that Mexican exports are relatively skilled-labor-intensive, when 
judged by Mexican standards. Third, unskilled-labor-intensive industries, in 
particular light manufacturing, had been protected more heavily than more skill-
intensive industries (Harrison 2005). These factors explain part of the increase in 
wage inequalities that have been observed in post-liberalization periods in Latin 
America. An additional, and possibly more important, source of increasing wage 
inequality is skill-biased technological change, which could be partly attributed to 
trade-liberalization. 
Analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on employment, the distribution of 
wages, and relative prices can only be the first step in judging its poverty and 
distributional effects. In the second step, the implications on household welfare 
20 In much more detail, the reasons why "it depends" are reviewed e.g. in Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2004b), Harrison (2005) and Winters et al. (2004). 
21 See Arbache et al. (2004) for a review of the effects of trade liberalization on the 
distribution of wages in developing countries. 
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need to be addressed, which is what this chapter intends to do for the case of the 
Colombian trade liberalization. 
In the early 1990s, Colombia drastically reduced trade restrictions and 
implemented institutional as well as regulatory reforms. In addition to trade 
liberalization, the government undertook a series of other structural reforms 
ranging from capital account liberalization, foreign exchange deregulation, and 
financial markets reforms to a labor reform and major public sector restructuring. 
Economic reforms combined with the non-tradable boom brought substantial 
overall welfare gains to urban Colombians. Between 1988 and 1995, urban mean 
per capita income increased at an annual rate of approximately 3.2 percent and 
urban poverty declined significantly. Yet at the same time, inequality worsened 
considerably." 
Trade liberalization may have contributed to this increase in inequality and a 
series of papers by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003, 2005) and Attanasio, Goldberg, 
and Pavcnik (2004) has examined the labor market impacts of the Colombian 
external liberalization. Attanasio et al. (2004) find trade liberalization to have 
affected the Colombian wage distribution through (I) increasing returns to college 
education, (2) wage decreases in sectors that initially exhibited lower wages, and 
(3) a shifts towards more informal employment. Yet, the effects are rather small 
and they conclude that trade liberalization has only played a minor role in 
explaining the observed worsening of the wage distribution in the early 1990s. In a 
more recent paper, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004a) have tried to assess the 
implications of their findings on urban poverty. They compile poverty profiles in 
order to identify determinants of poverty that may be affected by trade 
liberalization and relate these determinants to their earlier findings on the labor 
market impacts. According to this "reduced form" approach, trade liberalization 
had, if at all, a negative impact on urban poverty, in particular through increasing 
informality. 
In addition to these studies on the impact of trade, a number of studies ( e.g. 
Ocampo et al. 2000, Velez et al. 2005) have analyzed inequality and poverty 
changes in Colombia. Velez et al. (2005) examine poverty and distributional 
dynamics during the reform period. Their "decomposition through 
microsimulation" approach allows them to identify and decompose the sources of 
observed distributional and poverty changes. They find the overall inequality 
increase between 1988 and 1995 to be the result of a number of counterbalancing 
forces. Widening rural-urban disparities as well as educational expansion in the 
presence of convex earnings with regard to education implied increasing inequality 
that was only slightly hampered by decreases in returns to education. Velez et al. 
(2005) offer very interesting insights into the income distribution dynamics of 
Colombia. Yet, the study fails to link these observations to economic policy 
changes or external shocks. 
22 See World Bank (2002), UNDP (1998), and Velez et al. (2005) for detailed 
descriptions of poverty and distributional changes in this period. 
Jann Lay - 978-3-631-75365-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:52:47AM
via free access
COLOMBIA IN THE EARLY l 990S 25 
In this chapter, we use a microsimulation model, which comprehensively 
models the household income generation process, to evaluate the impact of trade 
liberalization on poverty and the distribution of income in urban Colombia in the 
early l 990s.23 The drivers of distributional change in the model are changes in 
employment, wages, and relative goods prices, which are linked to trade 
liberalization based on existing empirical studies. Since providing quantitative 
estimates of trade-induced labor market and price changes remains arbitrary to a 
certain extend, we complement these studies by discussions on the influence of 
other relevant factors and provide additional survey-based descriptive evidence. In 
particular, the approach taken in this chapter hence tries to close the gap between 
the evidence on the effects on wages and employment provided by Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003, 2005) and the final impact on poverty and the distribution of 
income. The chapter can be seen as an extension of the work by Velez et al. 
(2005), as the microsimulation model is quite similar. Instead of simply 
decomposing distributional change, we attempt to link certain drivers of poverty 
and distributional change to trade liberalization. Our intention is not to construct 
one trade liberalization counterfactual, but rather to estimate the order of 
magnitude of the poverty and distributional implications of the respective labor 
market (and relative price) changes that we can relate to trade reform as well as the 
interactions between these changes. Furthermore, we assess the magnitude of these 
effects vis-a-vis poverty and distributional changes triggered by factors that cannot 
be related to trade liberalization. To this end, a number of hypothetical, although 
empirically motivated, scenarios with changes in earnings and employment as well 
as relative goods price changes are fed into the microsimulation, which then 
produces counterfactual income distributions. 
The chapter is structured accordingly. We first review the Colombian trade 
reform of the early 1990s as well as accompanying structural reforms and shortly 
examine the macroeconomic context. We then describe the microsimulation 
model. The subsequent section discusses the poverty and distributional outcomes 
of the hypothetical scenarios. The final section summarizes the results and 
concludes with some tentative policy implications. 
2.2. Colombia in the early 1990s: "Apertura" and a non-tradable boom 
In the early 1990s, the Colombian government under Cesar Gaviria implemented 
an ambitious structural reform program. Among the various reforms, of which 
most were put into effect under the 4 years of the Gaviria administration, the most 
relevant were the so-called "Apertura", which comprised a trade and capital 
account liberalization, and a major public sector reform. Further more moderate 
23 We restrict our analysis to urban areas because of data shortcomings in rural areas, 
e.g. the lack of disaggregation of agricultural activities and of expenditure data, which 
make it impossible to trace the transmission channels of trade liberalization in the 
rural setting. 
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reform efforts include policies to increase domestic competition and a partial labor 
market reform.24 
Colombia's trade reform was announced as a gradual and selective process that 
should have liberalized imports during a five-year period lasting until the end of 
1994. Yet, macroeconomic imbalances forced the administration to change plans 
and the tariff schedule due in 1994 was already adopted in August 1991. The root 
cause of these difficulties was a real appreciation of the peso that undermined the 
government's intention to smooth adjustment to the trade reforms by a monetary 
policy aimed at a real depreciation. Efforts to devalue the peso were contrasted by 
increasing speculations of an appreciation, which were fuelled by the discovery of 
new oil fields. Facilitated by the opening of the capital account, large capital 
inflows and stagnating imports generated a balance of payment surplus that 
entailed international reserves accumulation. This situation created increasing 
difficulties of monetary management and, in September 1991, the government 
took the decision to drastically reduce tariffs almost overnight. Table 2.1 gives 
some indications of the magnitude of the "Apertura": in just a few months, 
nominal average tariffs were reduced from almost 40 percent to about 10 percent 
and the sectoral dispersion of the protection rates also went down, as shown by the 
reduction of the average effective rate from almost 70 percent to just 22 percent. 
Table 2.1: Trade Liberali=ation in Colombia 
Nominal tariff rates % 
Effective rates of protection 
Type of goods \ year % 
1990 /992 1990 1992 
Consumption goods 53 17 109 37 
intermediate inputs 36 10 61 18 
Capital goods 34 10 48 15 
Total 39 12 67 22 
Source: Bussolo and Lay (2005). 
Quantitative restrictions were almost completely eliminated as well. Before 
Gaviria took office, 50 percent of all imports were subject to import licensing; 
only one year later less than 3 percent of imports were still under such a scheme. 
The reduction of import tariffs and quantitative restrictions was complemented 
with other measures including regulatory changes, as anti-dumping and other 
unfair competition, institutional reform, including the creation of a new 
independent Ministry of Foreign Trade, and, finally, the stipulation of international 
trade treaties, as the free trade agreement (FTA) with Venezuela in 1991, the 
contemporary reviving of the Andean Pact, another FT A with Chile in 1993, and 
the Group of3 treaty with Mexico and Venezuela in 1994. 
To evaluate the impact of the trade reform, not only the scale and scope of the 
trade reform itself have to be taken into account, but also additional structural 
reforms as well as the macroeconomic context. The late 80's and the beginning of 
24 See Ocampo (1999) for a detailed description of the reforms. 
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the 90's witnessed a series of other important structural reforms. Many of these 
affected the role of the public sector and regulations, such as central bank 
independence, decentralization, social security and tax reforms, housing policy 
changes, as well as changes in financial sector and port regulations. In addition, 
external liberalization was not restricted to the current account. Foreign exchange 
controls were reduced and capital transactions were liberalized although certain 
restrictions on capital inflows were maintained. Furthermore, public expenditure 
increased substantially in the early 1990s from approx. 30 percent of GDP in 1988 
to 34 percent in 1995. This expansion was largely financed by higher public 
revenues following the mentioned tax reforms. Fluctuations in international prices 
for coffee and oil, which in 1991 accounted for approximately 40 percent of 
Colombian exports, also affected the Colombian economy." Yet, Colombian 
economic performance in the early 1990s, in particular in urban areas, was 
dominated by a consumption boom with aggregate consumption growing by 
almost 10 percent annually between 1992 and 1995. Consumption growth was 
fuelled by capital inflows as well as increased public spending and translated into 
strong growth of the non-tractable economy. In sum, the Colombian economy in 
the early 1990s was characterized by an appreciated exchange rate and a vibrant 
non-tractable economy. 
Although the introduction of the "Apertura" policy package was triggered by 
macroeconomic imbalances, its main objective was to stimulate growth and to 
improve the distribution of income. Growth effects were expected from ( 1) the 
reallocation of resources towards more productive uses according to price signals 
from international markets, (2) increased competition, and (3) technology transfer 
that would be enhanced by increased private capital inflows. Inequality would 
have decreased if unskilled labor had benefited from increased specialization 
towards labor intensive industries. Together, growth and lower inequality would 
have reduced poverty. 
In the macroeconomic context described above, labor reallocation processes 
after trade liberalization were dominated by employment destruction in formerly 
protected sectors and employment creation in non-tractable sectors, particularly in 
informal activities. The driving forces were increased international competition as 
well as the real appreciation. As protection patterns were biased towards labor 
intensive sectors, unskilled labor was affected more by this decline in tractable 
sector employment also putting pressure on unskilled wages. This distributionally 
unfavorable effect was reinforced by skill-biased technological change that is 
likely to be related to trade liberalization and increasing capital inflows. All in all, 
the effects of trade liberalization, which we will analyze in much more detail 
below, did hence not correspond to the expectations. 
25 Between 1991 and 1993, hence during the period of liberalization, coffee prices 
(Arabica prices paid to Colombian growers) declined by approx. 25 percent. Due to a 
frost in Brazil prices more than doubled between January and December 1994. 
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2.3. Capturing the transmission channels: Methodology 
This section describes the microsimulation model that we use to simulate and 
decompose the poverty and distributional impact of trade liberalization. The 
general principle of the model is that, based on a household income generation 
model, individual labor earnings adjust to produce changes in the following 
aggregates: (1) changes in average wages in different wage labor market segments, 
(2) changes in profits from self-employment, (3) changes in employment shares in 
different labor market segments, i.e. the shares of wage-earners, self-employed, 
and inactive individuals per segment. Furthermore, resulting household incomes 
are deflated taking into account (4) changes in food vs. non-food prices. Later, we 
will construct counterfactual scenarios of changes in these aggregate variables that 
we attempt to link to trade liberalization. 
In the microsimulation, we hence model the household income generation 
process.26 This implies that individuals make occupational choices and earn wages 
or profits accordingly. These labor market incomes plus exogenous other incomes, 
such as transfers and imputed housing rents, comprise household income. The 
major advantage of using microsimulation techniques is that the poverty and 
distributional impact of policies, as in reality, will depend on the characteristics of 
the households or even individuals. In other words, the microsimulation takes into 
account both individual and household heterogeneity. Individual heterogeneity 
refers to personal characteristics, which influence occupational choices and 
income generated on the labor market. Occupational choices are subject to a 
number of factors, which include gender, marital status, or age of children. 
Important determinants of labor income are education and experience. Household 
heterogeneity is reflected, for example, in different sources of income and 
demographic composition. Furthermore, the microsimulation captures some 
household heterogeneity in terms of expenditure structure. 
The components of the income generation model are an occupational choice 
and an earnings model. In the choice model, individual agents can choose between 
inactivity, wage-employment, and self-employment." The occupational choice 
model is assumed to be slightly different for household heads, spouses, and other 
family members. Once occupational choices are made, earnings are generated 
accordingly either in the form of wages or as profits for the self-employed. Being 
self-employed means being part of what might be called a "household-enterprise", 
in which all self-employed members of a household pool their incomes. The wage-
employment market is segmented: the wage setting mechanisms are assumed to 
26 The following section borrows from Robilliard et al. (2002). A more detailed 
discussion of a similar labor market specification can be found in Alatas and 
Bourguignon (2005). 
27 Throughout the chapter, we will use self-employment and informal sector 
employment interchangeably; well aware that there are many dimensions of 
informality. 
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differ for skilled and unskilled labor as well as for females and males, which 
implies that there are four wage labor market segments. 
The following set of equations describes the model. Household m has km 
members, which are indexed by i. 
logw =a +x P +e mi g(mi) mi g(mi) mi 
Nm= tlnd[c:<,.n +z,.;a:(mn +u;,; >Sup(o,c;(.,0 +z,,,;a;.,0 +u;J] 







The first equation is a Mincerian wage equation, where the log wage of member 
i of household m depends on his/her personal characteristics. The explanatory 
variables include schooling years, experience, the squared terms of these two 
variables, and a set of regional dummies. This wage equation is estimated for each 
of the four labor market segments. The index function g(mi) assigns individual i in 
household m to a specific labor market segment. The residual term em; describes 
unobserved earnings determinants. 
The second equation represents the profit function of household m. Profits are 
earned if at least one member of the household is self-employed. The profit 
function is of a Mincer type and includes as explanatory variables the schooling of 
the household head, her/his experience plus the squared terms the former two 
variables, and regional dummies. Of course, profits also depend on the number of 
self-employed in household m, Nm, The residual &m captures unobserved effects. 
Household income is defined by the third equation. It consists of the wages and 
profits earned by the household members and an exogenous income Yom, This 
exogenous income corresponds to "other income" in the survey and may include 
government transfers, transfers from abroad, capital income, etc .. !Wm; is a dummy 
variable that equals I if member i of the household is wage-employed and 0 
otherwise. Likewise, profits will only be earned if at least one family member is 
self-employed (N,,;>O). Household income is deflated by a household specific price 
index, which is defined by equation (4). The parameters denotes the expenditure 
shares for food- and non-food. These shares are calculated by household income 
quintiles. Note that the prices Pi for food and Pn/ will be I initially. The index 
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function d(m) indicates to which of the five income brackets household m belongs 
and which food expenditure share is assigned to the household. 
The fifth equation explains the aforementioned dummy !Wm;. The individual 
will be wage-employed if the utility associated with wage-employment is higher 
than the utility of being self-employed or inactive. The utility of being inactive is 
arbitrarily set to zero, whereas the utilities of the employment options depend on a 
set of personal and household characteristics, =mi• These characteristics include 
gender, marital status, education, experience, other income, the educational 
attainments of other household members, and the number of children. Unobserved 
determinants of occupational choices are represented by the residuals. 
Equation (6) gives the number of self-employed. Similar to the choice in 
equation (5), the individual i of household m will prefer self-employment if the 
associated utility is higher than the utility of inactivity or wage-employment. The 
self-employed household members form the "household enterprise" with Nm 
working members. Thus, the last two equations represent the occupational choices 
of the household members. The occupational choice model is estimated separately 
for household heads, spouses, and other household members in urban and rural 
areas. The index function h(mi) assigns the individual to the corresponding group. 
The model just described gives the household income as a non-linear function 
of individual and household characteristics, unobserved characteristics, and the 
household budget shares. This function depends on three sets of parameters, which 
are estimated based on the 1988 survey. These parameters include ( 1) the 
parameters of the wage equation for each labor market segment, (2) the parameters 
of the profit function for "household enterprises", (3) the parameters in the utility 
associated with different occupational choices for heads, spouses, and other family 
members. 
The income generation model requires some comments on the assumptions 
behind its formulation. First of all, despite the availability of data on working time 
we decided to model the occupational choice as a discrete choice.28 Secondly, our 
model assumes that the Colombian labor market is segmented along different 
lines. One line of segmentation separates wage-employment from self-
employment. In a perfectly competitive labor market, the returns to labor would be 
equal for these two types of employment. Yet, segmentation may be justified 
because income from self-employment is likely to contain a rent from non-labor 
assets used, and its clearing mechanism may differ from that of wage employment. 
Information on non-labor assets is not available for Colombia, hence distinct 
equations need to be estimated even if the labor markets were competitive. In 
addition, even in those cases where information on non-labor assets is available, a 
segmented labor market can be justified by the fact that wage-employment may be 
rationed and self-employment thus "absorbs" those who do not get a job in the 
preferred wage work. Wage work could be preferred for generating a more steady 
28 However, estimating wage equations based on hourly wages did not make a major 
difference in the coefficients. 
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income stream or for fringe benefits related to this type of employment. 
Conversely, self-employment might exhibit important externalities, for example 
for households, in which children have to be taken care of. Self-employment of the 
household head may also create employment opportunities for other family 
members. Additional segmentation is assumed within the wage labor market. The 
segmentation hypothesis along the lines of skills and gender is strongly supported 
by the regression results. 
In a first step, the occupational choice model and the wage and profits equations 
are estimated in order to obtain an initial set of coefficients (ac;, /k, bh <5F, CH"', 
aHw, ci, aH') and unobserved characteristics (em;, &m, u"'m;, U5m;).29 The income 
generation model is estimated using data from the Colombian household survey 
from 1988. 30 The estimated benchmark coefficients are then employed and 
changed in the micro-simulation. Unobserved characteristics say for the wage 
equation can of course only be obtained for those who are actually wage-
employed. For self-employed or inactive individuals the unobserved characteristics 
in the wage-equations are randomly drawn from normal distributions with the 
respective estimated error variances. In the same way, we generate unobserved 
characteristics for the profit function for households without a household 
enterprise. As we estimate wage and profit functions using ordinary least squares 
(or 2 SLS), these unobserved characteristics are assumed to be normally 
distributed as well, again with the estimated error variances. Additionally, 
unobserved characteristics (or utility) need to be generated for the occupational 
choice model. In latent utility models, these residuals cannot be observed and are 
hence generated from the distribution underlying the respective model. The 
multinomial choice model assumes that errors follow the Gumbel ( or type I 
extreme value) distribution.' 1 Residuals have to be drawn consistent with the 
observed occupational choice, i.e. the utility an observed wage earner relates to 
29 The occupational choice model was estimated using a multinomial logit. The wage 
equations were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. Correcting for selection bias in 
these equations did not lead to major changes in the results and was hence dropped. In 
the estimation of the profit functions, the number of self-employed was instrumented. 
The estimation results for the wage and profit equations as well as for the 
occupational choice models are reported in App. Table 2.2 and App. Table 2.3. For a 
more detailed discussion of the estimation methods see Bourguignon and Ferreira 
(2005). 
30 The household survey used for estimation of the micro-simulation parameters is the 
Colombian Encuesta Nacional de Hogares from 1988 (EH61). After the removal of 
outliers, removal of individuals with top-coded earnings, and observations with 
missing data the survey covers 29 729 individuals living in 12 092 households in 
urban areas. The household weights are adjusted for the removed observations. The 
expenditure shares are calculated from an income and expenditure survey and 
matched with the EH61 based on household groups, classified according to income 
quintiles. For the problems of these datasets see Nunez and Jimenez ( 1997). 
31 The variance of this distribution is -rr?/6. Train (2003) contains a detailed (and 
accessible) discussion about the distributional assumption oflogit models. 
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wage-employment has to be higher than the utility associated with inactivity or 
self-employment. Statistically, this implies to draw these residuals conditional on 
the observed choice. We apply a method proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier and 
Gurgand ( 1998), who show how to obtain these conditional draws from a Gumbel 
distribution." 
In the simulation, changes in aggregate variables are used as target values. 
Individual earnings and occupational choices change to reach these targets on the 
aggregate level. The required individual changes are obtained by varying 
coefficients in the occupational choice and the earnings models. In other words, 
coefficients are adjusted and occupational choices and earnings change 
accordingly, until the results of the micro-simulation are consistent, at an 
aggregate level, with the given aggregates. Formally, the following constraints 
describe the consistency requirements. Let the right hand side variables describe 
the initial aggregate values, where EG corresponds to the number of wage-
employed, Sc;, the number of self-employed, we;, the sum of wages paid in segment 
G, m·, the sum of profits paid in activity F. "G" stands for the eight labor market 
segments, i.e. urban male skilled and unskilled, urban female skilled and unskilled, 
rural male skilled and unskilled, rural female skilled and unskilled labor. Note that 
A indicates that the coefficients, residuals, and indicator function values result from 
the estimation described above. 
L L 1Wm; = 
m 1,g(mi)=G 
L IInd[c;(nu) + =m,ah(mi) + u::;; > Sup(o,ch(mi) + =miah(mi) + u!,; )]= Ee 
m i,g(mi)=G 
L I1ndlch(m1) + =m,ah(mi) + U~; > Sup(o,ch(mi) + =miah(mi) + u::;, )J= Sc 
m i,g(mi)=G 






32 Another ad-hoc approach would use a random number generator for the Gumbel 
distribution (u=-log(-log(x)) where xis a random draw from a uniform distribution), 
and repeatedly draw residuals until the observed choices correspond to the simulated 
ones. 
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The liberalization shock now produces changes in these aggregates and in the 
price vector. The result is a new vector of these variables, which will be identified 
by an asterisk (E'a, s•a, w •a, rc°). For the above constraints to hold, an appropriate 
vector of coefficients and prices (aa, f3a, b, o, CHw, aHw, ci, aH) is needed. For 
these coefficients, many solutions exist and additional constraints have to be 
introduced. As in Robilliard et al. (2002) our choice is to vary the constants (aa, b, 
cw H, c58 ) and leave the other coefficients unchanged. We hence assume that the 
changes in occupational choices and earnings are dependent on personal and 
household characteristics only to a limited degree. Changing the intercept in one of 
the wage equations implies that all individuals of the respective segment 
experience the same increase in log earnings. This increase does not depend on 
individual characteristics. The same holds for the profit function. Consistency of 
the microsimulation and the new aggregates hence requires the solution of the 
following system of equations. This is the way the microsimulation is "forced" to 
reproduce given changes in aggregate variables. 
L L!Wm; = 
m i,g(mi)=G 
L L lnd[cZ(mi) + =m;lXh(mi) + u;, > Sup(o,cZrmi) + =m/4,(mi) + U~; )]= E; 
m i,g(mi)=G 
(II) 
I: I: lndlcZrmi) + =m;Cll,(mi) + U~; > Sup(o,cZ7mi) + =miah(mi) + u;; )J= s; 
m i,g{mi)=G 
L I:exp(a; +Xm;Pc +em;)I~mi =w; 
m i,g(mi)=G 





Equations (11) and (12) require the number of self-employed and wage-
employed to be consistent with the target values for each of the four segments (G). 
This also holds for the wage equation for each of the segments and the profit 
function, as indicated by equations (13) and (14). Hence, the above system 
contains 13 restrictions. The system has four unknown constants in the wage 
equations, one in the profit function, and 8 in the occupational choice model." 
33 Note that the constants of the occupational choice model - though estimated 
separately for heads, spouses, and others - are changed separately across the four 
labor market segments. Therefore, we have 8 unknown constants in the occupational 
choice model, two occupational choices in each of the four labor market segments. 
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Thus we have 13 unknown constants and 13 equations. We obtain the solution by 
applying standard Gauss-Newton techniques. 
Solving the above system gives us a new set of constants (a•o, b•, c•wH, c••H), 
which is then used to compute occupational choices, wages, and profits. 
Additionally, changes in relative prices of food and non-food items are taken into 
account by deflating the resulting household incomes by household group specific 
price indices. 
Before we turn to the simulations we shortly would like to point to some of the 
shortcomings of the model. First, we just differentiate between formal and 
informal employment defined by being wage- or self-employed. Yet, income 
differences also exist e.g. between manufacturing and personal service sectors and 
these sectoral wage differences are ignored. In addition, self-employment activities 
are very heterogeneous, which is only rudimentarily reflected in the model. An 
interesting extension of the income generation model would hence be to 
differentiate between subsistence-oriented and other self-employment activities. A 
more general second set of drawbacks of the microsimulation is its reliance on one 
cross-section and the assumption of constant behavioral parameters. Choosing the 
constants in the occupational choice and earnings equations to vary is an additional 
rather restrictive assumption. It implies that the within-group wage distribution 
only changes through entry and exit of individuals with certain characteristics and 
not, for example, through changes in returns to education. This may not be 
relevant for unskilled labor, but certainly for skilled labor in the considered period. 
A related third shortcoming regards the use of an occupational choice model, 
which is estimated comparing occupational "states", to simulate occupational 
transition. For example, the simulation makes those women move into 
employment first, who are relatively unlikely to be inactive; these are ceteris 
paribus more educated women. Whether it is the more educated who, in reality, 
move into employment may depend a lot on how the shock impacts on labor 
demand. A final point should be made on the rudimentary nature of the model with 
regard to the expenditure side. Expenditure shares, which are only defined by 
income quintile, are fixed, i.e. substitution is not allowed for. Furthermore, we 
only consider two price indices based on baskets of food and non-food items. 
Household heterogeneity in terms of consumption patterns is hence quite limited. 
2.4. The poverty and distributional impact of"Apertura" 
To set the stage for the following analysis, we examine the composition of income 
of urban households by the sources that we distinguish in our analysis, i.e. wage 
income from unskilled/skilled male/female labor as well as "informal" profits from 
self-employment and exogenous other income. Figure 2.1 shows the composition 
of household income by per capita income vintiles. As expected, informal profits 
constitute the main share of income for the poorer parts of the population. The 
poorest 5 percent of households derive almost half of their income from self-
employment. Unskilled male wage-employment accounts for most of the income 
earned by poorer households, whereas male as well as female skilled wage income 
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is an important income source only for the richest 20 percent of the population. 
Unskilled female wage income is most important for the urban middle class. 
Figure 2.1: Composition of income by source by income vintile 
5 10 




• sk fem wage 
• sk m wage 
a us fem wage 
• us m wage 
The historical scenario: To put the effects of trade liberalization into 
perspective, we construct a historical labor market scenario by comparing the 1988 
and the 1995 survey. In terms of employment composition, the most remarkable 
development in the early 1990s is the sharp increase of self-employment across all 
labor market segments, which for both male unskilled and skilled workers is at the 
expense of wage-employment (Table 2.2). Female labor market participation 
increases considerably, especially in self-employment activities.34 
Table 2.2: Labor force composition in 1988 and 1995 
1988 initial shares 1988-95 point change in shares 
Inactive Wage-work Se/f-empl. Inactive Wage-work Self-empt. 
Unskilled male 6.5 6.5 32.3 -0.3 -5.8 6.1 
Skilled male 7.6 7.6 19.5 0.1 -3.0 2.9 
Unskilled female 64.3 64.3 13.9 -6.8 2.1 4.7 
Skilled female 48.6 48.6 9.3 -2.4 -0.5 2.9 
Total urban 32.5 32.5 17.3 -4.0 0.2 3.8 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: The right panel of the table displays the percentage point change with regard to the 
initial occupational category shares. 
34 Our results are consistent with former studies, although comparability is limited due 
to the different segmentation choices. For an overview of labor market indicators for 
1988 and 1995 see Velez et al. (2005). Ocampo et al. (2000) additionally consider the 
sectoral composition of employment. 
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Unskilled male 40659 2.4 
Skilled male 85 331 6.5 
Unskilled female 30 316 -4.8 
Skilled female 57 272 6.8 
Self-empl. income 44 071 13.0 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Note: the second column shows percent changes. 
Table 2.3 reports (cumulative) income changes by labor market segments 
between 1988 and 1995. For both males and females the wage gap between 
unskilled and skilled labor increases considerably. This increase is more 
pronounced for females, as unskilled female wages even decline, which may also 
be caused by unskilled female entrants in the lower parts of the wage distribution. 
Whereas unskilled male wages grow only slightly in the period under 
consideration, informal profits increase substantially. These historical labor market 
aggregate changes should be interpreted with some caution, as they are just based 
on two surveys. 
We now pass these historical changes in employment and earnings to the 
microsimulation model to test whether the model is adequate to reproduce 
distributional and poverty change. Such an exercise will hence illustrate whether 
there are distributional changes the methodology cannot trace. Overall, this 
validation exercise suggests that the admittedly simple income generation model 
does reasonably well in capturing the forces of distributional change that are 
considered key transmission channels of trade liberalization. 
In Figure 2.2, we plot growth incidence curves of historical (based on the 1988 
and the 1995 household survey) and of simulated per capita income changes. 
Overall, the microsimulation gives lower growth in per capita incomes than could 
be observed historically (see also Table 2.4). This is not too surprising, since 
human and physical capital accumulation is partly ignored in the model. For 
example, the simulation does not reflect the considerable educational expansion 
between 1988 and 1995 that is also reflected in a marked increase in the share of 
skilled labor (App. Table 2.1 ). The distributional effect of this expansion is 
negative, since earnings are highly convex in years of schooling. This convexity 
implies that (wage) inequality increases if educational endowments of every 
individual increase by a constant greater than 1. Actually, the distribution of years 
of schooling became more equal between 1988 and 1995, which could not offset 
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Figure 2.2: Growth incidence curves, real data vs. historical simulation 1988-95 
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Source: Author's calculations. 
the unequalizing effect of higher mean education.36 This also explains why the gap 
between the historical and simulated growth incidence curves widens with rising 
income. Another phenomenon that the simulation does not capture is rural-urban 
migration, which is likely to increase the number of rather young and relatively 
uneducated individuals in urban areas. Despite these shortcomings, the 
microsimulation quite well reflects the structure of distributional change, in 
particular the "steps" in the historical growth incidence curve around the 40th and 
the 75th percentile. Furthermore, it reproduces oscillating income changes in the 
lower parts of the distribution and even traces some of the spikes of the historical 
35 For expositional purposes, we only plot the curves from the 5th to the 95th percentile. 
The entire curves can be found in App. Figure 2.1. For both the lowest and highest 
percentiles there are larger deviations between the simulation and real data. For the 
lowest percentile, the historical data shows a substantial decrease between 1988 and 
1995. In addition, the microsimulation cannot capture the very large per capita 
increases in the highest percentiles. We can only speculate on the extremely high 
negative (for the poor) and positive (for the rich) growth rates found in the historical 
data. While conflict-induced migration of poor migrants into the cities may well be a 
reason for negative growth at the bottom of the distribution, the high growth rates for 
the rich may arise from data deficiencies. For 1995 we have to drop 80 observations 
due to top-coding, while for 1988 the number amounts to 122, with roughly the same 
sample size. Despite our efforts to adjust the household weights for dropped 
observations, this might explain part of the observed increase. Although this merits 
further investigation it is not crucial to the question examined here. 
36 For details see Velez et al. (2005) and the summary chapter in Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
and Lustig (2005a). 
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growth incidence curve. Yet, the differences between the "real" and the simulated 
historical scenario are also reflected in the aggregate indicators reported in Table 
2.4 . The relatively pronounced differences in poverty reduction are mainly due to 
the failure of the microsimulation to capture the spike in the "real" growth 
incidence curve around the 30th percentile. Whereas the Gini-Index remains 
constant in the microsimulation, the survey data shows a considerable increase. In 
the microsimulation, the positive distributional impact of increasing informal 
profits and increasing female labor market participation hence compensate the 
negative effects of a rising wage-gap and increasing informality. In reality, 
educational expansion and very high growth rates of incomes in the highest ten 
percentiles, which the microsimulation fails to capture (or which may partly be due 
to data deficiencies), dominate distributional outcomes. 











Source: Author's calculation. 
% point change in index 
Poverty Inequality 
PO PI P2 Gini Theil 
60.4 26.S 14.9 39.9 46.7 
-6.8 -4.2 -2.7 32 
-3.8 -2.3 -I 4 0.0 -0.1 
While the above historical scenario reflects all policy changes and shocks, the 
following discussion intends to evaluate employment and earnings changes 
attributable to trade liberalization. We review existing evidence that we 
complement by own descriptive survey-based evidence. First, we consider 
liberalization-induced changes in the employment structure, i.e. employment 
creation or destruction and associated increases/decreases in unemployment or 
employment shifts between formal and informal activities. We then discuss 
earnings changes. 
The impact of trade liberalization varied considerably across sectors. According 
to Ocampo (1999), light manufacturing, such as apparel and leather, was mainly 
hurt through the real appreciation, whereas heavy manufacturing faced strong 
import competition. This competitive effect was reinforced again by the 
appreciation. The contraction in the manufacturing sectors also translated into a 
reduction of wage-employment and hence to informalization." In light 
manufacturing, informal female employment shrank massively, which is very 
likely to reflect job losses for self-employed women who are sub-contracted for 
work at home in the leather and apparel sector. The data however suggests that 
these job losses have not been associated with an increase in unemployment, in 
line with findings by Attanasio et al. (2004). The losses of wage-employment in 
37 See the changes in the sectoral composition of employment by labor market segment 
reported in App. Table 2.4. 
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manufacturing were hence compensated either by employment creation in other 
sectors, mainly in services, and increased informal employment. As the share of 
informal employment increases in the sectors that are affected by trade 
liberalization, the informal sector hence partly functions as a within-industry labor 
sink, a view supported empirically by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). There is no 
evidence of employment creation in export-oriented sectors. 
Whereas urban sectoral employment changes can be linked to trade reform 
reasonably well, determining the order of magnitude of earnings changes in 
different labor market segments that are due to the reform is more challenging. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and Attanasio et al. (2004) find trade reforms to be 
associated with an increase in wage inequality. Among other things, this increase 
is caused by decreasing industry wage premia in unskilled-labor intensive sectors 
caused by relatively large tariff cuts in those sectors. Unfortunately, Attanasio et 
al. (2004) do not report the relative importance of these premia in wages, but some 
own exploratory regressions (not reported) suggest that they are of minor 
quantitative importance. Hence, even if trade policy changes have a significant 
(unequalizing) effect on industry wage premia, the effect on the wage distribution 
may be rather small. The final impact on the distribution of per capita incomes is 
then likely to be even negligible. On the contrary, a major force behind increasing 
inequality is the increasing wage-gap between unskilled and skilled labor, whose 
negative distributional impact is reinforced by the unequal expansion of 
educational endowments. According to Attanasio et al. (2004), the increasing skill 
premium is primarily driven by skill-biased technological change. In how far the 
skill bias can be ascribed to trade reform is less clear, but there is evidence that the 
sectors with the largest reductions in tariffs were those with the sharpest increase 
in the share of skilled labor." Another source of the increasing wage-gap that can 
be more closely related to trade reform is the relative shift in labor demand due to 
sectoral reallocations. Contracting manufacturing sectors use unskilled labor more 
intensively, as illustrated in App. Table 2.6. 
In order to judge the impact of trade reform on relative wages, it is also 
instructive to consider other factors that have affected the supply and demand for 
unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. One important factor certainly was the 
boom in non-tradables. The sectors that most benefited from this boom were 
construction, as well as financial, government, and telecommunication services 
( Ocampo 1999). This suggests that the associated pattern of labor demand growth 
may have been slightly biased towards skilled wage labor. Yet, the strong increase 
in informal profits due to the boom should have had an indirect positive effect on 
unskilled wages. Overall, the non-tradables boom is hence likely to have affected 
the wage distribution rather positively. Furthermore, educational expansion, in 
contrast to its negative "endowment effect", should have an equalizing effect on 
relative wages through increasing the supply of skilled labor. In sum, other factors 
38 Compared to most other sectors, we also find a relatively strong increase in the share 
of skilled labor in manufacturing sectors. App. Table 2.6. 
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beyond trade liberalization and technological change thus tend to have an 
equalizing effect on the wage-distribution. 
Finally, we shortly provide evidence on relative goods price changes in the 
period under consideration. Between 1988 and 1995, nominal food (non-food) 
prices increased by a factor of 4.4 (5.1).39 When the relative price between food 
and non-food items is assumed to be 1 in the base period, this roughly gives a 
relative price decrease of 15 points. While prices for non-tradable food crops 
increased in the early 1990s, prices for importables decreased substantially and 
imports of cereals, cereal products, soy beans, and fruits surged (Jaramillo 2001). 
Trade liberalization is hence very likely to explain most of the relative price 
decrease of foodstuff. 
Starting from the above discussion, we now simulate "opening-up" 
counterfactual income distributions based on five different labor market and 
relative price change scenarios. More specifically, we first illustrate the poverty 
and distributional impact of trade-induced in formalization, and examine the role of 
increasing informal profits in cushioning possible adverse effects of this process. 
We then attempt to quantify the impact of the increasing skilled-unskilled wage-
gap. Finally, we assess the role ofrelative price changes. 
The simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 2.5 and the corresponding 
changes in poverty and distributional indicators are reported in Table 2.6. In all the 
simulations, we chose to approximate the trade-induced losses in wage-
employment by the losses in manufacturing wage-employment (reported in App. 
Table 2.4). As there is no indication of significant employment creation due to 
trade liberalization, labor market participation does not change in the simulations. 
As regards the effect of trade liberalization on relative wages, the above discussion 
demonstrates the difiiculties of constructing a trade counterfactual. Yet, the main 
unequalizing forces at work, i.e. sectoral growth patterns and technological 
change, can at least partly be attributed to trade liberalization. This is whJ we 
approximate trade-induced changes in wage inequality by historical changes. 'The 
income growth rates are chosen such that per capita growth would be equal across 
the simulations if there were no shifts between formal and informal employment. 
In other words, would we increase only wage labor incomes and informal profits 
by the rates given in Table 2.5, we would have the same per capita growth in Sim 
II to Sim IV. The benchmark growth rate was computed from Sim IV. 
39 Information on changes in consumer prices by commodity groups from the Banco de 
la Republica (www.banrep.org) and on index-weights from the Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) at www.dane.gov.co. 
40 Whether general technological change, which would have taken place with or without 
external liberalization, was the major factor is of course an open question. Yet, we 
find this unlikely in the time horizon under consideration. More precisely, we could 
say that the historical worsening of the wage distribution represent a lower bound of a 
"trade-cum-technological-change" scenario. 
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Table 2.5: Oveniiew of simulation scenarios 
II Uskm Skm Uskf Sk/1 
I Relfood 
Profits , f!.rice 
% point change in wage-
employment share (the -2.9 -1.2 -3.3 0.0 
same across all sims) 
Simi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.00 
%change in Sim II 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 1.00 Sim Ill 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 13.0 1.00 wages/profits Sim JV 2.4 6.5 -4.8 6.8 13.0 1.00 
Sim V 2.4 6.5 -4.8 6.8 13.0 0.86 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Table 2.6: Poverty and distributional simulation results 
_J % point change in index Per capita Poverty Inequality income PO Pl P2 Gini Theil 
Initial 21899.6 60.4 26.S 14.9 39.9 46.7 
Historical sim 7.3 -3.8 -2.3 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 
Simi -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Sim II 4.8 -2.3 -1.3 -0.8 0.2 0.2 
Sim Ill 4.9 -2.4 -1.4 -0.9 0.1 0.1 
Sim IV 5.3 -2.1 -1.2 -0.8 0.5 0.8 
Sim V 4.5 -2.2 -1.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Author's calculations. 
In Sim I, we assess the impact of increasing informality by simulating an 
increase in self-employment while keeping average income from all sources 
constant. The simulated increase implies a per capita income decrease, as 
individuals move into employment with lower average earnings. The headcount 
index almost remains constant, but the poverty gap indicator increases by 0.4 
percentage points. The increase in self-employment hence slightly causes the 
intensity of poverty to rise. The income losses in lower income groups also explain 
why inequality increases somewhat. By how much earnings decline due to 
becoming informal depends on individual characteristics. Yet, not only do the 
returns to individual characteristics change when an individual moves into 
informality. The move also involves an absolute income loss, which in relative 
terms becomes more important the poorer the household is. In addition, poorer 
individuals are more likely to move into informality. These three factors explain 
the worrisome decrease of per capita incomes in the lowest parts of the income 
distribution in this simulation. 
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While in Sim II all income sources grow by the same rate, Sim III takes into 
account the differential growth rates between wage and self-employment income 
(abstracting from the rising unskilled-skilled wage gap). Aggregate indicators 
remain virtually unchanged between the two simulations. Comparing the resulting 
growth incidence curves in App. Figure 2.2 gives a more nuanced picture. The 
comparison shows that the income losses in the lower parts of the distribution are 
somewhat lower but persist, i.e. for households with very low incomes the income 
losses due to higher self-employment cannot be compensated by higher self-
employment income. Overall however, the distribution of income growth between 
self-employment and wage-employment matters surprisingly little in terms of 
poverty and distributional outcome. 
In Sim IV, wages grow at the observed historical rates instead of equal rates, as 
in Sim III. Per capita income growth is 0.4 points higher in this simulation, as 
higher incomes grow at higher rates. At the same time, poverty reduction is lower 
and inequality increases quite considerably. Among the poor, income for 
households close to the poverty line declines most, as implied by the less 
pronounced differences in Pl and P2. These households are hit most by the 
dramatic decline in female unskilled wages. Overall, the isolated poverty impact of 
the increasing wage inequality does not seem to be too pronounced. Yet, the 
increase of inequality is quite substantial. This appears even more worrisome, as 
the simulation does neither account for educational expansion nor for increasing 
wage-inequality among skilled labor that is behind the extreme increase of per 
capita incomes in the highest vintile of the income distribution. 
Interesting insights can also be gained from comparing Sim IV and the 
historical simulation. These two simulations only differ in occupational choice 
changes. We know from the above discussion that an increase in informality does 
not have major distributional implications (except for the lower parts of the 
distribution). Increasing female labor market participation hence explains most of 
the striking differences in outcomes between these two simulations.41 Per capita 
income is significantly higher and inequality remains constant in the historical 
simulation. Increased female labor market participation, which cannot be linked to 
trade liberalization, hence plays an extremely important role in cushioning the 
negative distributional implications of increasing wage-inequality. 
Sim V adds changes in relative goods prices to Sim IV. The decrease of food 
vis-a-vis non-food prices eliminates the negative distributional impact of higher 
informality and increasing wage inequality. The comparison of the growth 
incidence curves of Sim IV and Sim V (App. Table 2.6) shows that the implied 
real income loss for households in the highest two deciles amounts to approx. 2 
percentage points in growth, while the poorest 40 percent gain around I percentage 
point. The effects on aggregate poverty indicators are rather small. 
41 Velez et al. (2005) also find female labor market entry among poor households to be a 
strongly equalizing force on per capita incomes. 
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The quantitative assessment of the poverty and distributional impacts suggests that 
trade liberalization had minor effects on urban poverty, but increased inequality 
quite considerably. We show that reform-induced impacts on employment and 
earnings were unequalizing, whereas changes in relative goods prices worked 
relatively in favor of poorer households. In addition, increasing inequalities were 
cushioned or exacerbated by factors not related to trade reform. More specifically, 
we find the following effects and interactions. 
• The poverty and distributional effects of increasing informality that can be 
linked to trade reform appear to be rather small, although the implied increase 
in inequality and the strong income losses among very poor groups are reasons 
for concern. 
• The increasing unskilled-skilled wage-gap has major negative distributional 
implications lowering considerably the poverty reduction potential of growth. 
• The positive distributional impact of changes in relative prices for consumer 
goods is relatively strong. The magnitude is comparable to the one of 
increasing wage inequalities. 
• Two factors related to the non-tractable boom, increasing female labor market 
participation as well as an increase in informal profits, played an important role 
in cushioning the possible adverse labor market effects of trade liberalization, 
in particular for the very poor. 
The described impacts can be observed in a relatively short time horizon of 
approximately 5 years. The question of whether trade liberalization is conducive to 
long-run growth and poverty reduction remains unresolved empirically. Cross-
country evidence is inconclusive" and in single country studies it is equally 
difficult to establish causality between trade policy and long-run economic 
performance. We do not attempt to assess this question for the Colombian case. 
Yet, the knowledge of medium-term adjustments and their distributional impacts 
that we have considered in this chapter are important at least for two reasons: First, 
if trade liberalization leads to increasing inequalities, this increase might well be 
permanent and socially undesirable." Second, the observed adjustment could 
provide important insights for designing trade policy reforms, in particular their 
timing and sequencing, and possible complementary policies. 
Colombia already has a very unequal distribution of income. The increase in 
inequality related to trade liberalization implies that in the future even higher 
average growth rates will be needed to achieve the same reductions in poverty. 
Yet, we do not believe that this is reason enough to abandon liberalization 
altogether. Our analysis has shown that the main source of the inequality increase 
is not a decline in the incomes of poorer households, but rather a considerable 
increase in the incomes of the rich. There is hence room for redistributional 
42 See e.g. Edwards (1998), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Yanikkaya (2003). 
43 Whether this increase has only been temporary, as in the case of Chile (Ferreira and 
Litchfield 1999), is an interesting question for further research on Colombia. 
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policies to ensure that the gains of trade liberalization are more equally distributed. 
We do not think that "static redistribution" through the tax and transfer system is 
desirable, but suggest that policy-makers should focus on "dynamic 
redistribution", in particular through the reallocation of resources in education. 
The guiding principle of educational reform should be to ensure that labor supply 
can adjust to the increasing wage gap between unskilled and skilled labor, thereby 
enabling the poorer parts of the population to grasp the opportunities created by 
trade liberalization. 
There are also more general lessons to be learnt from the Colombian 
experience. One such lesson is that the macroeconomic context matters. In the 
Colombian case, a thriving domestic economy lowered the adjustment costs of 
trade liberalization in income distribution terms, as employment creation in non-
tradable sectors compensated for employment destruction in import-competing 
sectors. It is of course unclear whether liberalization would have created jobs in 
export sectors had there not been a domestic boom associated with a real 
appreciation. Yet, it is unlikely that these jobs would have been created as fast as 
jobs in import-competing sectors were destroyed. From a policy perspective, 
overall domestic economic performance should hence be taken into account when 
decisions on the speed of liberalization are taken.44 
44 See Falvey and Kim (1992) for a survey of timing and sequencing issues in trade 
liberalization. 
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2.6.1. Additional figures 
App. Figure 2. 1: Complete growth incidence curves, real data vs. historical 
simulation 1988-95 
"?f.o 














0 W ¼ W W 100 
Cwnulative population ranked by per capita income 
1--- 88 vs. 95 survey - - - - - Historical simulation 
Source: Author's calculations. 








0 w ¼ w w 
Cwnulative population ranked by per capita income 
1--- Sim II ----- Simm! 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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App. Figure 2.3: Growth incidence curves, simulations IV and V 
0 w ¼ ~ w 
Cumulative population ranked by per capita income 
1--- Sim IV ----- SimV I 
Source: Author's calculations. 
2.6.2. Additional tables 
100 
App. Table 2./: Composition of the labor force by gender and skill 
1988 1995 
Unskilled Male 43.5 36.8 
Skilled Male 21.2 23.9 
Unskilled Female 20.9 20.3 
Skilled Female 14.4 19.0 
Source: Author's calculations. 
COLOMBIA 
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APPENDICES 
App. Table 2.2: Estimation results of wage equations and profit function 
Wage 
unsk male unskfem sk male 
Years of schooling 
0.036 -0.092 0.045 
(0.012)*** -0.105 (0.018)** 
Years of schooling 0.003 0.009 0.003 
squared (0.001 ) ... (0.004) .. (0.001)** 
Experience 
0.047 0.063 0.037 
(0.002)* .. (0.004)*•• (0.004) ... 
Experience squared 
-0.001 -0.001 0.000 
(0.000)'** (0.000)*** (0.000)• .. 
Education head 
Experience head 
Experience squared head 
Number of self-employed 
Constant 
9.314 9.956 9.041 
(0.050)* .. (0.690) ... (0.080)• .. 
Observations 6316 3100 2750 
R-squared 0.22 0.43 0.18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at I% 
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App. Table 2.3: Estimation results of the choice models, average marginal effects 
heads spouses 
wage- self- wage- self-
inactive employed employed inactive employed employed 
Male 
-0.271 0.149 0.123 -0.564 0.423 0.141 
(0 015)* .. (0 016)••· (0.013)••· (0 038)••· (0 047)••· (0.058)••· 
Married 
-0.01 I 0.061 -0.050 -0019 0.032 -0.014 
-0.008 (0011 )••· (0.010)••· -0.009 (0.011 )* (0.013)••· 
Years of schooling 
0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 0.021 -0011 
(0.003)••· -0.005 -0.005 (0.005)•• (0.006)* (0.007)••· 
Years of schooling squared 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 -0004 0.003 0.001 
(0.000)* .. (0 000)••· 0.000 (0.000)••· (0.000)••· (0.000)••• 
Experience(age-years of -0.006 -0004 0.010 0.014 -0.023 0.009 
schooline-6) (0.001 )••· (0 002)** (0.002)••· (0.002)••· (0 001 )••· (0.002)••· 
Experience squared 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000)••· (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)* .. (0.000)* 0 (0.000)*** 
Individual other income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(source not soecified) (0.0001••· (0.0001••· (0 0001•• coooo1•• 0.000 0.000 
No. of adult males in hh 0.017 -0.001 -0.016 0.003 -0.055 0.053 
without education -0.014 -0.027 -0.024 -0.018 (0.028)* (0.025)** 
No. of adult females in hh 0.020 -0.055 0.035 -0.050 -0.010 0.060 
without education (0.01 I)* (0.020)••· (0.019)* -0.034 (0.036)* -0.018 
No. ofadult males in hh with 0.019 -0.003 -0.016 -0.042 -0.013 0.055 
primary education (0 004)••· -0.009 (0 009)* (0.01 I)••• (0.007)* (0 012)••· 
No. of adult females in hh 0.005 0.021 -0.026 0.053 -0.002 -0.051 
with orimary education -0.004 (0008)** (0.008)••· (0.0121••· (0013)••· -0009 
No. of adult males with 0.015 -0.009 -0006 -0.041 -0.017 0.058 
secondarv education (0.003)••· -0.007 -0006 (0.006)••· (0.009) ... (0.008)••· 
No. of adult females with 0.010 0.004 -0014 -0002 -0004 0.006 
secondarv education (0.003} ... -0.006 (0.006)** -0.006 -0.009 -0009 
No. of adult males with high 0.006 -0.010 0.003 0.019 0.007 -0.026 
education -0.006 -0.01 I -0011 -0.012 -0.008 (0.010)** 
No. of adult females with 0.001 -0.015 0.014 -0.002 -0.024 0.026 
hieh education -0005 -0.010 -0.010 (0.013)* -001 I (0016)* 
No. of elderly males in hh -0.047 0. 132 -0.085 0.075 -0.010 -0.066 
without education (0.019)** (0.047)••· (0.042)** -0.059 -0.067 -0081 
No. of elderly females in hh -0.030 0.010 0.019 0.040 -0.101 0.061 
without education (0.016)* -0.033 -0.031 (0.053)* -0.050 -0 035 
No. of elderly males in hh -0.026 -0.034 0.060 0.035 -0.031 -0004 
with orimarv education (0.014)* -0.027 (0.026)** -0.023 -0037 -0.034 
No. of elderly females in hh 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.049 0.041 0.008 
with orimarv education -0.008 -0.020 -0.018 (0.024)* (0.028)* -0.019 
No. of elderly males in hh -0.037 0.052 -0.015 0.109 -0.067 -0.042 
with hieh education -0.023 -0.041 -0036 (0.043)** (0.039)* (0.023)* 
No. of elderly males with 0.021 -0.077 0.056 0.122 -0.170 0.048 
secondarv or hieher -0.019 -0.047 -0.044 (0.034)••· (0 066)••· -0.053 
No. of children aged Oto 9 
0.002 -0.008 0.006 0.035 -0.004 -0.030 
-0.002 (0.004)** -0.004 (0.005)••· -0003 (0.005)••· 
No. of children aged 10 to 18 
-0.004 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.010 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.004 (0.005)** -0003 -0 005 
Wage income of household 0.000 0.000 0.000 
head (0.0001**• 0.000 (0.000)* .. 
Observations 12092 8334 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1865 0.0988 
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inactive em(?loyed em(?loyed 
Male 
0.237 -0.320 0.083 
(0.012!*** (0.008)'" (0.011)"' 
Married 
-0005 0.130 -0.125 
-0.012 (0.018)"' (0.020)"' 
Years of schooling 
-0013 0.012 0.001 
(0.007)' (0.006)" -0.004 
Years of schooling squared 
0.000 -0001 0.001 
0.000 (0.000)** (0000)" 
Experience(age-yean of 0.011 0.019 -0.030 
schooling-6! (0.002)'" (0.002)*" (0 001)*" 
Experience squared 
0.001 0.000 0000 
(0.000)'" (0.000)*** (0.000)'** 
Individual other income 0.000 0.000 0.000 
{source not sl!ecified! 0.000 (0.000)"' (0.000)'" 
No. of adult males in hh -0.012 -0 007 0.019 
without education -0.013 -0.022 -0.019 
No. of adult females in hh 0.006 0.002 -0.007 
without education -0.019 -0020 -0.012 
No. of adult males in hh with 0.025 -0018 -0.007 
(!rima!l education (0.007)" -0.004 (0.006)"* 
No. of adult females in hh 0.006 0.014 -0.021 
with (?rima!l education (0.005)"* (0 008)' -0.007 
No. of adult males with -0.006 -0.026 0.032 
seconda!J: education (0.006)**" -0.005 (0 006)'"' 
No. of adult females with 0.015 0.000 -0.015 
seconda!J: education (0.004)"' -0005 (0.006)" 
No. of adult males with high 0.005 -0040 0.035 
education (0.01 I)*" (0.01 I)*" -0.008 
No. of adult females with -0.039 0.032 0.007 
high education -0.007 (0 01 I)*" (0.011)'" 
No. of elderly males in hh -0075 0.035 0.040 
without education -0.041 (0.013)"' -0039 
No. of elderly females in hh -0.012 -0 01 I 0.023 
without education -0.037 -0 023 -0.032 
No. of elderly males in hh 0.032 0.016 -0.048 
with l!rima!l education -0.025 (0.027)' -0.016 
No. of elderly females in hh -0.016 0.001 0.015 
with j!rima!l education -0.018 -0.020 -0.012 
No. of elderly males in hh -0.004 -0.005 0.010 
with high education -0.040 -0.027 -0.041 
No. of elderly males with -0.096 0.010 0.086 
seconda!J: or higher -0029 (0.042)" (0.047)' 
No. of children aged O to 9 
0.009 0.006 -0.014 
(0.003)' (0.005)'" (0.004)" 
No. of children aged 10 to 18 
0.001 0.006 -0.007 
(0.003)" -0.004 (0.004)' 
Wage income of household 0.000 0.000 0.000 
head 0.000 (0.000)" (0.000)'" 
Observations 9303 
Pseudo R-squared 0. 1345 
Standard errors in parentheses 
• significant at IO¾; •• significant at 5%; ••• significant at I% 
Jann Lay - 978-3-631-75365-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:52:47AM
via free access
50 COLOMBIA 
App. Table 2.4: Percentage point changes in sectoral employment composition, 
urban labor force, /988-95 
unskilled male skilled male unskilled female skilled female Total 
waee self wa2e self wae:e self wae:e self wae.e self all 
agr -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 1.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.4 
min -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
lif(ht man -0.3 0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -4.2 -0.2 -1.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.9 
heal' man -1.0 0.7 -0.3 0.7 -2.2 0.3 1.0 1.2 -1.0 0.7 -0.7 
Ulil -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 
COn.\'l I.I 9.1 I.I 4.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.7 -0.1 4.4 1.2 -,-~~d~-~;;,--- -5.8 2.8 0.5 ... 2.0 1.8 ···· is - -3.4 0.8 0.8 -7.1 -0.8 
trans 0.6 3.4 -0.3 9.1 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.4 2.7 0.6 
---- ---- -~ -------- -----------
comm 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 
fin 0.8 o~_ -2.4 -1.8 -I.I 0.2 -0.9 -3.7 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 ·------ ---- --·-·-·--· -----·----
pub -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 
oth serv 0.6 -8.1 0.3 -6.2 4.1 2.7 -0.2 2.4 2.1 -4.2 0.3 
Source: Author's calculations. 
App. Table 2.5: Shares of manufacturing wage-employment across labor market 
segments 
1988 1995 point diff 
Unskilled Male 21.6 18.8 -2.9 
Skilled Male 20.1 18.9 -1.2 
Unskilled Female 23.4 20.0 -3.3 
Skilled Female 14.5 14.6 0.0 
Total Urban 20.7 18.3 -2.4 
Source: Author's calculations. 
App. Table 2.6: Sectoral shares of wage-employment and skill intensity (wage-
employment, 1988 and 1995 
I Share in employment Skilled labor share % point 
1988 1995 1988 1995 diff. %diff. 
agr 1.7 1.2 30.0 36.8 6.8 22.6 
min 0.5 0.4 47.1 54.8 7.7 16.4 
light man 17.3 16.4 28.4 35.6 7.2 25.4 
heavman 10.5 9.5 34.8 47.1 12.3 35.4 
util 1.2 11 53.9 63.3 9.4 17.5 
canst 6.8 6.7 16.8 24.8 8.1 48.3 
trade rest 20.3 21.8 39.5 50.6 Ill 28.0 
trans 5.8 5.4 28.1 32.8 4.8 17.0 
comm 0.6 0.9 70.7 71.1 0.4 0.6 
fin 8.7 8.5 61.6 66.1 4.6 7.4 
pub 5.4 4.6 61.8 78.2 16.4 26.5 
othserv 21.4 23.5 48.1 54.7 6.6 13.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 40.0 ·48.9 8.8 22.0 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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3. Resource booms, inequality, and poverty: The case of gas in 
Bolivia 
3.1. Introduction 
In principle, countries richly endowed with natural resources, may it be fertile soils 
or mineral resources, should be able to prosper and overcome poverty faster than 
resource-poor countries. Yet, the experience of many resource-rich countries 
illustrates that this is not necessarily the case. Often, resource-rich countries go 
through boom and bust cycles that finally leave them poorer than resource-poor 
countries with similar initial conditions. Through a number of different channels 
resource wealth may negatively affect economic development." In many instances, 
tradable sectors become uncompetitive and shrink excessively because export 
revenues are consumed quickly rather than invested. This can be particularly 
harmful for economic development, as these sectors, especially manufacturing, are 
believed to exhibit important positive externalities, whereas resource sectors are 
often said to have an enclave character with few spillovers to the rest of the 
economy. In addition to hampering economic development, wealth and income in 
resource-dependent economies tend to be distributed very unequally, as resource 
rents typically benefit a small privileged group. As a more unequal distribution of 
income results in a lower rate of poverty reduction for a given growth rate, it is 
therefore unlikely that resource-rich countries achieve pro-poor growth, i.e. a 
growth pattern from which the poor benefit disproportionately, without deliberate 
interventions in favor of the poor. 
There is an extensive empirical literature on the "resource curse" and the 
channels through which it operates. Starting with Sachs and Warner (1997), many 
authors have confirmed that resource-rich countries actually grow more slowly 
than resource-poor countries using cross-country growth regressions. Yet, the 
impact of resource booms (and busts) on economic development and poverty as 
well as the transmission channels depend on both country and resource 
characteristics. Therefore, quite some country case studies have been undertaken, 
which have sharpened our understanding of how the resource curse works. Some 
of these studies, for example the collection in Auty (200 I), have focused on the 
impact of resource wealth on long-term development, whereas other studies have 
rather looked at the short to medium run economic impact of a resource boom or 
bust. The studies in Gelb et al. (1988) examine the economic impact of the oil 
windfalls in the late 1970s on a number of oil-exporting developing economies. 
These case studies focus on relative price effects, related sectoral shifts, in 
particular the performance of agriculture, and the fiscal response, especially public 
investment programs. The case studies included in Collier and Gunning (1999a 
and 1999b) centre on the savings response of public and private agents when faced 
with trade shocks. 
45 See Auty (2001) and Lay and Omar Mahmoud (2004) for surveys of the literature on 
the resource curse. 
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The present chapter examines one particular resource shock, namely the gas 
boom Bolivia experienced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Following the studies 
in Gelb et al. (1988), we analyze the sectoral shifts and the fiscal response to the 
gas shock in the short to medium run. In contrast to these studies, our focus is on 
the poverty and distributional effects of the shock. We consider some of our 
findings to be of relevance to poor resource-rich countries with similar structural 
characteristics. The central question is whether the gas boom really bypasses large 
parts of the (poor) population in Bolivia, thereby leading to increasing inequalities 
in an already very unequal society. We examine the transmission channels through 
which the large resource inflows related to the gas boom, both initial foreign 
investment in the sector and the subsequent export earnings, as well as large public 
transfer programs (that may well be interpreted as a means of redistributing 
resource rents) affect the distribution of income. In doing so, we focus on general 
equilibrium effects and the corresponding labor market impacts, in particular on 
shifts in formal vs. informal employment and changes in relative factor prices. 
These transmission channels seem to be particularly relevant, as direct 
employment effects of the resource boom are virtually absent. 
To address these issues adequately, we propose a modeling framework that 
captures the structural features of the Bolivian economy and allows us to trace the 
poverty and distributional implications of the resource-boom-induced changes on 
the labor market. The framework therefore consists of a multi-sectoral computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model that is combined with a microsimulation model. 
The CGE model allows us to construct counterfactual scenarios to disentangle the 
effects of the gas boom from other shocks that the Bolivian economy experienced 
at the same time and to trace the transmission channels at work at the 
macroeconomic level. Changes in important factor market aggregates from the 
CGE model, more specifically changes in relative factor prices and in the 
workforce composition in terms of formal and informal sector employment, are 
then passed on to a microsimulation model. The microsimulation model is based 
on an income generation model estimated on household survey data and produces 
a counterfactual income distribution given the CGE model results. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first part provides an 
overview of the scope and scale of the gas boom that began to shape the Bolivian 
economy in the late 1990s and a first broad assessment of its macroeconomic 
impact. It also motivates the counterfactual simulations of the second part. There, 
we first describe our methodological framework and then present our results. The 
final section concludes. 
3.2. The gas boom and other resource shocks 
We consider Bolivia a particularly interesting case for the following reasons. It is 
the poorest country of South America with a long history of resource-induced 
booms and busts, and quite some observers have argued that the country's resource 
wealth is the root cause of its poverty (e.g. Auty and Evia 2001). The structural 
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reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have been associated with some growth, but that 
growth has not done the job of lifting large parts of the population out of poverty 
in an economy with a highly unequal distribution of income, although poverty has 
been reduced somewhat in the course of the 1990s. 
Bolivia's economy has always been and still is highly dependent on natural 
resources. In the 1990s, hydrocarbons and minerals have typically accounted for 
roughly 50 percent of exports and the hydrocarbons sector contributes significantly 
to public revenues. In the second half of the 1990s, huge investments have been 
undertaken in the gas sector to explore and exploit Bolivia's vast gas reserves. 
Recent reserve additions have turned Bolivia into the second largest gas reserve 
holder in Latin America only after Venezuela. A new gas pipeline to Brazil went 
into operation in 1999 through which the bulk of Bolivia's gas exports run today, 
and gas exports are expected to increase further in the following years. 
The gas shock can be split into three important components: first, the huge 
investment into the gas sector between 1997 and 2003, most of which was foreign 
direct investment; second, the gas exports through the new pipeline to Brazil; and 
third, the government take of the gas rents. Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of 
these components as a share of GDP in the 1990s. Investments in the gas sector 
reached about IO percent of GDP in the peak years 1998 and 1999. Unfortunately, 
more recent figures beyond 2001 are not available. Figure 3.1 also shows the 
phasing out of gas exports to Argentina in the course of the 1990s and the gas 
exports to Brazil, which started in 1999. By 2003, gas exports to Brazil accounted 
for almost 8 percent of GDP, as they had reached the contracted volume, which 
under the current contract is going to be roughly constant until 2019. In addition, 
gas exports to Argentina are likely to rise again, as new contracts were signed in 
2005. Exports will thus mainly fluctuate due to fluctuations in gas prices, which 
are linked to a basket of international energy prices.46 Numbers on the government 
take from the gas sector are difficult to obtain. Here, we draw on a study by the 
Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) (2002) of UNDP 
and World Bank, which places the government take in 2001 at more than 4 percent 
of GDP. According to the Ley de Hidrocarburos from 1996, the government take 
comprises royalties, a profit tax and a tax on remittances abroad, which is why the 
government take cannot be easily calculated from publicly available budgetary 
publications. 
46 This of course only holds if both Brazil and Bolivia comply with the signed contract. 
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Figure 3. 1: Major gas-related resource flows in percent of GDP, 1990-2003 
--Gas exports 
--Mneral and rretal exports 
- - • • lnvestrrent in gas exploration and explo~ation 
- Upstream governrrent take from the gas sector 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: Data on GDP, exports, and investment in gas exploration and exploitation from 
INE. Upstream government take from the gas sector is from a study of the joint 
UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) 
(2002). The government take includes royalties, patents, and taxes on profits. Values 
for 2003 are preliminary. 
The gas boom was arguably the biggest but not the only significant external 
shock. The Bolivian economy was hit by an adverse terms of trade shock in the 
late 1990s, which comprised falling prices for exports of the four major metals 
zinc, gold, tin and silver. These shocks together with a further expansion of 
soybean production in the Bolivian lowlands had a major impact on the 
composition of Bolivian exports in the second half of the 1990s and the early 
2000s (Figure 3.2). Hydrocarbon exports rose steeply from less than 10 percent to 
more than 30 percent of total exports over the period 1999-2004, as did soy and 
soy derivatives exports from 5 percent in 1990 to more than 20 percent in 2004. 
By contrast, exports of minerals and metals experienced quite some decline from 
well above 40 percent in the early 1990s to about 20 percent in 2004. On balance, 
the already high degree of export concentration increased even further. By 2004, 
the three product groups accounted for 80 percent of Bolivia's exports. 
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Source: Data from UDAPE Dossier Vol. 15 (2005). 
Note: Values for 2004 are preliminary. 
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The resource shocks were associated with substantial macroeconomic 
adjustments. Figure 3.3 shows the real effective exchange rate and some major 
balance-of-payments items for the 1990s and the early 2000s. After a real 
depreciation in the early 1990s, Bolivia experienced a strong appreciation 
following the inflow of foreign direct investment that was mainly directed at the 
gas sector. There are thus clear signs of Dutch disease effects in the second half of 
the 1990s, which appear to dominate the impact of the negative commodity price 
shock. The current account deteriorated until 1999, imports increased and exports 
fell. Only after 2000, exports started to recover, led by rising gas deliveries to 
Brazil. The dramatic decrease in exports in the second half of the 1990s can of 
course not entirely be attributed to the export sectors loosing competitiveness 
because of real exchange rate appreciation. Another important factor were the 
commodity price shocks for Bolivia's major exported metals. In addition, the 
Brazilian crisis from 1999 negatively affected Bolivia's export demand, all the 
more so as the trigger of the crisis was a massive devaluation of the Brazilian Real. 
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Figure 3.3: Real exchange rate (right scale, 1995=100) and balance-of-payments 
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Source: Data from IMF International Financial Statistics (March 2005). 
The gas boom and other external shocks also had some impact on sectoral 
growth rates in the second half of the 1990s. When studying the Bolivian national 
accounts, one will find that the gas boom after 1996 appears to have triggered a 
tremendous construction boom. Yet, according to personal correspondence with 
!NE, these figures reflect the construction of the gas pipeline to Brazil with the 
bulk of pipeline-related construction works entering the national accounts in 1998. 
When pipeline construction is deducted, there are still signs of a temporary, yet 
less pronounced increase in construction activities in the late 1990s (App. Figure 
3.1). As Figure 3.4 indicates, overall sectoral change in the 1990s has been 
modest; there are, however, some indications of Dutch disease type adjustments. 
The most important non-tradable sector, the services sector, seems to have 
benefited from the gas boom, as it grew significantly stronger after 1996. Starting 
from a very low base, modern agriculture, one of the most export-oriented sectors, 
expanded very strongly in the 1990s, while traditional agriculture experienced the 
lowest growth rates, its importance therefore declining. The main factor behind the 
drop in modem agriculture's share after 1997 is arguably not the gas boom and the 
associated real appreciation, but rather the 1997/98 El Nii'io, which caused planted 
soybean areas to contract. 
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Figure 3.4: Sectoral shares in GDP, 1992-1997-2001 
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Source: Data from INE (www.ine.gov.bo, 2005). 
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As regards changes in employment, in particular shifts between formal and 
informal employment, there is strong evidence of increasing informality in the late 
1990s in Bolivia. Spatz (2004a) finds a drop in the formal sector share from 55 
percent in 1997 to only 50 percent in 2001. Using different data and a slightly 
different definition of the informal sector, Tannuri-Pianto et al. (2004) detect an 
even more pronounced decrease in formal employment (from 44 percent in 1997 
to 32 percent in 2002). Klasen et al. (2006) stress the importance of tight labor 
market regulations in the presence of negative external shocks as the root cause of 
increasing informality. 
The preceding analysis suggests that the gas boom provided substantial 
(additional) fiscal resources to the Bolivian government. A key question is whether 
these resources have been directed towards the poorer parts of the population. 
Possibly somewhat surprisingly, the Bolivian fiscal stance deteriorated during the 
period under investigation despite these additional resources. In 2003, the overall 
budget deficit amounted to 8 percent of GDP. The root cause of the fiscal 
problems is what many observers have perceived as a failed pension reform that 
dates back to 1996. It should be noted that pension payments out of the old pay-as-
you-go system in Bolivia represent a highly regressive transfer, as they cover 2 
percent of the Bolivian population at the incredible cost of 5 percent of GDP 
(World Bank 2004). 
Increased spending on social security left little room for raising expenditure 
targeted at the poorer parts of the population. Nevertheless, pro-poor expenditure 
in basic social services, defined as expenditure in primary and secondary 
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education, primary health care, and the Bonosol" payment, increased from 9.1 (27) 
to 12.4 (33) percent of GDP (total public expenditure) between 1995 and 2002. It 
should however be taken into account that about half of Bolivia's basic social 
expenditure is funded by donors and official loans. Studying the effectiveness of 
these expenditure shifts goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Yet, the increasing share of pension payments certainly represents the major 
public expenditure shift that can be observed during the period under investigation. 
It may be seen as a consequence of bad fiscal management and a badly 
implemented reform. We are however inclined to interpret this expenditure shift as 
being related to the expectation of the windfall profits from gas exports and hence 
as a way to transfer resource rents to the population - although this interpretation 
is of course open to debate. 
3.3. The modelling framework 
Having established that resource shocks, and in particular the gas boom, were 
associated with major adjustments in the Bolivian economy, we now tum to a 
counterfactual analysis in which we examine the isolated impact of the gas boom. 
In the analysis, we combine a CGE model with a microsimulation model, 
connecting the two through several link variables. 
3.3.1. The CGE model 
The CGE model provides a standard recursive-dynamic, trade-focused 
representation of the national economy.'" However, to make it applicable for the 
analysis of the gas boom, the model differs from the typical specification in two 
important respects: first, production is split up into formal and informal activities. 
Such a distinction enables us to examine one possible channel through which the 
gas boom and the associated real appreciation might have had a negative 
distributional impact, namely by forcing workers to switch from more productive 
formal activities to less productive informal activities. This mechanism is similar 
in spirit to those assumed in much of the literature on the resource curse. Sachs 
and Warner ( 1995), for example, argue that resource booms tend to be detrimental 
to economic growth as Dutch disease effects lead to a contraction of sectors 
exhibiting positive externalities. Second, exploration and pipeline construction are 
47 The Bonosol payment was introduced in the late 1990s as an annuity to be paid to 
every Bolivian aged 65 or more out of the proceeds of privatization. The first 
payment of US$ 212 was made in 1997. The government however soon realized that 
such an amount would not be sustainable and reduced the annual payment to US$ 60 
(under a new name "Bolivida"). Bolivida payments however were not processed until 
200 I. Political pressure led the Sanchez de Lozada administration to reinstitute the 
Bonosol payment of US$ 240 in 2003. See Escobar and Nina (2004) and Martinez 
(2004) for details. 
48 Van der Mensbrugghe (2003) gives a technical description of the prototype CGE 
model on which our model is based. 
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considered as separate investment demand categories in order to model the huge 
investment outlays that preceded the expansion of the gas sector. 
On the production side, the model differentiates between activities and 
commodities, thus allowing for the same commodity to be produced by one or 
more sectors, and for the same sector to produce one or more commodities. To 
take just one example, the modern agricultural sector does not only grow cash 
crops such as soybeans, but is also engaged in livestock farming. Sectoral output 
results from combining intermediate goods and six different primary factors 
(skilled labor, unskilled labor, formal capital, informal capital, land, and a sector-
specific resource in the case of oil and gas) in a nested CES structure." 
International trade is specified along conventional lines, with import demand being 
derived from a CES aggregation function of domestic and imported goods, and 
export supply from a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function of 
domestically sold and exported goods. Export demand is infinitely elastic, i.e., the 
small-country assumption holds. 
The disaggregation of production, which is based on a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for 2001, reveals structural differences between formal and 
informal operations, even though they are not as clear-cut as theoretical models 
tend to suggest (Table 3.1). Regarding trade orientation, the sectors with the 
highest trade shares are all formal, but since several other formal sectors produce 
pure non-traded goods, we can only tentatively hypothesize that the gas boom has 
led to an informalization of the economy via Dutch disease effects. A more 
pronounced pattern emerges with respect to the composition of factor income. It 
turns out that all informal activities make intensive use of unskilled labor, whereas 
capital intensity is high in most formal activities. 
The sectoral composition of value added reflects certain assumptions about how 
factor markets operate. We distinguish two categories of capital that are specific to 
formal and informal activities, respectively. Formal (informal) capital is partially 
mobile within the formal (informal) economy, which is modeled by means ofCET 
functions. By contrast, our specification does not allow land to be shifted between 
modern and traditional agriculture given that the two activities are regionally 
separated.50 The natural resource is sector-specific; its supply is a positive function 
of the resource price relative to the economy-wide price level. The market for 
unskilled labor is segmented between rural and urban areas, where modern 
agriculture is considered part of the urban economy, as it resembles other (formal) 
urban activities in using wage labor and capital rather than relying on self-
employment. The two segments are linked through rural-urban migration. Along 
the lines of the Harris-Todaro model, the decision to migrate depends on wage 
differentials. Skilled labor is assumed to be fully mobile across production sectors. 
Market clearing is achieved via wage adjustments, but the intersectoral 
49 For the exact nesting structure, see van der Mensbrugghe (2003). 
50 Note that the model allows for both limiting cases - perfect capital (land) mobility 
and perfect capital (land) immobility - as well as any intermediate case due to the 
CET specification. 
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wage differentials observed in the base period are assumed to persist. These 
differentials point to systematically lower labor productivity in informal sectors. 
Unskilled workers, for example, receive only slightly more than half the average 
wage in the informal construction sector, while they are almost paid the average 
wage in the formal sector (Table 3.2). 
Table 3. I: Structural Characteristics of the Bolivian Economy 
Factor income as share of value added 
Sectors 
I Trade orientation 
Imports Exports LabU LabS Kaplnf KapForm LandR NatRs 
TradAgr 0.07 0.02 0.67 
ForFis 0.09 0.56 OJ3 
Formal 
AfodAgr __ 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.27 
---------, ---- --- -----···-···· 
Oi/Gas OJI 0.11 
---·-· 
Exploration . 0.09 
FoodPro 0.07 0.14 0.26 0.23 
--····-
OthLiMan 0.20 0.14 0.34 OJ6 
Chem 0.53 0.02 0.35 0.05 
Oi/Ref 0.12 0.02 0.02 O.IO 
Min 0.11 OJ7 0.18 0.09 
HeavMan 0.60 0.20 0.51 0.27 
E/eGasWat 001 0.16 
Const OJO 0.28 
------ -·---
Trade 0.17 OJ3 
Trans 0.06 0.05 0.37 0.27 ------ -·---
CommFinBus 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.27 
Rea/Est 
SocPerServ 0.02 0.01 0.13 OJ7 
HotRest 0.05 0.05 OJ I 0.21 
PubServ 0.07 0.93 
Informal 
FoodPro 0.07 0.15 0.50 0.20 0.30 
OthLiMan 0.20 0.14 0.51 0.19 0.30 
Const 0.55 0.09 0.36 
TradeDomS 0.49 0.21 0.30 
Trans 0.06 0.05 0.43 0.20 0.36 
- ·-· 
HotRest 0.05 0.05 0.44 O.IO 0.46 
Imports as share of absorption plus intermediate demand 





















Source: Authors' calculations based on the Social Accounting Matrix for 2001. 
Note: Imports are calculated as a share of absorption, exports as a share of domestic 
production. 
- -
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Table 3.2: Sectoral Deviations.from average wages 
Sectors 
Skilled labor Unskilled labor 
Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Food Pro 2.85 1.27 3.26 2.57 
OthLiMan 0.65 0.38 1.31 0.94 
Const 0.65 0.29 0.97 0.54 
Trade 0.42 0.27 0.50 0.49 
Trans 1.67 1.03 3.72 2.30 
Hot Rest 0.59 0.33 115 0.70 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note:A value above (below) one indicates higher-than-average (lower-than-average) 
wages. Computed from the SAM. 
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The factor income generated in the production process is distributed to four 
different household groups - poor and rich urban households as well as poor and 
rich rural households - according to fixed coefficients derived from the SAM. 
Moreover, households receive transfers in fixed proportions to government 
expenditures and remittances from abroad that are fixed in foreign currency. They 
use their gross income to pay taxes, to save and to consume. The allocation of 
consumption expenditures on different goods is modeled employing a Linear 
Expenditure System (LES). The sectoral allocation of government and the non-gas 
component of investment demand are both governed by fixed coefficients, whereas 
investment demand for exploration and pipeline construction is exogenously 
given. 
Despite the exogeneity of gas-related investment, the model is savings-driven, 
i.e., non-gas investment adjusts so as to bring about the necessary ex-post identity 
of savings and investment. The balance of payments equilibrium is determined by 
the equality of exogenous foreign savings to the value of the current account. With 
fixed world prices, the real exchange rate serves as the equilibrating variable. In 
the macro closure for the government, the budget deficit is allowed to adjust in 
order to achieve a predetermined level of real government expenditures at a fixed 
household income tax schedule. 
A simple recursive-dynamic framework allows us to implement the gas boom 
as a sequence of shocks (see below) and to trace over time the changes in 
economic structure caused by the boom. There are four elements driving model 
dynamics - exogenous labor growth, investment-driven capital accumulation, 
exogenous growth of natural resources in the gas sector, and exogenous 
productivity growth. Several other exogenous variables require updating to arrive 
at a realistic baseline scenario. Government expenditures and transfers, for 
example, are assumed to grow at the same rate as GDP. 
Finally, the CGE model is linked to the microsimulation model. We assume that 
the link is sequential, i.e., the CGE model is solved first and certain target values 
are passed to the microsimulation that is "forced" to reproduce the aggregate 
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changes in these targets. In line with our focus on skilled vs. unskilled labor and 
formal vs. informal employment, the following link variables are used: ( 1) the 
share of unskilled workers in the formal sector, (2) share of skilled workers in the 
formal sector, (3) mean wages for skilled workers, (4) mean wages for unskilled 
workers, and (5) mean informal profits." While the first four link variables have a 
straightforward interpretation, the fifth is based on the concept of mixed income 
received by self-employed workers. Accordingly, informal profits are calculated as 
the sum of skilled and unskilled labor income as well as informal capital income. 
Before we discuss the specification of the microsimulation model, it should be 
stressed that the CGE and the microsimulation model should not be seen as a 
consistent macro-micro modelling framework. Rather, the idea of combining these 
two types of simulation models in a sequential fashion is to get "the best of the two 
modeling worlds". The CGE model is a useful tool to examine the transmission 
channels of the resource boom. It provides a consistent modeling framework based 
on an empirical representation of the Bolivian economy and yields a numerical 
counterfactual approximation of the shocks' labor market impacts. Yet, in order to 
assess the ultimate poverty and distributional consequences of the shocks, the 
microsimulation is a much more suitable tool. It takes into account household 
heterogeneity in terms of factor endowments at a much more detailed level and 
models occupational choices and corresponding earnings changes at the individual 
level. Sequentially combining these models typically implies the imposition of a 
number of ad-hoc assumptions that may not be satisfying from a theoretical 
perspective. 
3.3.2. The microsimulation model 
The microsimulation model is based on an income generation model that is 
estimated on household survey data." The following estimations are based on all 
individuals employed outside traditional agriculture, as our focus is on changes in 
51 Although formal profits account for an important share in value added, they are not 
passed to the microsimulation for two reasons. First, most formal profits are retained 
and invested. Second, capital income is likely to be measured very poorly in 
household surveys. As formal profits increase considerably during the gas boom, we 
may systematically ignore an inequality-increasing factor. 
52 We use the Encuesta Continua de Hogares from 2001. The survey comprises 24 996 
individuals from 5 797 households. Due to a number of missing income observations, 
incomes were imputed based on income equations estimated separately by labor 
market segments (smallholder, worker in traditional agriculture, agricultural 
employer, worker in modem agriculture, informal self-employed/employer, informal 
worker, formal employer, and formal worker). This imputation is also necessary for 
using income data for poverty and distributional analysis. 
Jann Lay - 978-3-631-75365-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:52:47AM
via free access
THE MICROSIMULATION MODEL 63 
formal vs. informal employment. In contrast to the CGE model, the 
microsimulation hence assumes that smallholders remain in their occupation." 
The two basic components of this income generation model are a model of 
occupational choices that represents the "choice" between formal and informal 
employment" as well as earnings functions that correspond to the respective sector 
of employment. If individuals happen to be in ( or switch to) the formal sector they 
are assumed to earn a wage, whereas individuals in the informal sector are 
assumed to be (or become) part of a household enterprise and contribute to the 
profits earned by this enterprise. Table 3.3 provides an overview of the equations 
of the income generation model, the econometric models, the sub-samples and lists 
of the explanatory variables. We limit the discussion of the specification to 
innovative and interesting features. As estimation results correspond to 
expectations, we do not further comment them here, but report the detailed results 
in App. Table 3.1 and App. Table 3.2. 
The choice between informal and formal activities is estimated separately for 
household heads, spouses, and other household members using a logit model. The 
equations of the choice model are interrelated through the head's wage (and hence 
her choice) entering the occupational choice model of spouses and other household 
members. We hence assume a sequential choice with the household head deciding 
first. 
In addition to the formal-informal segmentation, we assume segmentation 
according to skill levels, differentiating between unskilled and skilled labor 
(defined in terms of years of schooling). We therefore estimate separate wage 
equations for skilled and the unskilled labor employed in the formal sector using 
OLS. The set of explanatory variables (reported in Table 3.3) is standard. The 
individuals in the informal sector are assumed to pool resources and work effort in 
a household enterprise, for which we estimate a profit function. The numbers of 
informal unskilled as well as informal skilled individuals enter as separate 
explanatory variables. As the number of household members working in the 
enterprise is very likely to depend on the prospective profits to be earned in 
informal activities, we are likely to have an endogeneity problem here. We 
therefore instrument the number of unskilled as well as skilled household 
enterprise members. As instruments we use the total number of (informal and 
formal) household members (unskilled or skilled, respectively, that we additionally 
53 The income generation model is based on a model first proposed by Alatas and 
Bourguignon (2005) to decompose inequality and poverty changes between two 
household surveys. See Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (2005a) for a selection of 
country studies using this type of decomposition technique. It has also been used in a 
macro-micro simulation framework by Robilliard et al. (2002) and Bussolo and Lay 
(2005). 
54 Employment is assumed to be informal if the individual is self-employed/non-
remunerated household member and/or works in an enterprise with less than 5 
employees. 
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differentiate by gender and age) interacted with the share of formal employment of 
the province of residence. 
Table 3.3: Overview of the income generation model 
Explained variable and estimated Model Sub- Explanatory variables 
eauation samvle 
1 Being in formal or informal sector Logit Heads Education (squared), 
P(formal = 11 X') = g(c' + X'a' experience, female, share of 
formal workers in province 
of residence 
2 Being in formal or informal sector Logit Spouses Education (squared), 
P(formal = 11 X') = g(c' + X'a') experience, female, 
indigenous, geographical 
dummies, number of 
children under I 0 
( interacted with female), 
share of formal workers in 
province of residence, log 
wage of household head (if 
head formal) 
3 Being in formal or informal sector Logit Others Education (squared), 
P(formal = 1jX 0 ) = g(c 0 + x 0 a 0 ) experience, female, widow, 
number of children under 10 
( interacted with female), 
share of formal workers in 
province of residence, log 
wage of household head (if 
head formal) 
4 Unskilled wage Linear Unskilled Education (squared), 
In wus = cus + xus pus + uwus formal experience (squared), 
sector female, geographical 
5 Skilled wage Linear Skilled dummies 
lnw'' =c" +X''P'' +uw" formal 
sector 
6 Profits of household enterprise Linear Informal Average education of 
lnp=c'+X'P'+up sector members (squared), 
enterprises Average experience of 
(max. one members (squared), number 
per of female members, 
household) geographical dummies, 
number of members 
These estimated relationships form the basis of the microsimulation. The 
microsimulation is shocked using changes in the five link variables that are passed 
on from the CGE analysis. To gain an understanding of how the microsimulation 
works it is useful to think of the set of equations summarized in Table 3.3 as a 
system of equations. 
Let employment n be the sum of n"' and n'' , the number of unskilled and 
skilled labor, respectively. 
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fs"' denotes the formal share of employment among the unskilled. The number of 
formal unskilled nr is given by the sum of heads, spouses, and other household 
members that derive a higher ''utility" from being employed in the formal than 
from being employed in the informal sector where ( ind~ ,(c' + X'a' +uhl > uhO) is 
an indicator function assuming 1 if the condition in brackets is fulfilled and 0 
otherwise. uhO, uhl, usO, usl, uoO, uol are residuals for heads, spouses, and others, 
respectively, that cannot be observed in latent variable models and are hence 
drawn consistent with the observed choice." 
nf" fs~=-
n~ 
"f.indwJc' + X'a' + uhl > uhO) + "f.ind •. ,(c' + X'a' + usl >usl) 
~ h 
+ "f.indw ,(c" + X'a' + uol > uoO) = nf~ 




"f.ind,, ,(c' +X'a' +uhl > uhO)+ "f.ind,, ,(c' +X'a' +usl > usl) 
M_h sic s 




The mean unskilled wage is the wage of all unskilled workers in the formal 
sector divided by the number of unskilled formal workers. 
"f.indw ,( )w:_, + "f.indw_,(.)ws:, + "f.indw J )w:, 
mean(ww) =-w~•------~-----~-----nfw (3) 
where WW = exp(cw + r fr+ uww) is the individual unskilled wage with uww' the 
observed residual. The same equation holds for the skilled 
"f.ind.,.( )w;;_, + "f.ind,, ,()ws:,_, + "f.ind,, J .. )w;;, 
mean(w'') = "-' ''-' " ' 
nf'' 
(4) 
where w'' = exp( c'' + X '' fl" + uw'') . 
Whereas wages are summed over individuals, total profits from informal 
activities are summed over households (hh) 
55 Residuals are drawn conditional on the observed choice, as suggested by 
Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (1998). We randomly draw two residuals from a 
Gumbel distribution (type I extreme value, variance n2/6), one for each alternative. 
This is equivalent to drawing one logistically distributed residual, as the difference of 
two Gumbel-distributed random variables is logistically distributed (with variance 
n2/3). See Train (2003) for details. 
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mean(p) = -~'~' --
n - nf"' -nf'' 
BOLIVIA 
(5) 
where the profit phh in household hh will only be greater than O if at least one 
member is employed in the informal sector. 
p,,,, = exp(cp + X' fr+ upX-l)[(ind,( )-!)+(ind,()-!)+~ (indJ )-!)] (6) 
Remember also that the number of (skilled and unskilled) household enterprise 
members enters the profit function. 
(7) 
The above equations describe the initial distribution of labor income (with the 
exception of traditional agriculture). As mentioned above, the microsimulation is 
"forced" to reproduce the changes in the aggregates given by the CGE model. This 
is achieved by varying the constants in the above system of equations such that the 
household income generation model just reproduces the target values. Increasing 
e.g. the constant c" leads some heads to switch from informal to formal activities. 
When individuals switch from informal to formal activities, they are assigned a 
simulated wage residual, as we do not have an observed unexplained wage uw for 
her. The same holds if an individual becomes the first household member active in 
the informal sector (not if she joins an existing enterprise).56 
The above income generation model represents only part of the income 
households receive. It focuses on income generation in non-agricultural sectors 
and translates changes in labor incomes and the formal-informal composition of 
employment into poverty and distributional changes. Other income sources include 
income from traditional agricultural activities (including home-consumed 
production) and all kinds of transfer incomes from remittances to public transfers. 
Agricultural incomes of smallholders from the household survey will be scaled up 
using a weighted real factor price index for traditional agriculture (real factor 
56 To adjust to the targets, we need to vary the constants in the occupational choice 
equations differently for unskilled and skilled labour, respectively. This implies that 
we fix the (absolute) differences between the occupational choice model constants for 
heads, spouses, and others for both unskilled and skilled labour. If one thinks of this 
problem in terms of solving the system of equations to reach the new target values, 
this means that the occupational constants (i.e. for heads, spouses, and others) for 
each skilled segment are augmented by the same amount. We now have 5 variables (2 
"vectors" of constants of the choice models and 3 wage/profit constants) and 5 
equations. The system is solved using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
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prices for land and unskilled labor are weighted with the share in value added of 
the sector). Changes in public transfers and changes in other income sources will 
not be taken into account in our counterfactual microsimulation of the gas boom. 
Public transfers will also grow or decrease in accordance with the CGE model. It 
should however be borne in mind that these income sources and changes therein 
do not affect individual behavior (at least in our model). 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Stylized simulations for link variables 
While in the gas shock simulations presented below all link variables change 
simultaneously, the importance of specific labor market link variables for poverty 
and inequality can be seen more clearly if they are considered in isolation. 
Consequently, we performed stylized simulations for each link variable, the results 
of which are reported in Table 3.4. Since the mechanics of the income generation 
model can be better understood when looking at the urban population only, we 
restrict the results to this group. It turns out that, at constant factor prices, a lower 
formal employment share (by 5 percentage points) leads to a significant rise in 
urban poverty. The effect is markedly stronger for skilled workers. Yet, urban 
mean per capita income declines by 2.93 percent when informality increases 
among unskilled labor, much more strongly than the 1. 76 percent decline recorded 
for skilled labor. This seemingly paradox result can be explained by looking at the 
distributional shifts. Whereas increasing informality is equalizing for unskilled 
labor, as indicated by the decrease in the Theil-Index, it is inequality increasing for 
skilled labor. This rise in inequality reinforces the negative poverty effect of 
declining incomes for skilled workers. 
A more detailed analysis of the distributional impact that looks at the entire 
distribution rather than aggregate indicators reveals striking results (see App. 
Figure 3.2 and App. Figure 3.3): for both unskilled and skilled labor, the very poor 
are affected most by increasing informality. These results can be rationalized by 
looking at who moves into informality as well as the size of the income loss for 
movers relative to both their initial income and the income losses incurred by other 
individuals. The size of the income loss depends on individual characteristics (as 
the returns to these characteristics differ between formal and informal activities) 
and on whether an individual joins an already existing household enterprise or 
establishes a new one. From the estimation that underlies the microsimulation we 
know that less educated younger (and hence poorer) individuals tend to move into 
informality first. As regards the size of the income losses, the estimation results for 
wages and profit functions indicate that the income loss of moving into informality 
is higher for more educated individuals, at least in absolute terms, when they move 
into an existing household enterprise. Since the constant in the wage function for 
skilled labor is lower than the constant in the informal profit function, it may also 
happen that establishing an informal enterprise increases earnings for a skilled 
individual conditional of course on other individual characteristics. For an 
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unskilled individual, by contrast, moving into informality will always imply an 
income loss, which explains the overall decrease of per capita incomes. It is the 
combination of these effects that explains the poverty and distributional 
57 
outcomes. 
That overall income losses for unskilled labor are higher than for skilled labor 
can hence be explained by two factors. First, unskilled labor always loses when 
moving into informality. In addition, they are more likely to move into an existing 
enterprise instead of establishing a new one. For both the unskilled and skilled 
workforce, the move of less educated (and hence poor) individuals explains the 
strong negative income growth in the lower parts of the income distribution, as the 
incurred losses are relatively large compared to initial income. A similar reasoning 
explains why unskilled workers from middle-income classes do not suffer 
significant income losses. Fewer formal workers lose their jobs and if they do their 
relative income loss is not too high. Yet, higher educational endowments are 
associated with higher income losses, which is why the growth incidence curve is 
downward sloping for higher incomes. This effect seems to overcompensate the 
general effect that the relative importance of income losses decreases with higher 
incomes and explains the overall "positive" distributional impact among unskilled 
workers. 
The negative distributional shift when informality increases among skilled 
workers is not only due to the strong losses of the poor. The very rich do not seem 
to be affected at all or even experience slightly positive income gains. This is 
mainly due to the very low incidence of informal work among high-skilled 
workers. In addition, these individuals are likely to set up a new household 
enterprise instead of moving into an existing one. 
Table 3.4: Marginal effects of changes in link variables on urban inequality and 
poverty (point differences) 
Scenario PO Pl Theil 
Urban 
Initial 50.8 23.5 63.3 
5 % point decline informal share unskilled 0.7 0.5 -1.2 
5% point decline informal share skilled 1.7 0.9 1.2 
IO % increase in unskilled wages -0.9 -0.7 -I.I 
IO % increase in skilled wages -0.7 -0.4 2.4 
10 % increase in informal profits -1.6 -I.I -1.3 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
The poverty and distributional effects of increases in different types of labor 
incomes are in line with expectations. An increase in unskilled wages decreases 
poverty and improves the distribution of income. Maybe somewhat less obvious is 
the relatively strong reduction in the headcount index associated with an increase 
57 Furthermore, differences in the variance of the simulated residual also play a role for 
the distributional impact, but this effect should not be too large. 
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in skilled wages. Yet, the impact on Pl is much less pronounced, indicating that 
the "skilled poor" are close to the poverty line, and the overall income distribution 
worsens quite substantially compared to the distributional improvements that can 
be reached e.g. by an increase in unskilled wages. Increases in informal profits 
tum out to reduce poverty most effectively. 
3.4.2. Gas shock simulations 
We now tum to a counterfactual analysis of the gas shock. We use the CGE model 
in combination with the microsimulation model to evaluate the distributional and 
poverty impacts of a gas boom over the period 1997-2005 by simulating two 
scenarios. The first scenario combines a positive temporary demand (investment) 
shock with a delayed positive supply shock. The size of the shocks roughly 
corresponds to what Bolivia actually experienced (see 3.2). The demand shock 
consists of a doubling of real investment demand in exploration and pipeline 
construction over the period 1998-2001, which is financed by foreign capital 
inflows. After 2001, foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector is assumed 
to fall back to the pre-shock level. The upfront investment is assumed to induce a 
positive supply shock from 2004 onwards, which is modeled by quadrupling oil 
and gas reserves, i.e. the specific factor used in oil and gas production. The second 
scenario combines the first scenario with a progressive reallocation of parts of 
public revenues to households, as observed in the household surveys. More 
specifically, it is assumed that real government transfers to poor rural, poor urban, 
and all rich households increase by 100%, 50% and 10% (and again by 50%, 25%, 
and 5%), respectively, from year 2000 (from year 2004) onwards. This scenario 
takes into account the mainly transfer-induced rise in public deficits that occurred 
before the government received higher revenues from oil and gas extraction. 
Benchmark: In the benchmark simulation, real GDP growth is exogenously 
fixed and assumed to increase by four percent annually over the period 1997-2005, 
while the growth rate of labor productivity is calibrated for each year so as to keep 
growth constant over time. This implies steadily increasing labor productivity 
growth over the whole simulation period. Yet, the assumption that productivity 
growth is only labor-augmenting is not appropriate for Bolivia. We therefore 
assumed a balanced growth path along which capital per worker, measured in 
efficiency units, remains constant over time, and calibrated the growth rate of 
capital productivity, which keeps the capital-labor ratio constant. At given labor 
growth rates and given capital accumulation rates, this implies increasing capital 
productivity at a decreasing rate over the total simulation period.58 
The most striking distributional result of the benchmark simulation is the lack 
of significant progress with regard to poverty reduction despite relatively high 
58 In the policy simulations discussed below, these calibrated productivity parameters 
are kept constant, and the growth rate of GDP and the capital-labour ratio are allowed 
to vary endogenously. 
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growth rates of 4 percent. This is largely the result of rural-urban migration, which 
increases the supply of urban unskilled labor, thereby depressing wages and 
increasing the urban wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers (App. 
Table 3.3). As a result, urban inequality rises while poverty stays constant (Table 
3.6). At the same time, migration reduces the supply of unskilled labor in rural 
areas and thereby increases wages. Together with increasing land rental rates, 
higher wages for rural unskilled workers raise the mixed income earned in 
agriculture (agricultural profits in App. Table 3.3) and slightly reduce poverty and 
income inequality in rural areas (Table 3.6). At the national level, both the 
incidence of poverty (PO) and the poverty gap (Pl) hardly change over the period 
under consideration. 
Gas Shock: Given that our CGE model does not allow for multiplier effects, it 
is not surprising that the foreign direct investment in gas exploration and the 
construction of pipelines is shown to have only a minor impact on aggregate 
economic activity. In the short run, the demand shock causes a steep rise in the 
price level, which even lowers real GDP, while over the medium run production 
capacity is slightly higher than in the base run. 
The model can much more reliably capture the structural effects of the demand 
shock, which tum out to be sizeable. The investment boom induces a massive 
expansion of exploration, which clearly dominates the much less pronounced 
expansion of formal (pipeline) construction. As a result, the factors attracted into 
gas-related activities are predominantly formal capital and to a lesser extent skilled 
labor, exerting upward pressure on formal profits and skilled wages. Two 
secondary effects refine this picture. First, booming gas-related investment crowds 
out other investment goods, which are predominantly produced by heavy 
manufacturing as well as the formal and informal construction sectors. Since these 
sectors make intensive use of unskilled labor, the respective wage is driven down. 
The contraction of informal construction lowers the informalization of the 
economy. Second, the rise in the price level, which at a fixed exchange rate 
implies a real appreciation of about six percent in the medium run, leads to a 
contraction of trade-oriented sectors such as heavy manufacturing, mining, and 
modem agriculture, whereas sectors with low trade shares and non-traded sectors 
tend to expand. Among the gaining sectors with low trade-orientation, informal 
activities figure prominently. They realize higher returns on capital and demand 
additional labor, in particular unskilled workers, thus raising the informal share of 
unskilled labor. 
As shown in Table 3.5, the investment boom is on balance associated with 
higher (lower) wages for skilled (unskilled) labor, higher profits in the informal 
urban sectors, and an increasing informalization of urban production activities, as 
indicated by lower formal unskilled employment shares compared to the base run. 
The net result of the in formalization and the rise in the wage gap on the one hand, 
and increasing informal profits on the other, is that aggregate indicators of urban 
poverty and inequality hardly change (Table 3.6). In addition, lower wages for 
unskilled workers reduce incentives to migrate from traditional agriculture. 
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Nevertheless, agricultural per-capita income increases slightly as a result of higher 
prices for agricultural products, which in turn leads to a slight reduction of rural 
poverty. 
In contrast to the investment demand shock, the subsequent extraction of gas 
from new fields significantly raises real GDP growth to almost 6 percent on 
average over the period 2004-2005. A rise in the aggregate price level and a 
significant improvement of the government budget balance through additional 
revenues are among the other important macroeconomic consequences of the gas 
shock. 
The growth process induced by the gas shock is not sectorally balanced. The 
primary and most pronounced effect is the expansion of oil&gas and oil refining, 
the main downstream activity. This drives up formal capital prices and skilled 
wages, as these sectors are capital and skilled labor intensive. Furthermore, the 
reduction of the budget deficit is reflected in markedly higher investment demand 
by the government, which benefits both formal and informal construction. Making 
intensive use of unskilled labor, the construction sectors drive up unskilled wages 
via increased labor demand. Since the informal construction sector is particularly 
unskilled-labor intensive, the share of unskilled workers employed in the informal 
sector goes up as a result of the construction boom. As in the case of the 
investment shock, a real appreciation leads to a reallocation of resources from 
more to less trade-oriented sectors including most informal activities, which 
reinforces the informalization of the economy. The effect is, however, 
quantitatively less important than that running via investment in construction. 
Increased demand for skilled labor causes the unskilled-skilled wage gap to 
increase. Again, this increase as well as the rising importance of lower-paid 
informal employment is compensated by increases in informal profits so that 
overall urban inequality remains largely unchanged. The significant poverty 
reduction appears to be entirely growth-induced. It is larger in urban areas, which 
directly benefit from higher gas extraction while rural areas benefit only indirectly 
from higher demand for agricultural products and a moderate rise in rural-urban 
migration. Even though the Theil index barely changes within regions, the national 
income distribution slightly worsens as the income gains are biased towards urban 
households. 
Gas Shock plus Transfers: A redistribution of royalties and other revenues from 
the public to private households has essentially two primary effects: First, it 
increases disposable household income, consumption and household savings. 
Second, it increases current public expenditures and therefore reduces public 
savings. This will have secondary effects on overall income, inequality and 
poverty. At given household marginal propensities to consume and to save, the 
redistribution leads to a restructuring of final demand from investment demand 
towards private consumption. This is because the fall in government investment is 
not fully offset by a rise in private investment. Lower investment means lower 
capital accumulation and thus lower growth compared to the isolated gas shock 
scenario. The reduction of investment demand is mostly felt in the construction 
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sector, both formal and informal, which reduces its production by 15 and 20 
percent in 200 I and 2005, respectively. By the same reasoning as above, this leads 
to lower wages for unskilled labor and a lower informal share among unskilled 
workers. The latter effect is, however, offset by increased labor demand from all 
other informal sectors, which expand their production in response to a real 
appreciation caused by the expansionary government policy. 
Regarding the overall changes in link variables, the redistribution policy hence 
appears to reinforce the results of the gas shock, with a widening wage gap, a 
slight increase in informal employment shares, as well as a further upturn in 
informal and agricultural profits. The corresponding poverty and distributional 
results, given in Table 3.6, only reflect the changes in labor market linkage 
variables. The direct effects of the transfers on disposable household income will 
be analyzed separately below.59 In urban areas, both the headcount ratio and the 
poverty gap fall somewhat in 2001, driven by the rise in informal profits that 
offsets the negative effects of further increased informality and falling unskilled 
wages. Owing to considerably higher profits in traditional agriculture that result 
from increasing demand for agricultural products distributional and poverty results 
look more favorable for rural areas. 
Table 3.5: CGE results/or link variables (shocks compared to BaU) 
I Agricultural Unskilled Skilled Informal Unskilled Skilled formal formal 
profits profits wage wage share share 
Gas shock 
2001 1015 l03.9 98.6 l02.3 -0.91 -0.04 
2005 l03.8 108.4 l05.4 109.2 -1.19 0.06 
Gas .,hock plus transfers 
2001 l07.5 104.8 97.9 103.2 -0.98 -0.15 
2005 113.6 109.5 102.6 108.4 -1.40 -0.20 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: The table shows percentage changes compared to the BaU for profits and wages. 
The differences in fonnal employment shares for unskilled and skilled labor are 
percentage point differences to the BaU. 
59 The 2001 household survey, which is used in the microsimulation model, contains the 
Bolivida transfer payments. Simulating the "targeting" implied by the Bolivida and 
other public transfers goes beyond the scope of this chapter. We later illustrate the 
incidence of public transfers schemes by some exploratory simulations. 
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Pl Theil PO ~-pf· Theil PO Theil PO 
Initial 1997 61.2 35.0 76.8 50.8 23.5 63.3 77.8 53.3 73.6 
Ball 2001 61.3 34.7 77.6 51.2 23.5 64.6 77.4 52.5 72.6 
2005 60.8 34.1 78.2 50.8 23.2 65.4 76.7 51.5 71.8 ··-~·------- - - ···------·--·-
Gas shock 2001 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 
2005 -2.3 -1.3 0.4 -3.0 -1.6 0.2 -1.3 -1.0 0.2 
Gas shock plus 2001 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 -1.2 -1.1 
transfers 2005 -2.6 -1.9 -0.6 -3.2 -1.6 0.0 -1.7 -2.4 -1.6 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
To investigate the possible primary poverty and distributional impact of 
transfers, we conducted a stylized microsimulation in which we raised the transfers 
as observed in the household survey (PA YG pensions, Bonosol payments, and 
other social transfers) by 10 percent. If all households were covered by the transfer 
scheme, per capita incomes increase by one percent, which can also be interpreted 
as the cost of increasing the transfers (Table 3.7). Strikingly, while PO indicates 
some transfer-induced poverty reduction, Pl does not. This can easily be explained 
when looking at the growth incidence curve given in App. Figure 3.4, which points 
to a very bad targeting, where the poorest 50 percent of the population benefit less 
than proportionately. The shape of the growth incidence curve also illustrates that 
aggregate indicators of inequality, such as the Theil index that barely changes in 
this experiment, may well be misleading. 
Table 3. 7: Poverty and distributional impact of increases in public transfers 
Scenario PO Pl Theil Resource cost 
National 
Initial 61.2 35.0 76.8 
JO % increase in public transfers -0. 7 -0.1 -0.1 0.97 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: The resource cost refers to the increase in per capita income implied by the transfer. 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we combined a computable general equilibrium model with a 
microsimulation model to analyze numerically the short to medium-run impact of 
Bolivia's booming gas sector on poverty and income distribution. This approach 
accounts for major transmission mechanisms through which the gas boom affects 
Jann Lay - 978-3-631-75365-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:52:47AM
via free access
74 BOLIVIA 
the distribution of income. It captures microeconomic determinants of 
distributional such as the occupational choices between formal and informal 
employment and the corresponding changes in earnings at the individual level, as 
well as macroeconomic and sectoral determinants such as relative factor prices, 
rural-urban migration and informalization of production and employment. By 
focusing on poverty and distributional effects and by distinguishing informal and 
formal activities, our analysis adds a new perspective to the existing literature, 
which largely consists of macroeconomic studies based on the dichotomy between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
Our simulation results suggest that the gas boom and the expansion of public 
transfers have both unequalizing and equalizing distributional impacts that tend to 
offset each other. As net distributional change is limited, growth generated by the 
boom also reduces poverty and the boom hence does not completely bypass the 
poorer parts of the Bolivian population. Poverty reduction with little distributional 
change can be observed despite increasing informality. Using stylized 
microsimulation experiments, we illustrate that lower formal employment can lead 
to a significant rise in urban poverty and that the very poor are affected most by 
increasing informality. Yet, considerable overall increases in informal profits 
compensate this possible negative impact. Informalization and increasing informal 
profits during the investment boom mainly result from contractions of investment 
good and trade-oriented sectors (cost-push). When gas exports pick up, demand for 
informally produced non-tradables increases (demand-pull) and formal sectors are 
hurt by real appreciation. The positive distributional impact of increased informal 
profits also masks the inequality-increasing impact of the widening of the 
unskilled-skilled wage gap that is particularly strong during the initial investment 
boom. Regarding the increase in public transfers, the government's redistribution 
policy is largely ineffective in reducing poverty as it is poorly targeted. The 
indirect effects of increased public transfers tend to reinforce the informalization 
process and hence the distributional and poverty impacts of the gas boom. In 
addition, the resulting lower investment leads to lower overall economic growth. 
If the increases in informal profits compensate the potentially negative poverty 
effects of increased informality - why should we worry about the resource-boom 
induced structural change? Before we shortly discuss this crucial question, we 
should stress that this chapter examines the reallocation processes induced by a gas 
boom and their distributional consequences in a time horizon of approximately one 
decade. Yet, only in a longer time horizon, sectoral externalities might come into 
effect, which render this reallocation towards informal activities worrisome. We 
think there are good reasons to believe that a sectoral pattern of change 
characterized by specialization into certain non-tradables and informalization can 
permanently damage a country's development prospects, although concrete 
empirical evidence is scarce. Manufacturing sectors that contract considerably in 
the Bolivian case are widely viewed as exhibiting important learning by doing 
effects. In addition, informal sectors may exhibit important negative externalities, 
as employment is often unstable and employees are typically not covered by any 
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kind of social insurance. Such precarious employment is likely to have negative 
effects on human capital accumulation. If this pessimism about the sectoral change 
is valid, Bolivia's natural gas abundance may be seen as a curse rather than a 
blessing.60 However, the relationship between resource abundance and low 
economic growth and little poverty reduction is not a law; rather, it presents a 
challenge to find appropriate policies to avoid the pitfalls. While designing a 
coherent strategy towards this end is extremely difficult, redistribution of resource 
rents could make a dent in poverty- if targeted effectively. 
60 Sachs and Warner (1997) note with regard to larger pos1t1ve externalities in 
manufacturing that this assumption "remains somewhat speculative". This assessment 
still holds today and also applies to possible negative externalities of informal 
employment. In light of increasing informalization in many Latin American 
economies the latter may constitute an interesting area for future research. 
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App. Figure 3.2: Growth incidence curve, 5 point decline informal employment 
for unskilled labor 
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App. Figure 3.3: Growth incidence curve, 5 point decline informal employment 
for skilled labor 
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App. Figure 3.4: Growth incidence curve, JO percent increase in transfers to all 
households 
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3.6.2. Additional tables 
App. Table 3.1: Estimation results for the /ogit choice models, choices are 
dichotomous variables with formal= 1, informal= 1 
dep var 
Explanatory var Head's choice Spouse's choice Other's choice 
Education 
-0.19 -0.323 -0.219 
(5.30)** (5.19)** (3.17)** 
Education squared 
0.018 0.026 0.023 
(9.30)** (7.85)** (6.06)** 
Experience 
-0.012 -0.011 0.005 
(3.81)** -1.36 -0.57 
Female dummy 
-1.089 -0.857 -0.756 
(11.16)** (2.70)** (3.44)** 
Formal employment 4.624 3.24 4.008 










No of children under 0.448 0.107 
10 (2.53)* -1.49 
Interaction female*no -0.391 -0.221 
of children (2.06)* (2.07)* 
Head's formal sector 0.193 0.131 





-1.633 -1.686 -2.929 
(5.45)** (2. 75)** (5.03)** 
Observations 3385 1140 1102 
Pseudo R2 0.1716 0.2693 0.1943 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; * * significant at I% 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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App. Table 3.2: Estimation results for the wage and profit equations 
dep var 
Formal unskilled 







Experience -0.001 -0.001 





-0.182 -0.17 -0.452 
(2. 18)* -1.78 (3 .34)** 
Tarija dummy 
0.307 0.15 0.137 
(3.62)** -1.59 -1.34 
Santa Cruz 
0.193 0.246 0.065 
(2.77)** (3.63)** -I.OJ 
Beni dummy 
0.374 0.175 0.171 
(4.81)** (2.30)* -1.73 
Pando dummy 
0 0.258 0.792 







Avg. experience -0.001 
squared (8.20)** 
Number of -0.602 
females (13.87)** 
Number of 1.332 
enterprise (20.07)** 
Constant 
5.092 4.258 4.947 
(45.57)** (25.40)** (48.74)** 
Observations 1357 1407 1905 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.31 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at I% 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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App. Table 3.3: Business as Usual (BaU) scenario 
Variable II 1997 2001 2005 
GDP growth rate 4.00 4.00 
Price level 1.00 0.97 0.94 
Growth rate of capital productivity 1.45 1.15 
Growth rate of labor productivity 1.56 1.61 
Labor demand 
Skilled labor 1.00 I. 11 1.23 
Rural unskilled labor 1.00 1.06 1.13 
Urban unskilled labor 1.00 1.16 1.34 
Migration_ 1.00 0.87 0.78 
C:apital demand 
F onnal capital 1.00 I.II 1.25 
lnfonn11l Cllj)Ital 1.00 1.12 1.27 
- - --···------- · 
Link variables 
Agricultural profits 1.00 1.06 1.13 
Informal profits 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Unskilled wage 1.00 0.97 0.97 
Skilled wage 1.00 1.03 1.07 
Formal share unskilled 0.38 0.38 0.39 
Formal share skilled 0.72 0.71 0.71 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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4. Structural change and poverty reduction in Brazil: The 
impact of the Doha Round 
4.1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization, in particular the liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products, is considered by many observers as one of the key components of a 
strategy to reduce poverty worldwide. In their review of the relationship between 
trade liberalization and poverty, Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004), conclude 
that trade liberalization "may be one of the most cost-effective anti-poverty 
policies available to governments" although it may not be the most powerful. Yet, 
the complex relationship between trade, growth, distribution and poverty does not 
allow for a simple conclusion with regard to the impact of trade liberalization on 
poverty, as the poverty outcomes of trade liberalization may vary substantially 
from case to case. Despite the complexity of this relationship the evidence so far 
provides enough insights to predict at least the largest impacts (Winters, 
McCulloch, and McKay 2004). One of these insights is the importance of the 
impact of trade liberalization on wages and employment, which depends on the 
structure and the functioning of the labor market. 
For the Brazilian case, this chapter intends to evaluate the poverty effects of 
trade liberalization in the medium run. In doing so, we focus on the labor market, 
as we consider this transmission channel to be of overriding importance in this 
time horizon. This implies to assess the poverty impact of a Doha Round (and a 
Full Liberalization)61 counterfactual scenario against a scenario that incorporates 
some of the main features of medium run structural change. We will thus examine 
whether the effects of trade liberalization, in particular on poverty and the 
distribution of income, are still prominent in the medium run. 
Recent research has demonstrated that growth can differ tremendously in its 
power to reduce poverty both across countries and over time.62 In particular, in 
high-inequality countries such as Brazil, an apparently slight worsening of the 
income distribution can imply that growth has very little impact on poverty. It is 
hence not only important by how much trade liberalization raises incomes, but 
how it affects the pattern of income growth. The driving forces of this pattern work 
through the labor market. Among them are changes in relative factor prices, but 
also changes in endowments play an important role in the medium run, as for 
61 The global trade liberalization scenarios will not be discussed in this chapter. The 
trade shocks that the Brazilian economy faces were developed by a team examining 
the economic effects of likely Doha negotiation outcomes using a (GT AP-based) 
global trade model. We will comment only on the changes in tariffs and international 
prices, as they affect the Brazilian economy. Detailed information on the scenarios 
and the global trade model used to investigate their economic effects are available 
from the authors on request, as the project output has not been published yet. 
62 See Ravallion (2001a), Ravallion and Datt (1999), World Bank (2005b), Grimm, 
Klasen, and McKay (2006) or Kappel, Lay and Steiner (2005). 
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example the workforce advances its skills. In addition, sectoral employment 
change can contribute significantly to poverty reduction. Such change in the 
structure of employment can have very large effects on poverty, as it may enable 
people to escape poverty traps. There is quite some evidence on the existence of 
such poverty traps that can arise if occupational or technology choices are discrete 
and there exist fixed or sunk costs to choosing a higher return occupation or 
technology (Barrett 2004). Moving out of agriculture where poverty rates are often 
much higher than in other sectors is one example for such choices. This latter issue 
is of particular interest in the Brazilian context, as there has been a massive 
reduction in agricultural employment in recent years, which we consider to be 
likely to continue. This reduction in agricultural employment may have 
contributed to poverty reduction, as poverty among agricultural households is 
considerably higher than among non-agricultural households. Trade liberalization 
that one would expect to favor agriculture in Brazil may thus work against the 
"natural" forces of structural change with an adverse impact on poverty reduction. 
However, trade liberalization may also relieve some of the pressure put on non-
agricultural incomes by the reduction in agricultural employment and have some 
direct poverty reducing effect through raising agricultural incomes. 
This last example illustrates the necessity of quantifying each of these 
transmission channels to evaluate the overall poverty and distributional impact of 
trade reform. The features incorporated in our simulation exercise are therefore 
changes in different sources of factor income, changes in the sectoral composition 
of the workforce, and educational upgrading of the workforce. These changes are 
driven by changing consumption patterns, purely exogenous factors (at least in our 
model), such as differentials in productivity growth rates across sectors and 
differential growth rates for different types of labor, and, finally, the trade shocks. 
The methodology used here combines a dynamic computable general equilibrium 
model with a microsimulation model for Brazil. For a time horizon of 15 years, a 
business as usual scenario and two trade counterfactuals are developed in the COE 
model and crucial aggregate results on relative factor prices and resource 
movements from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors are linked to a 
microsimulation. This macro-micro model enables us to analyze the long-term 
poverty and distributional impact of different growth patterns. 
The chapter is structured as follows. We first provide some background 
information on the Brazilian case and motivate our approach. Then, we describe 
the macro and micro modules of the model. The results of our simulations are 
reported and commented in the following section. The last section summarizes and 
concludes. 
4.2. Background and motivation 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess whether trade reform favors the 
Brazilian poor. It is therefore important to know who the poor are, where they live, 
and especially how they earn their living. In addition, it should prove helpful to 
identify economic trends that have been particularly important for the poor. 
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Brazil's per capita income has virtually stagnated for the past 25 years and the 
very unequal distribution of income has remained more or less unchanged. 
Accordingly, poverty in Brazil has been roughly constant over the past 25 years 
(Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig 2005b; Verner 2004). In light of the substantial 
structural changes that have occurred in this period, especially increasing 
urbanization, a massive decline in agricultural employment, increasing 
unemployment, an important educational expansion and demographic changes, 
this appears "paradoxical", as Bourguignon et al. (2005b) put it. Yet, micro-
imulation exercises by Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005) show that each of the 
features of structural change affects poverty and inequality, but they tend to cancel 
out each other.6' 
Poverty in Brazil varies considerably between regions, rural and urban areas, 
and city sizes with poverty being particularly high in rural areas, small and 
medium towns and the metropolitan peripheries of the North and the Northeast 
(Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri 2001). In 1996, the North and the Northeast 
accounted for 55 percent of the poor and for 34 percent of the Brazilian 
population. At the national level, about 20 percent of the population lived in rural 
areas contributing 35 percent to total poverty.64 The high poverty rates in rural 
areas, particularly in the Northeast, are related to this region's predominance of 
employment in agriculture. The Northeast has the highest share of agriculture in 
employment with 34 percent in 2001 compared to only 11.5 percent in the 
Southeast.65 According to Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri (2001), 20 percent of all 
households had a household head employed in agriculture and these households 
contributed 34 percent to overall poverty in 1996. 
Yet, not only do poverty levels differ across regions, rural and urban areas, and 
activities, but also do the changes in poverty. Vemer's (2004) PNAD-based66 
figures suggest that the poverty headcount in the Northeast declined from almost 
60 percent in 1990 to 42.3 percent in 2001, whereas poverty in Brazil's most 
populous state Sao Paulo rose slightly from 8.6 to 9.4 percent during the same 
period. For urban areas, Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005) show that extreme 
poverty increased between 1976 and 1996. According to Paes de Barros (2004) 
however, the poverty incidence in rural areas in general and among households 
engaged in agricultural activities, in particular, declined from levels of about 60 
percent to around 50 percent between 1992 and 2001. 
One important factor for understanding these developments are the structural 
changes in Brazilian agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s. These changes have 
63 Note that their analysis compares the income distribution of 1976 with the 1996 
distribution. For detailed results see Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005). 
64 Poverty is measured by the headcount ratio. The poverty figures in this paragraph are 
taken from Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri (2001). 
65 The figures on agricultural employment are own calculations based on the PNAD 
1997 and the PNAD 2001. 
66 The PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios) is a regularly conducted 
representative household survey. 
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certainly had a profound impact on rural livelihoods and poverty in Brazil, but 
they may also have affected urban areas for example by putting pressure on urban 
labor markets through increased migration. With the exception of Paes de Barros 
(2004), research efforts in this direction however have focused on agricultural 
performance rather than on how this performance affects people's livelihoods. In 
their assessment of the impact of sector-specific as well as economy-wide reforms 
on Brazilian agriculture, Helfand and Rezende (2004) conclude that agriculture 
became one of the most dynamic sectors in the Brazilian economy. Between 1980 
and 1998 real GDP grew by about 40 percent and real agricultural output by about 
70 percent. In many sub-sectors, yields increased significantly and more harvested 
area was dedicated to exportables, in particular soybeans and sugarcane. 
Agriculture benefited from a conducive macroeconomic environment and trade 
reforms that led to less industrial protection and the elimination of taxes and 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural exports. In addition, specific agricultural 
reforms - in particular a reform of agricultural credit and price support policies; an 
agrarian reform program, including a land reform; and, finally, the deregulation of 
domestic markets for agricultural goods - were important drivers of the observed 
agricultural performance.61 The increase in agricultural productivity however was 
accompanied by a massive lay-off of hired labor and by important changes in the 
size distribution of farms. According to the agricultural census from 1996, the 
number of small farms declined dramatically and agricultural employment shrank 
by 23 percent between 1986 and 1996, although these figures should be taken with 
caution (Helfand and Rezende 2004). Non-agricultural activities appear to have 
compensated for the loss in agricultural employment in rural areas, but 
unemployment rates in urban areas with a previously important share of 
agricultural labor have risen in that period (Dias and Amaral 2002). Our analysis 
based on the 1997 and 2001 household surveys (PNAD) suggests that this decline 
in agricultural employment has continued after 1996. In 200 I, agriculture 
accounted for 20.6 percent of employment in Brazil down from 24.2 percent in 
1997. Unemployment in rural areas has stayed constant at about 2.5 percent during 
this period, whereas urban unemployment has risen from 9.44 to 10.6 percent, an 
increase that may be related to the decline in agricultural employment.68 Less 
agricultural employment opportunities may also be one of the reasons for further 
urbanization in Brazil although it is difficult to establish this link empirically, as 
we explain in more detail later. The rural population declined quite dramatically 
from 24.41 percent in 1991 to 21.64 percent in 1996 (IBGE 1997) and 16 percent 
in 2001 (PNAD 2001, authors' own calculations). The trends in rural poverty 
67 See Helfand and Rezende (2004) and Dias and Amaral (2002) for details. 
68 Data from employment histories in the PNAD reveal that in both 1997 and 2001 
about 6 percent of those who became unemployed in the last year were employed in 
agricultural sectors before. Taking into account that approx. 20 percent of the 
workforce are employed in agriculture, this figure is rather low and may be taken as a 
sign that the rise in urban unemployment is not causally linked to the decline in 
agricultural employment. 
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mentioned above suggest that the described developments have improved rural 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, poverty rates in rural areas remain well above urban 
poverty rates. 
Future developments in agriculture are not known with certainty, but it is likely 
that some of the observed trends, in particular the decline in agricultural 
employment and the related, though very small, increase in incomes from 
agriculture, will continue. We therefore incorporate them in our Business as Usual 
(BaU) scenario, against which the trade reform scenarios are to be judged. The 
BaU scenario should hence provide a quantitative assessment of the poverty and 
income distribution effects of these possible future developments. Trade 
liberalization may have important consequences in this regard through potentially 
favoring export-oriented agricultural sectors, possibly offsetting at least some of 
the decrease in agricultural employment, and increasing agricultural incomes. 
So far, we have been mainly concerned with the rural poor and the 
developments in the agricultural sector. More than two thirds of the Brazilian poor 
however either live in urban areas or from income earned in non-agricultural 
sectors. They may have been only indirectly affected by the intersectoral resource 
shifts just described, for example through downward pressure on non-agricultural 
wages because of labor released from agriculture. Ferreira and Paes de Barros 
(2005) find the abovementioned increase in extreme poverty in urban Brazil to be 
related to rising unemployment and informality. In addition, lower labor market 
returns contributed to higher poverty. These negative effects on poverty were 
partially offset by demographic developments, but mainly by educational 
expansion. In this regard, it should also be noted that low levels of education are 
an important determinant of poverty in Brazil. Educational expansion has hence 
become a major policy focus of the Brazilian government for good reasons.69 
Better education, in particular for the poor, is of course only one of the many 
factors that decide upon whether and how the poor benefit from growth. Social 
conflict and crime, deficient public service delivery as well as unemployment, in 
particular youth unemployment and a high share of informal work relations and 
self-employment are pressing problems in the metropolitan areas and their 
peripheries. Some of the latter issues certainly go beyond the scope of our analysis, 
but the decline of the informal sector as well as urban unemployment are key 
factors for poverty reduction. The poverty incidence among informal sector 
employees and the urban self-employed is almost as high as among rural self-
employed (Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Leite 2004). 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to empirically model the informal economy 
and formal-informal linkages without making very crude assumptions, for example 
on informal technologies, which is why we decided not to model informal 
69 The Bolsa Escola Program, a means-tested conditional cash transfer program that 
reaches 6 million households in Brazil, is one of the major policy instruments in this 
regard. See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002) for an assessment of Bolsa Escola 
using a microsimulation model. 
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activities explicitly. With regard to trade liberalization, it may of course well be 
that informal and formal activities are affected differently by trade reform, due to 
differences in technologies as well as export-orientation. Furthermore, our model 
is a full-employment model and we hence disregard unemployment, which may 
also arise, at least transitorily, due to trade liberalization. Admittedly, our poverty 
impact analysis may therefore miss some of the transmission channels through 
which trade liberalization affects especially the urban poor. We do however make 
an attempt to represent further educational expansion in our simulations. 
All in all, our analysis hence addresses the poverty and distributional impact of a 
subset of features of structural change that we consider particularly relevant for the 
Brazilian case (and possibly beyond Brazil), most importantly further structural 
change in agriculture, and how these features interact with trade policies. 
4.3. The modeling framework 
The model consists of a sequentially dynamic CGE model that is linked to a 
microimulation. The microsimulation takes the changes in factor and goods prices 
as given; hence, there is no feedback between these two parts of the model. We 
consider this framework particularly suited for the questions at hand, as the CGE 
model captures some of the main features of structural change and the relative 
price changes accompanying them. The microsimulation then allows for a detailed 
empirical assessment of the household responses to these changes. As will become 
clear in the following, the major advantage of the microsimulation is that its micro 
unit is the individual rather than the household, which offers much richer ways of 
representing distributional dynamics. 
4.3.1. The macro model 
A 1997 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) has been used as the initial benchmark 
equilibrium for the CGE model. This SAM has been assembled from various 
sources incorporating data from the 1997 Input Output table, information from the 
SAM assembled by Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr, and Gurgel (2003), and the 2001 
PNAD household survey. For the purposes of this model the full SAM - which 
includes 41 sectors, 41 commodities, 12 factors (skilled and unskilled labor by 
gender and by farm and non-farm occupation, agricultural and non-agricultural 
capital, land and natural resources), an aggregate household account, and other 
accounts (government, savings and investment, and rest of the world>7° - has been 
aggregated to a smaller size and it comprises the accounts shown in Table 4.1. 
70 See annex for a full list of accounts. 
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Table 4. 1: CGE Model accounts 
Model Sectors 
I Cereal Grains 7 OilMinerals 13 Machinery Equipment 
2 OilSeeds 8 LightManufacturing 14 OtherServices 
3 RawSugar 9 AgrilndustriesExp 15 Construction 
4 OthCrops 10 WoodProductsPaper 16 TradeCommunication 
5 Livestock II ChemicalsOilPr 17 PublicServices 
6 Raw Animal Products 12 MetalMineralProducts 
F aLtors of Production 
18 Land 21 Non-Agriculture Unskil. La 23 Agriculture Unskil. Lab 
19 Natural Resources 22 Non-Agriculture Skilled La 24 Agriculture Skilled Lab 
20 Capital 
Other Account~ 
25 Production Taxes 29 Direct Taxes 32 Investment-Savings 
26 Indirect Taxes 30 Households 33 Variation of Stocks 
27 Tariffs 31 Government 34 Rest of the World 
28 Export Taxes 
The CGE model is based on a standard neoclassical dynamic general 
equilibrium model and the following subsections describe its main features. Given 
our focus on labor markets and dynamic structural trends, more detailed 
explanations are provided on the modeling of factor markets and growth. 
Production. Output results from nested CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) functions that, at the top level, combine intermediate and value added 
aggregates. At the second level, on the one hand, the intermediate aggregate is 
obtained combining all products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure), and, on 
the other hand, value added results by aggregating the primary factors. At this 
level, primary factors are a capital-labor bundle and aggregate land. Lower levels 
disaggregate capital and labor, and then labor into different categories. 
Income Distribution and Absorption. Labor income and capital revenues are 
allocated to households according to a fixed coefficient distribution matrix derived 
from the original SAM. Notice that one of the main advantages of using the micro-
module is to enrich, as described above, this rather crude macro distribution 
mechanism. Private consumption demand is obtained through maximization of 
household specific utility function following the Linear Expenditure System 
(LES). Private savings are a fixed proportion of income. Once the total value of 
private consumption is determined, government and investment demands" are 
disaggregated in sectoral demands according to fixed coefficient functions. 
International Trade. The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods 
originating in different geographical areas.72 Imports demand results from a CES 
aggregation function of domestic and imported goods. Export supply is 
71 Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government 
expenditures are exogenously fixed. 
72 See Armington (1969) for details. 
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symmetrically modeled as a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. 
Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or foreign markets 
responding to relative prices. The assumptions of imperfect substitution and 
imperfect transformability grant a certain degree of autonomy of domestic prices 
with respect to foreign prices and prevent the model from generating comer 
solutions. This single country Brazilian model has been linked to a global CGE 
model by adding export demand functions so that the increased market access 
accompanying multilateral trade liberalization scenarios can be simulated more 
precisely. In particular, export demands have been implemented as shown in 
equation (I) and, during a trade policy simulation, to mimic the quantity and price 
shocks resulting from the global model, both the intercept d'k and the price level 
WPEindex are changed accordingly. 
q' 
ED = ,(WPEindexk J' k ak 
WPEk 
(I) 
No international import supply functions have been added and Brazil is a price 
taker for its imports. The balance of payments equilibrium is determined by the 
equality of foreign savings (which are exogenous) to the value for the current 
account. 
Factor Markets. Labor is distinguished into 2 categories: skilled and unskilled. 
These categories are considered imperfectly substitutable inputs in the production 
process; moreover, some degree of market segmentation is assumed: capital and 
land are perfectly mobile across sectors, and natural resources are sector specific, 
and labor markets for the unskilled are segmented between agriculture and non-
agriculture, whereas skilled workers are fully mobile. 
The labor market specification is a key element of our model and an important 
driver of poverty and distributional results. Therefore, its specification calls for 
some clarification and justification. Before we enter a discussion on the specific 
assumptions of our model, we shortly define labor market segmentation, as the 
applied modeling literature often handles this term rather sloppy.73 A common 
misunderstanding is that a labor market is segmented if one can identify 
"segments" with different wage-setting mechanisms, for example due to efficiency 
wages being paid to some segment of the workforce. Yet, different wage-setting 
causes wage rigidity that implies (price) rationing, but not segmentation. Such 
rationing due to different wage-setting may well be observed in an efficient, 
smoothly functioning labor market.74 A segmented labor market however does not 
73 See Taubman and Wachter (1986) for a general discussion of labor market 
segmentation. 
74 Note that rationing might of course well be inefficient if is for example due to 
government interventions. 
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work smoothly, as labor market mobility is limited and this puts constraints on the 
adjustment of the supply side. Such constraints could for example be deficiencies 
in educational systems that prevent unskilled workers from acquiring more skills 
despite an increasing wage gap between unskilled and skilled labor. 
As mentioned above, we assume that the labor market is segmented into 
unskilled and skilled labor. We think that this has become a standard assumption 
in COE modeling for good reasons. The inequalities of the Brazilian society also 
in terms of educational endowments and more importantly, access to education 
and on-the-job training, certainly justify this assumption even over medium-term 
time horizons. 
In addition, we assume that the market for unskilled labor is further segmented 
into agricultural and non-agricultural activities. This is without doubt a more 
controversial assumption, in particular in light of its importance in terms of 
poverty and distributional results. An obvious first check of this assumption is 
whether incomes in agriculture are really lower in agriculture once we control for 
all the "usual suspects" of wage determination, including education, experience, 
gender, racial dummies, other than sectoral employment-related variables, such as 
self-employment, being employed in the informal sector, or working only 
seasonally, and geographical variables that capture differences between the 
Brazilian regions as well as between rural and urban areas. Note that these 
geographical variables also capture spatial price differentials. Taking the largest 
non-agricultural sector in terms of employment, "other services", as a reference 
group, an OLS regression shows that individual labor incomes are significantly 
lower in all agricultural sectors except the oil seeds and the sugar cane sector, 
which only account for approximately 6 percent of agricultural employment. The 
regression results are reported in App. Table 4.4. Note that labor incomes in all 
non-agricultural sectors, with the notable exception of agricultural processing, are 
significantly higher than in "other services"." 
There can be a number of reasons for observing this income gap between 
agricultural and non-agricultural employment. A first explanation could be that 
agricultural income, in particular from self-employment, is systematically 
underreported. Yet, the regression results suggest that there is no underreporting 
problem for the self-employed, as for example both the dummy for self-
employment and the dummy for being a landowner16 tum out to be significantly 
positive. It can be argued at this point that these dummies reflect the returns to 
land, and underreporting may still be present. Even if so, we also do not see a 
reason why there should be systematically more underreporting among the wage-
employed in agricultural than among those in non-agricultural sectors. 
75 Note that these equations were estimated on monthly wages, which may introduce 
some seasonality bias. We also do not control for hours worked. We admit that the 
procedure to test for segmentation is somewhat rudimentary, but besides its 
shortcomings it should provide a rough approximation of sectoral wage differences. 
76 More than 60 percent of the agricultural self-employed work on their own land. 
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Another reason for the sectoral income differential may lie in pos1t1ve 
externalities associated to agricultural employment. Examples of such externalities 
include food self-sufficiency or employment opportunities for other family 
members. Yet, you can also easily think of negative externalities of agricultural 
employment, such as the exposure to weather shocks or hard physical work. These 
externalities are difficult if not impossible to quantify and we implicitly assume 
that positive and negative externalities tend to cancel each other out. 
If we accept that there is an income differential between agriculture and non-
agricultural sectors, the question is why individuals do not respond to this 
differential and move to the non-agricultural sector until incomes in both sectors 
are equalized. There must hence be barriers to mobility between agricultural and 
non-agricultural employment that prevent people from moving out of the 
agricultural sector. When thinking about limited mobility and the reasons behind 
it, the time horizon of the analysis is an important issue. It should be borne in mind 
that the time span considered here is approximately 15 years. A very important 
factor also in the medium run is that many people in the agricultural sector own 
land. Smallholders who own their own land and non-remunerated family members 
on these farms account for approximately 40 percent of agricultural employment in 
Brazil. There may be important externalities related to land ownership, such as 
economic independency. Some smallholders may not sell the land they own 
because of a bequest motive. The specificity of human capital acquired in the 
agricultural sector may also play an important role in making people stay in the 
agricultural sector. In addition, risk aversion may also prevent people from 
switching from agricultural to non-agricultural activities since they will only on 
average gain more in non-agricultural sectors. The estimations for our 
microsimulation model that we comment in more detail later lend empirical 
support to some of these hypotheses. In particular, we find that land ownership 
prevents individuals from moving out of the agricultural sector. 
The implementation of dual labor markets for unskilled workers follows the 
standard Harris-Todaro specification where the decision to migrate is a function of 
the expected income in the non agricultural (urban, in the original formulation) 
segment relative to the expected income in the agricultural (rural) segment. The 
specification deviates somewhat from Harris-Todaro. First, relative wages are used 
as a proxy for relative incomes. Second, actual wages determines migration rather 
than expected wages in the absence of unemployment. The basic migration 
equation has the form given in equation (2), where MIGR represents the level of 
migration between segments. Note that the index / indicates the skill level (/ = 
unskilled), and the index g represent the segment (g = agriculture or non-
agriculture ). 
[ 
m"' l AWAGE . I MIGR, = Xt ( Nag,,,t) - I 
AWAG£Agri,/ 
(2) 
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The variable A WAGE is the average wage in the respective segments and is given 
by equation (3). The average wage is calculated based on the net-of-tax wage rate, 
the rate which matters to the worker deciding to migrate or not. 
Labor market equilibrium conditions are based on two separate labor markets 
rather than the integrated market of the skilled workers. Equation (4) determines 
the equilibrium wage rate by segment-i.e. agriculture and non-agriculture. It sets 
the aggregate segment labor supply equal to the demand for labor in the same 
segment, i.e. it determines the variable iv' which is now indexed by both segment 
index as well as labor type. The model allows for inter-sectoral wage differentials, 
but these are exogenous in the standard model. Equation (5) evaluates the relative 
wages with respect to the segment-specific equilibrium wage. 
L' I=" Ld1 g, ~ ,, (4) 
ieg 
(5) 
The remaining loose end is the definition of labor supply and this is given by 
equations (6) and (7). It is assumed that labor supply net of migration is given in 
any given period. In the dynamic scenario, labor supply in each segment grows at 
the same exogenous rate, l and migration is subtracted from this amount in the 
agricultural segment, equation (6), and is added to labor supply in the non-
agricultural segment, equation (7). Equation (8) determines the total economy-
wide labor supply for each labor type. 
(6) 
(7) 
L;o,,l = L~ri,/ + L~agri,/ (8) 
Model Closures. The equilibrium condition on the balance of payments is 
combined with other closure conditions so that the model can be solved for each 
period. Firstly consider the government budget. Its surplus is fixed and the 
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household income tax schedule shifts in order to achieve the predetermined net 
government position. Secondly, investment must equal savings, which originate 
from households, corporations, government and rest of the world. Aggregate 
investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government 
expenditures are exogenously fixed. 
Growth equations. Sectoral shifts among agriculture and non-agriculture and 
human capital upgrading are two of the main features that have characterized 
recent growth processes in Brazil, and indeed in most developing nations. To 
capture these features in a transparent and simple dynamic framework, 
productivity growth calibration is different for the agriculture and non-agriculture 
sectors. Equation (9) defines the growth rate of GDP at market price and equation 
(10) is a formula expressing a balanced growth, where capital to labor ratio in 
efficiency units is constant. 
RGDPMP =(I+ gY) RGDPMP_1 (9) 
( 10) 
Equation ( 11) and (12) determine the growth rates of labor and capital 
productivity for the non-agricultural sectors (subscript nag). The growth rates have 
two comrments, a uniform factor applied in all sectors to all types of labor and 
capital, y and y", and a sector- and factor-specific factor, x' and x*. In defining a 
baseline, the growth rate of GDP is exogenous, as well as the capital to labor ratio. 
In this case, equation (9) is used to calibrate they' parameter and equation (10) 
calculates the common growth rate for capital productivity, y". In policy 
simulations, y1 and y" are given, and equation (9) defines the growth rate of GDP, 
whereas equation (10) estimates the capital output ratio. 
)_I -(1+yl + -vi )JI nag,/ - 11, nag,/ nag,/,-1 ( 11) 
( 12) 
Productivity growth in agriculture is treated differently. As already mentioned, 
in the last decade, Brazilian agriculture recorded high productivity growth, and we 
impose exogenous growth rate for productivity in agriculture uniformly across all 
factors, as shown in the following equations. Equation (13) represents the increase 
in labor productivity in agricultural sectors not subject to the uniform productivity 
shift factor y1• Equations (14) through ( 16) update productivity of capital, land and 
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the sector specific factor, respectively. With agricultural productivity assumed to 
be uniform across all factors of production, the growth parameters ;I,;/, ;I, ;i will 
be the same for all agricultural sectors. 
(13) 
(14) 
A~g,lt = (l + Z;g,11 )A~g,lt,-1 (15) 
(16) 
Additional support for a sector specific treatment of productivity where 
agriculture shows total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates higher than those for 
manufacturing comes from a recent panel study on sectoral productivity growth in 
OECD and developing countries.77 In this study, depending on the estimation 
method, the average growth rate for agricultural TFP in middle-income developing 
countries ranges from 1.78 to 2.91 (in% per year). 
Other elements of simple dynamics include exogenous growth of labor supply, 
with skilled labor growing faster than unskilled labor, and investment driven 
capital accumulation.78 
Equation (17) determines labor supply growth for the skilled workers (unskilled 
labor supplies are determined in equations (6) and (7)). It simply applies an 
exogenous assumption about the growth of labor supply, g'', to the labor supply 
shift parameter. Equation ( 18) updates population. Equations (19) and (20) are 
similar growth equations for land and the sector-specific resource, respectively. 
afs =(I+ gf') af'._1 
Pop = (1 + gPop) Pop _1 





Capital accumulation is based on the level of investment of the previous period 
less depreciation. Equation (21) represents the motion equation for capital growth, 
where 8 is the rate of depreciation and KAP is the capital stock. 
77 See Martin and Mitra (1999). 
78 Note that public investment, in this version of the model, has no impact on production 
technology. 
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KAP= (1- o)KAP_1 + XFz1p,-I (21) 
Other exogenous variables may require updating for the baseline. One obvious 
one is government expenditure. This is typically assumed to grow at the same rate 
as GDP: 
XFc;ov = (1 + gY )XFGov,-1 (22) 
Other variables that have been updated include the various transfer variables, 
foreign savings, exogenous world prices (i.e. the terms of trade), and fiscal 
policies. 
4.3.2. The micro model 
The micro model is linked to the macro model through changes in the following 
set of endogenous (in the CGE model) variables: (a) changes in agricultural and 
non-agricultural labor income ofunskilled labor (2 variables); (b) changes in labor 
income of skilled labor (1 variable); (c) changes in the sectoral (agriculture vs. 
non-agriculture) composition of the unskilled workforce (1 variable). In addition, 
we take into account that unskilled and skilled labor supplies grow at different 
rates. In the microsimulation, we do not produce a series of cross-sections through 
time, but only simulate one cross-section that reflects the cumulative changes in 
the aforementioned exogenous and endogenous variables between 2001 and 2015. 
In accordance with the structure of the CGE model, the micro model treats 
skilled and unskilled labor differently and, in particular, simulates the decision to 
move from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors only for unskilled workers. 
In the following, we first illustrate the equations to be estimated to serve as a 
basis for the microsimulation and we report and comment on some estimation 
results.79 Then, we outline the microsimulation module that combines (static) 
reweighting methods to reflect the changes in the composition of the labor force, 
i.e. the unskilled/skilled labor ratio, and (dynamic) behavioral elements to simulate 
the sectoral movements and wage changes given by the CGE. We conclude this 
section by pointing towards possible shortcomings of the data and the methods 
applied. 
79 The estimations are based on the 2001 PNAD. The sample includes 378 701 
individuals in 112 558 households. The number of employed individuals used for the 
estimation of the income generation model is 166 646. Due to a relatively large 
number of missing income observations, labor incomes are imputed using simple 
OLS income regressions for different groups of employed individuals (urban/rural, 
agriculture/non-agriculture, worker/self-employed/employee). See Ferreira et al. 
(2001) for details on the PNAD dataset and the problems of using the PNAD income 
measure for poverty and distributional analysis. 
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First, we estimate sectoral mover-stayer models for unskilled heads and non-
heads separately. For both heads and non-heads, we observe whether an individual 
has moved from agriculture into a non-agricultural sector. Our sample hence 
consists of those individuals who are still in agriculture and those who have moved 
out of agriculture within the last year. 
In contrast to many other household surveys, the PNAD provides information 
on employment histories, which allows us to identify the movers out of agriculture 
and, very important for our undertaking, the characteristics of the movers at the 
time of moving. For all the movers we thus know, for example, which type ofland 
right they had if they were self-employed before they moved out of agriculture. To 
our knowledge, this information has not been explored to date. The estimated 
model hence combines the idea of the mover-stayer model from the migration 
literature'° with the approach to modeling occupational dynamics typically applied 
in income generation microsimulations." In the latter approach, bi- or multinomial 
choice models are estimated on the entire population. In our case, this would imply 
comparing the characteristics of those in agriculture with those in non-agricultural 
sectors. Instead, the mover-stayer model compares the characteristics of only the 
movers with those of the stayers. This appears to be more appropriate in the 
current setting, as our goal is to simulate the transition from agriculture to non-
agriculture. 
Let move be a dichotomous variable that assumes a value of I if the individual 
has moved out of agriculture in the last year, and O if the individual has stayed in 
agriculture. As indicated by equation (23), an individual will move (move= I) if 
the utility ( U) associated to this choice is higher than the utility of staying in 
agriculture."' Otherwise, the individual will stay in agriculture (24). 
move= I if U (move=])> 0 
move = 0 otherwise. 
(23) 
(24) 
As indicated by equations (25) and (26), the utility of moving depends on a set 
of explanatory variables X and a random error term£. We hence assume a linear 
relationship between utility and the explanatory variables. The subscripts msh and 
80 See for example Nakosteen and Zimmer ( 1980). 
81 See for example Robilliard, Bourguignon, and Robinson (2002) and Bussolo and Lay 
(2005). The combination of retrospective information and choice models has been 
applied in microsimulation models e.g. to model fertility or schooling decisions. See 
Grimm (2005) for an application on Cote d'Ivoire. 
82 The utility of staying in agriculture is assumed to be 0. This is typical identifying 
assumption of the logit. 
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msnh refer to heads and non-heads, respectively. They also serve to remind us that 
the parameters and variable vectors are from the mover-stayer (ms) model." 
U(move = 1)msnh = am,nh + X msnh/Jm,nh + 8 msnh 
(25) 
(26) 
where X msh includes an educational dummy for more than lO years of schooling, 
age, a dummy that refers to own-consumption worker, an employment category to 
our knowledge unique to the PNAD that describes workers who are not self-
employed, do not receive any monetary income, and work "for their own 
consumption"84, two dummies that refer to the type of land right held by the self-
employed in agriculture, one referring to a situation, in which the landowner 
agrees with the self-employed occupying the land and another to the self-employed 
owning the land, and a regional dummy for the northern region. X m,nh for the non-
heads is a vector of similar variables, but some notable differences that will be 
discussed later in the regression results section. It consists of three educational 
dummies, experience (age-schooling-6), experience squared, a female dummy, a 
dummy for blacks, and the same employment category and land right dummies as 
before plus a dummy for non-remunerated family members or workers. Note that 
the reference group for the employment-related dummies are the wage-employed. 
In addition, the explanatory variables for the non-heads include a dummy for the 
household head being employed in a non-agricultural sector and another dummy 
for the head being a mover out of agriculture. 
As we cannot observe the latent utility U, the parameters of the mover-stayer 
model will be estimated by maximum likelihood logit techniques, i.e. we estimate 
the models described by equations (27) and (28), where F denotes the cumulative 
density function of the logistic distribution. 
(27) 
(28) 
In addition to the sectoral choice model, Mincer wage/profit equations for 
unskilled labor in agriculture (the subscript uagr) and non-agriculture (unagr), and 
for skilled labor (s) are estimated: 
83 We do not use a subscript for indicating individual observations in the exposition of 
the micromodel for illustrative purposes. 
84 See Notas Metodol6gicas PNAD 2001. 
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In w uag, = a uag, + X uag, fJ uag, + uw uag, 






where the explanatory variables in all three equations include years of education, 
experience, the corresponding squared terms, a female dummy and racial 
dummies. In addition, we include regional dummies that in equations (30) and (31) 
also differentiate between rural and urban areas. In the equation for the unskilled 
in agriculture (29), we introduce a dummy for being self-employed and the number 
of non-remunerated family members in order to capture their labor input. The 
wage/profit equations (29) to (31) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). 
Some words on the choice of this specification are in order, as estimating the 
two wage equations for unskilled labor using OLS may appear problematic to the 
reader who is familiar with the concept of selectivity bias and is aware of the 
available econometric methods to deal with it. The reason for estimating two wage 
equations is based on the assumption that the wage-setting process in agriculture is 
different from the one in non-agricultural sectors; and the results of our regressions 
confirm this assumption. When estimating two separate equations we therefore 
might have to account for selectivity bias. Selectivity bias refers to a bias in the 
coefficients of the wage equations which arises as the coefficients do not merely 
reflect the returns to education, seniority, or the influence of the included 
dummies, but also the returns of being employed in ( or selected into) the 
respective sector. For example, having a high level of education affects the 
sectoral choice, i.e. the earnings indirectly, as well as the earnings directly. 
Applying OLS to the estimation of two separate (sectoral) wage equations would 
result in coefficients that reflect both the indirect (selection) and the direct effects. 
Selection can also be interpreted in terms of having a kind of "comparative 
advantage" in the chosen sector, which is not explicitly accounted for but 
represented by the biased OLS coefficients. Econometricians often describe the 
concept of selectivity by noting that the selection into the respective sectors is non-
random. It has become very common to correct for selectivity bias using the so-
called Heckman correction or one of its many variants. 
Many authors have warned against the indiscriminate use of the selectivity 
correction methods." In line with this general skepticism, for reasons that have to 
do with the purpose of estimating the above equation, and due to practical 
estimation problems, we believe that correcting for selectivity bias is not necessary 
or may even lead to wrong results in the present context. The purpose of 
85 See Johnston, Di Nardo ( 1997, pp. 449-450) for a short overview of the major 
problems involved and the citations there. 
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estimating the wage equations is to impute earnings for those who move between 
sectors. If we estimate the wage equation using OLS we implicitly assume that the 
returns to education and other characteristics of the individual include the indirect 
returns due to selection. We believe that this can be reasonably assumed, as an 
individual, for whom a wage is to be imputed, is actually selected into the 
corresponding sector."6 In addition, estimating a selection model rendered 
inconsistent results. The only feasible estimation strategy would then have been to 
reduce the number of explanatory variables in the wage equation to include only 
one educational dummy for tertiary education with the remaining educational 
dummies to be only included in the selection equation."' This of course would have 
been highly unsatisfactory in terms of explaining the variation in earnings. These 
results are mainly owed to a combination of the following two factors. First, lower 
levels of education are highly significant in selecting an individual into agriculture. 
Second, there is little variation in these variables for those in non-agricultural 
sectors. In light of these theoretical and practical arguments we used OLS rather 
than Heckman correction procedures. 
With few exceptions the explanatory variables of the mover-stayer models as 
well as in the wage/profit equations are significant at the 5 percent level." The 
detailed regression results are reported in the App. Table 4.1 and App. Table 4.3, 
but here we just want to comment on some results that we find remarkable and 
consider of particular importance with regard to the simulation exercise. 
The mover-stayer models appear to have some predictive power for the 
decision to move out of agriculture, as indicated for example the Pseudo R 2 of 0.07 
for the heads' and 0.15 for the non-heads' mover-stayer model. It should be noted 
that measures of fit for logit models can only provide a rough indication of 
whether a model is adequate (Long and Freese 2001). 
In the mover-stayer model for heads, one educational dummy for IO or more 
years of schooling, turned out to have a significant positive influence on moving 
out of agriculture. Yet, we find a number of factors that negatively affect the 
choice of moving, among which age is the most important one. As we would 
expect, older individuals are less likely to move out of agriculture. The effect of a 
discrete change in age of some years is particularly strong for younger individuals. 
Working only for own-consumption also has quite a strong negative effect on the 
propensity to move out of agriculture. Many of these own-consumption workers 
are employed in the livestock sector and possibly even own livestock. In addition, 
if household heads own land or if they have an agreement with the landowner to 
occupy the land, they are more likely to stay in agriculture. Owning land or other 
agricultural production factors, such as livestock, hence acts as important barrier to 
86 This assumption implies that there are no differences between individuals in terms of 
sectoral comparative advantages. If we estimated the wage equation correcting for 
selectivity, these differences would be reflected in the individual inverse Mills ratios. 
87 These or similar problems of applications of the Heckman procedure are often noted 
in applied work. A case in point is Spatz (2004b). 
88 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. 
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intersectoral movements. Finally, household heads from the north are more likely 
to move out of agriculture, an interesting finding one might not necessarily expect, 
as the north is a region with a low share in agricultural employment. 
As described above, the list of explanatory variables for non-heads is longer. 
The strongest determinant of moving out of agriculture is the dummy indicating 
whether the household head is employed in a non-agricultural sector. We can think 
of either a self-employed head being able to offer employment to other household 
members in a non-agricultural household enterprise or networks of a wage-
employed head that facilitate finding non-agricultural employment for relatives. In 
addition, the choice of the household head to leave agriculture strongly influences 
the choice of the non-heads. Educational dummies for having finished primary and 
secondary education have a significant positive effect on the probability of moving 
out of agriculture. This effect is strongest for having finished primary education 
and declines somewhat for higher educational levels. The effect of a change in 
experience is much stronger than the effect of the corresponding change in the 
squared term. As in the case of the heads, the overall marginal effect of experience 
(including the squared term) declines with increasing experience. The subset of 
coefficients for educational dummies, experience, and squared experience can be 
interpreted as reflecting the earnings opportunities of an individual in non-
agricultural employment. In other words, these five explanatory variables can be 
thought of as a reduced form representation of the wage differential between 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Accordingly, the coefficients for 
education can be seen to reflect decreasing returns to education for the movers and 
the results for experience appear to catch both the effect of age being a barrier to 
move out of agriculture as well as the typical seniority effect in earnings, i.e. 
increasing but marginally decreasing returns to experience. In a similar way, the 
significant and negative coefficients for racial dummies can be interpreted either or 
both as a direct barrier to non-agricultural employment and/or an indirect effect 
that works through more racial discrimination in non-agricultural employment than 
in agriculture. 
Non-remunerated workers are less likely to move out of agriculture. This 
finding point towards the importance of externalities associated to this type of 
employment, as estimation results indicate that the income gains due to an 
additional household member engaged in the household farm are rather moderate 
(see App. Table 4.3). The coefficients of being an own-consumption worker or 
owning land are of the same sign as in the case of the heads and the changes in 
predicted probabilities due to a change in the dummy of equal magnitude. 
In sum, the results for the heads show the barriers to moving out of agriculture, 
whereas the results for non-heads also illustrate the possible gains of such a move. 
Household heads appear to respond to wage differentials between agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors to a lesser degree. They hence tend to be ''trapped" in 
agricultural activities, possibly due to factor market imperfections. Their decision 
to stay or move however is of great importance for the decision of other household 
members. 
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The microsimulation involves three steps. First, households are reweighted in 
order to reflect the change in the skilled/unskilled labor ratio that results from 
different growth rates of these two types of labor over time. In a second step, 
unskilled labor moves out of agriculture until the new share of unskilled labor in 
agriculture given by the COE is reproduced. Third, wages/profits are adjusted 
according to the COE results taking into account the changes in the skill 
composition of the workforce as well as the sectoral movements of unskilled labor 
from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors. 
The reweighting procedure basically increases the weight of skilled individuals 
and decreases the weight of unskilled individuals to reach a new given ratio of 
unskilled to skilled workers following an efficient information processing rule.89 
Let weight denote the old weight (normalized to 1), and nweight the new weight of 
individual i. As Robilliard and Robinson (2003), we estimate the new weights by 
minimizing the Kullback-Leibler cross-entropy measure of the distance between 
the new and the old weights 
"' [ nweight ) Min L,nweight; -In . ; 
; weight, 
(32) 
subject to the following constraints 
L nweight; · U; tu' 
_ tu -(1 + gJ 
-=L=-nw-e-ig_h_t;-. s-, - Is · (1 + g,) Tl° (33) 
Inweight, =l (34) 
with u (s), a dummy variable for unskilled (skilled) individuals i, tu (Is), the initial 
unskilled (skilled) labor force, and g" (gs), the cumulative growth rate (between 
2001 and 2015) of the unskilled (skilled) labor force. tu" (Is') hence denotes the 
target value for the number of unskilled (skilled) labor. Equation (33) hence states 
that the new weights have to reflect the new skill composition (the ratio of 
unskilled to skilled workers) of the workforce. Equation (34) is the adding-up 
normalization constraint. 
Note that this procedure gives new individual weights for just the employed 
population. Yet, for our purposes we need household weights for entire population. 
89 For details on maximum entropy econometrics see Golan, Judge and Miller (1996). 
Robilliard and Robinson (2003) apply these methods to reweight household survey 
weights. They also provide a GAMS code for solving this type of problems. 
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To those households where one or more individuals are employed, we assign the 
mean of the new individual weights. Households without any employed members 
were given the old weight. Note that the resulting unskilled-skilled ratio under 
these "final" new weights is of course not exactly equal to the ratio imposed in the 
cross-entropy reweighting."" Since the workforce in agriculture is almost entirely 
unskilled (more than 95 percent), the share of the unskilled labor force in 
agriculture is only slightly lower under the new weights. We use these new 
weights throughout the following parts of the microsimulation. 
The estimation of the sectoral choice logit model and the two wage equations 
provide the basis for the following steps in the simulation. In the second step, we 
apply the changes in the sectoral composition of the workforce from the COE 
(from agricultural into non-agricultural sectors) to the microlevel. In the 
simulation, those individuals from agriculture with the highest propensity to move 
to non-agricultural sectors are chosen to leave agriculture. This propensity is 
simulated by calculating the linear prediction of the logit model and adding a 
simulated residual. 
Equations (35) to (39) indicate how we move unskilled individuals out of 
agriculture. Let the index j refer to all unskilled individuals employed in the 
agricultural sector and i to all employed individuals. Note that the share of 
unskilled agricultural employment may change (and actually does, but only 
slightly) because of the introduction of the new weights at this stage and that move 
(not move*) is O for all j, as their observed choice is to stay in agriculture. 
Individuals move to non-agricultural sectors, i.e. move* equals I, if the utility 
associated to the choice to move increases. Equations (38) and (39) illustrate that 
we increase the utility of moving by augmenting the constants amsh and amsnh by 
;"',.am,h and ;"',.am,nh, respectively, in order to make individuals move. Changes in 
the choices of the heads have an impact on the choices of the non-heads, as the 
head's choice enters the utility of the non-heads, indicated by x,:,.h. The residuals 
i~,h and i!,,.h are simulated such that the resulting utility is consistent with the 
observed outcome in the initial situation.'1 Using a Newton-Raphson algorithm, we 
augment the constants until equation (35) holds. 
_ "f.nweight1 - "f.move;-nweight1 
agrshare = 1 1 L nwe ight, (35) 
90 We acknowledge that this is an ad-hoc procedure. In principle, it is possible to 
reweight all individuals respecting all necessary constraints. Yet, we consider the 
value added of this computationally quite expensive exercise too low. 
91 There are also residuals associated to move = 0, which is why the residuals of move 
=l have the superscript I. The residuals are drawn from a Gumbel distribution (type I 
extreme value) conditional on the observed choice, as suggested by Bourguignon, 
Fournier, and Gurgand (1998). 
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move'= I ifU' (move'=l)>U' (move'=O) 
move• = 0 otherwise 
and 






In order to determine both l"lamsh and l"lam.,nh we need another equation. We 
decided to fix the share of heads and non-heads movers so that equation (40) 
holds. 
Lmovet • weight1 
J L move7'"h · weight 1 
J 
'°' .msh L..move 1 ·nweight1 
~ .msnh L..move 1 • nweight1 
(40) 
After the assigning new weights and moving individuals out of agriculture, 
wages/profits need to be adjusted according to the COE results in the third step of 
the simulation. We illustrate the procedure of adjusting the constants of the 
wage/profit equations for unskilled labor only.92 Let k=l, ... ,K be an index for 
unskilled individuals still employed in agriculture ( excluding non-remunerated 
household members), k=K+l, ... ,M for the movers, and, finally, k=M+l, ... ,L for 
those unskilled in non-agricultural sectors who have been employed there before 
(again excluding non-remunerated household members). We assume that non-
remunerated household members earn an own labor income once they move out of 
agriculture. In equations (42) and (44) we calculate the target values for average 
labor income in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, w,,a8, and w,mag,, 
respectively, simply by multiplying initial average labor income by the growth 
rates g 11agr and g,magr given by the COE. These target values for the new 
distribution are reached by adjusting the constants in the wage/profit equations, as 
indicated by equations (43) and (45), taking into account the new weights that 
reflect the changed skill composition of the labor force. Note that for agriculture 
the procedure is slightly more complicated, as we also have to take into account 
that the dummy for agricultural self-employment as well as the number of non-
remunerated family members might change, indicated by x:agr in equation (43). 
92 For skilled labor, the adjustment in the constant only needs to account for the changes 
in weights. 
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M L wuagrk. weightk 
W uagr = k=I M • (l + g.,agr) 
l:weightk 
k=I 
K L w,'.agr k . nweightk 
~ k=I Wuagr = .;:...,_K _____ _ 
l:nweightk 
k=I 
i exp((a,,agr + 11auagr) + x:agrPuagr + U~uagr) · nweightk 
k~ k 
L L wunagr, . weight/ 
l=M+I (1 ) 
w,magr = L · + gunagr 
l:weight1 
l=M+I 
L L w:agr1 • nweight1 
l=K+l 
wunagr = [, 
Inweight1 
l=K+l 
t exJ(auagr +11auag,)+XunagrP,magr +~unagr) -nweight, 










The unexplained wage uw,,nagr for those who enter non-agriculture is calculated 
by taking the unexplained wage from agriculture and multiplying it by the ratio of 
the standard deviations of the residuals in the non-agricultural and agricultural 
sectors, respectively. For non-remunerated household members moving into non-
agricultural sectors we simulate a residual. 
In addition to labor income, we consider transfer and capital income as reported 
in the PNAD. Transfer income is scaled up or down with the GDP per capita 
growth rate and capital income with the change in the rental rate from the CGE 
model. The sum of all household members' individual incomes is divided by the 
number of household members to give the income per capita. We use regional 
poverty lines taking a R$ 80 per capita poverty line (in current 2001 prices) for 
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urban Rio de Janeiro as a basis and adjusting for regional price differences 
following Paes de Barros (2004). The poverty lines are reported in App. Table 4.5. 
Before we proceed to the results of our analysis, some shortcomings of the 
present approach have to be noted that will be addressed in future work. First, the 
household income generation process is of course much more complex than the 
proposed microsimulation model suggests. Many structural features of the 
Brazilian labor market, such as a high degree of informality in wage-employment 
and the important role of self-employment, are only accounted for rudimentarily. 
The major reason is that there is no point in modeling these labor market features 
on the micro level if they are not reflected in the COE. Second, the data that we 
use to estimate the mover-stayer model may not only capture long-term transitions 
from agricultural into non-agricultural employment. Some of the movers may 
actually move into a non-agricultural job only temporarily, for example due to 
seasonal reasons. Third, doubts have emerged regarding the reliability of the 
information drawn from the PNAD, in particular on rural, informal sector, and 
capital income (World Bank 2003). 
Finally, it may seem natural to assume that the sectoral movements are 
somehow related to physical migration from rural to urban areas either within or 
even between the Brazilian regions!' Traditionally, migration has acted as an 
important adjustment mechanism in Brazil. Nearly 40 percent of all Brazilians 
have migrated at one point in their lives (Fiess and Verner 2003). However, the 
data does not allow to link intersectoral movements to geographical migration. 
First, the migration-related questions of the PNAD unfortunately do not cover 
rural-urban migration. The available information is on whether an individual has 
moved between municipalities and/or between federal states. Second, using the 
information on migration in combination with the employment history from the 
PNAD 2001 suggests that only a minor share of about 12 percent of those leaving 
the agriculture actually migrates to another municipality. Approximately half of 
these migrants move to another federal state. In light of the importance of 
migration as an adjustment mechanism and the fact that the decline in agricultural 
employment is accompanied by a reduction in the rural population of equal 
magnitude, we think that these figures reflect data deficiencies rather than the 
Brazilian reality. It is quite likely that migrants are underrepresented in the PNAD. 
Therefore, we had to ignore the issue of geographical migration here due to the 
low share of migrants among the sectoral movers. Exploring these issues further 
and extending the model by linking structural change to geographical migration 
could prove a fruitful exercise, particularly in the Brazilian context. 
93 This would of course add to the list of arguments why the labor market for the 
unskilled should be considered segmented. 
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4.4. Brazil in the next decade: How trade policy affects a Business as Usual 
scenario? 
A central question of this chapter is assessing the poverty effects of trade policy 
refonns in the long run, when many structural adjustment forces shape the income 
generation process. Our starting point consists of using our CGE model to build a 
business as usual scenario depicting the evolution of the Brazilian economy in the 
next decade. This evolution should not be considered as a statistical forecast, but 
rather as a consistent "projection" of the economy in a future where inter-sectoral 
productivity growth differentials, skill upgrading, and migration of labor out of 
fanning activities play major roles. This Business as Usual (BaU) projection is 
then contrasted with alternative scenarios where trade policy refonns are added. 
The following subsections, describe in details the macro and micro results for the 
BaU and trade scenarios. 
4.4.1. The Business as Usual macro results 
In the BaU scenario, real GDP for Brazil is projected to grow (from 2005 onwards) 
at the fairly sustained yearly rate of 3.3%; this is somewhat optimistic when 
compared with the recent two decades' (l 980-2000) rate of 2%. This GDP growth 
perfonnance is backed up by strong factor productivity growth rates. As explained 
above, productivity in the agriculture sector is factor neutral and its growth rate is 
exogenously set at 2.9% per year; in the non-fann sectors, growth of labor 
productivity is calibrated at 1.02% per year and growth of capital productivity at 
0.82% per year. 
These differences in productivity growth rates across sectors, combined with 
faster growth of the supply of skilled versus unskilled labor generate significant 
structural adjustments, in line with those observed for the last decade. The changes 
in the structure of labor markets, shown in table 4.2, are of particular relevance for 
poverty and income distribution trends. On the supply side, education increases the 
supply of skilled workers which is growing at a 2.0% annual rate versus a yearly 
1.6% growth rate for the unskilled labor supply. Additionally, through out-
migration, the supply of unskilled workers in agriculture is shrinking. Labor 
demand is affected by the following three factors: labor productivity in agriculture 
is exogenous and slightly higher than in the rest of the economy; income elasticity 
of private consumption is below one for agricultural commodities and above one 
for other commodities; and, finally, international prices for traded agricultural 
products are decreasing through time. These three factors concur in reducing 
demand for labor in agricultural sectors and are the key drivers for the migration 
towards the non-agricultural segment. 
The described supply and demand trends are equilibrated by movements in the 
wages. In the time horizon considered here, the education premium is declining: 
real wages of the skilled increase at 1.3% annually. In non-agricultural sectors, 
wages for unskilled workers increase by the yearly rate of 0.9%, however this 
upward trend is dumped by migration. The reverse happens to agricultural wages 
which are boosted by the implied reduction of supply due to out-migration. 
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Table 4.2: Medium term labor market structural adjustments, 200/-2015 
Unskilled Lab Cumula-
Employment Wages migration tive 
-- ·-··-·--··· - ..... as~ of: ~igraJ{!! 
Product- Income Sending Receiving 2001-ivity of elast of Skilled Unsk Skilled Unsk 
labor demand Pop Pop 2015 
Yearly J!r constant Yearly growth rates Yearly% Millions 
Agri 2.9 0.54 0.0 1.7 1.7 -4.0 
Non-Agn 1.0 1.05 2.2 0.9 0.5 4.0 
Economyw,de 2.0 1.7 1.3 
Source: Authors' calculations 
As shown in Table 4.3 these structural trends result in a significant 5 percent 
points shrinking in the agricultural employment for unskilled combined with a 
reduction of the unskilled wage gap between agriculture and non-agriculture. 
Notice that the employment percent structure of this table is one of the key 
variables linking the macro and micro models. 
Table 4.3: Employment shares and wage ratios in 200/ and 2015 
Employment % 
Skilled Unskilled Unskilled wages 
2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015 
Agri 4 3 27 22 
Non-Af!ri 96 97 73 78 
Ratio N-Agri/Agri 1.8 1.6 
Source: Authors' calculations 
The BaU's GDP and labor markets macro trends are linked to developments at 
the sectoral level (shown in Table 4.4). Output growth rates are slightly lower for 
the agricultural sectors than for the non-agricultural ones. Agriculture exports, due 
to falling primary commodity international prices, grow at a slightly lower pace 
than non-agriculture exports. Additionally, in agricultural sectors, employment of 
unskilled workers is stalled or reduced, whereas demand for skilled workers, 
whose wages are increasing at a contained pace, is increasing. Productivity gains 
dictate that less workers are needed to achieve the same output, and rising wages, 
in particular for unskilled workers, induce producers to substitute (although with a 
low level of substitution) skilled workers for unskilled ones. The rightmost panel 
of the table shows the relative sizes of sectors in terms of employment and the skill 
intensities of each sector. Services are the largest employers of both skilled and 
unskilled workers but, on average, they use skilled labor more intensively. 
Agriculture employs almost a third of unskilled workers and uses this factor quite 
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intensively, whereas manufacturing labor intensities are in-between agriculture and 
services. 
Table 4.4: BaU's output and trade sectoral growth rates, and employment 
intensities 
Annual average growth rates Employment percentages 
Labor demand by sector by skill 
Output Imports Exports Skilled lfnsk- Skilled Unsk. Skilled -Unsk 
- --·---- - ----·------- .. -·-----~--- --
0 
---·------- --~----
Cerea/Grains 3.2 2.5 2.3 0.3 0.1 5 2 98 
Oi/Seeds 3.1 2.2 2.4 0.1 -0.1 0 I 6 94 
RawSugar 3.2 0.2 0.1 0 I 4 96 
OtherCrops 2.9 1.3 2.5 0.0 -0.1 I 12 3 97 
Livestock 3.2 1.5 0.3 0.1 2 4 IO 90 
RawAnima/Products 3.3 2.5 1.6 0.4 0.3 0 3 I 99 
Oi/Minera/s 3.3 3.0 2.9 1.5 1.7 0 0 15 85 
LightManufacturing 3.3 0.8 3.7 1.0 1.2 I 2 16 84 
Agri!ndustriesExp 3.2 0.5 3.4 1.0 1.2 2 3 16 84 
WoodProductsl'aper 3.3 0.9 3.5 1.0 1.2 2 2 15 85 
ChemicalsOi/Pr 3.3 1.8 2.9 I. I 1.3 2 I 30 70 
Meta/Minera/Products 3.5 1.8 3.3 1.2 1.4 2 2 17 83 
MachineryEquipment 3.6 1.9 3.5 1.4 1.6 3 2 28 72 
----------- ----· ~ ----~--------- ----------
-OtherServices -3~0-- 2.6 1.7 2.1 i.3 58 30 33 67 
Construction 3.2 2.3 2.5 2 8 6 94 
TradeCommunication 3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.4 15 18 17 83 
Pub/icServices 3.1 2.7 1.7 2.2 2.4 9 4 41 59 
Agri 3.0 1.9 2.4 0.0 4 27 6 94 
Non-Agri 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.2 96 73 26 74 
Economywide 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.0 100 100 24 76 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: The mapping of this table sectors and GTAP sectors is shown in App. Table 4.6 and 
App. Table 4.7. 
4.4.2. Distributional and poverty results for the BaU 
A moderate decrease in poverty between 2001 and 2015 results from micro-
simulating the identified key structural trends on the Brazilian household data. 
Considering the full sample of all households, the headcount poverty ratio (PO) 
declines by about 6 percentage points (see Table 4.5). The reduction of the average 
normalized poverty gap (PI) and the poverty severity index (P2) indicates that 
those who remain poor move closer to the poverty line."' Inequality changes very 
94 A short note on the interpretation of the reported poverty measures: The income-gap 
ratio, i.e. average income shortfall (of the poor) divided by the poverty line, can be 
calculated as Pl/PO. This ratio is 0.4 for all households in our case, i.e. the perfectly 
targeted cash transfer needed to lift every poor person out of poverty is 40 percent of 
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little, as indicated by the 0.1 decrease in Gini coefficient ( or as in the Theil or 
other inequality indices, not reported). 
These average indices indicate that some progress in reducing aggregate 
poverty and inequality is achieved in a Business as Usual scenario, but these 
aggregate measures may conceal relevant distributional changes at a more 
disaggregated level. In fact, reaching stronger poverty reduction may require 
specific pro-poor policies which often rely, for their successful implementation, on 
more detailed information about disaggregated distributional effects. 
A first obvious way to gather more detailed information is to analyze the 
poverty and inequality impacts separately for the agricultural and non-agricultural 
households. 
Table 4.5: Poverty and inequality in the BaU scenario, by sectors 
All households Non-agricultural Agricultural hou.fehold.f 
2001 level 
2001-15 
2001 level 2001-15 2001 level 
2001-15 
chanl!e chanl!e chanl!e 
PC income 314.9 1.5 351.9 1.2 148.3 2.3 
Gini 58.6 -0.1 57.1 0.6 56.6 -0.7 
PO 23.6 -5.6 18.6 -3.1 46.2 -13.8 
Pl 9.6 -3.0 7.1 -1.6 21.0 -8.0 
P2 5.3 -1.8 3.7 -0.9 12.3 -5.2 
Pupu/atwn% 100 81.8 3.3 18.2 -3.3 
Cuntr. tu PO 64.4 8.8 35.6 -8.8 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: PC income is per capita income in 2001 R$ and the change is given as annual 
growth rate. All levels are in percent and changes in percentage points. 
A household is classified as "agricultural" when its head and/or at least two of 
its members are employed in agriculture. In 2001, according to this classification, 
agricultural households accounted for 18.2 percent of the Brazilian population, 
poverty incidence among them almost reached 50 percent, and their contribution to 
total poverty was about 36 percent (see Table 4.5). Between 2001 and 2015, the 
share of agricultural households in the population shrinks by 3.3 percentage points 
following the decline in agricultural employment of more than 5 percentage points. 
Poverty among agricultural households falls by more than 13 percentage points, 
whereas poverty among non-agricultural households decreases by only 3.1 percent. 
Accordingly, the contribution of agricultural households to the headcount falls by 
almost 9 percentage points. 
the poverty line times the number of the poor. Thus, 0.4 times the percentage point 
change in PO (here 2.4) provides a percentage point change benchmark for evaluating 
the change in Pl, as this would be the change in Pl that we would observe had the 
average income of the poor stayed constant while the headcount declined. 
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A more detailed analysis also shows that the lack of progress in aggregate 
inequality is due to the agricultural and non-agricultural groups' individual 
inequality indicators moving in opposite directions. Among non-agricultural 
households, inequality rises because skilled labor income, a major source of 
income for these households, grows faster than that of unskilled labor. Conversely, 
inequality among agricultural households falls, mainly because richer agricultural 
households earn a higher share of their income from non-agricultural unskilled 
labor and, in some cases, from skilled labor. 
Figure 4. I: Growth incidence curves, BaU, all, agricultural, and non-agricultural 
households 
0 20 40 60 80 
Cumulative population ranked by per capita income 
I== ~~n-agr ----- Agr I 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
100 
Another way of analyzing detailed distributional effects is to consider growth 
incidence curves. These curves plot per capita income growth at income 
percentiles (Ravallion and Chen 2003) and are shown in Figure 4.1 for all 
households as well as for the agricultural and non-agricultural groups." Reflecting 
the increase in unskilled agricultural wages from the CGE model's results, per 
capita income growth is much higher for agricultural households. In addition, the 
agricultural growth incidence curve illustrates a strong pro-poor distributional 
shift, which reflects both the increase in agricultural labor incomes and the gains 
resulting from moving out of agriculture. These agricultural households specific 
distribution shifts also explain the pro-poor changes in the national distribution, 
95 The household category, i.e. agricultural or non-agricultural household, is the 
category the household belonged to in the base year 2001. 
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since only minor distributional changes are registered in the non-agricultural 
distribution. However, richer non-agricultural households experience somewhat 
higher gains than poorer households. Non-agricultural poor household incomes 
increase by a meager 1 to 1.5 percent annually. 
These more detailed analyses of the long term evolution of the Brazilian income 
distribution highlight the different roles played by changes in inequality and shifts 
in the growth rates of the average incomes. The following two relevant questions 
then arise: if the current (2001) distribution of income were to remain unchanged, 
how would additional growth help in reducing poverty? And, what is the role of 
the differential in the sectoral growth rates for agriculture and non-agriculture in 
reducing poverty? 
Answering these questions requires performing two additional micro-
simulations as follows. The first simulation generates a counterfactual distribution 
under the assumption that all incomes out of all sources grow by 1.5 percent 
annually. This implies shifting the entire income distribution "to the right" leaving 
its shape unchanged. Individuals do not change employment sectors and hence 
households retain their initial non-agricultural or agricultural classification. Results 
are presented in Table 4.6 and changes are given as percentage share of the BaU 
change (column I). In addition, we simulated a second counterfactual distribution 
for agricultural and non-agricultural households separately with per capita incomes 
of the respective household types growing with the BaU rates, i.e. by 1.3 percent 
annually for non-agricultural and 2.4 percent annually for the agricultural 
households (column II). 
Table 4.6: Poverty and inequality in a distributionally neutral scenario 






PC income 314.9 100.0 100.0 351.9 117.7 100.0 148.3 65.7 100.0 
PO 23.6 91.7 102.4 18.6 139.8 133.3 45.9 56.5 90.5 
PI 9.6 90.9 97.7 7.1 132.5 119.7 20.8 61.9 93.2 
/'2 5.3 86.8 97.9 3.7 125.6 114.3 12.l 62.6 93.4 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
The comparison of the counterfactual simulations of the "completely" 
distributionally neutral ( column I) and the "separately" neutral ( column II) 
scenarios shows that the growth bias in favor of agricultural households is poverty 
reducing. Yet, the difference between the BaU and the completely neutral scenario 
does not seem too pronounced. This is due to the fact that poverty among non-
agricultural households is reduced much more than in the BaU, where the income 
distribution among these households worsens. This "slight" worsening of the 
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income distribution hence hampers quite strongly the potential of growth to reduce 
poverty among non-agricultural households. In addition, the differences between 
the two neutral scenarios for non-agricultural households illustrate that a 0.2 
percentage point difference in annual growth rates for 14 years can make a 
difference in terms of poverty reduction. The last two columns of Table 4.6 show 
the importance of growth for reducing poverty among agricultural households as 
well. A 0.9 point percentage point difference in annual income growth rates for 14 
years implies a reduction of about 5 percentage points less in the headcount over 
this time period. In contrast to what we see for non-agricultural households, the 
impact of the pro-poor distributional shift for agricultural households observed in 
the BaU is relatively small. In other words, had the income distribution among 
agricultural households not improved, growth would have reduced poverty by only 
little less. 
The poverty reductions recorded in the BaU scenario are due the change in skill 
endowments, the increase in real factor prices, and inter-sectoral movements. A 
main advantage of micro-simulation techniques is their ability to decompose the 
total effect in different partial effects that can be attributed to single causes. A 
slight complication arises because different causes interact. The interaction arises 
because factor incomes increase at different rates in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. By simulating counterfactual distributions, where only one 
cause at the time, or a combination of two of them, are included, it is possible to 
decompose the total effect into individual or joint (interactive) contributions. 
Figure 4.2: Decomposition of poverty changes, BaU, all households 
D Skill Upgrading 
• Sect. Change 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a Factor Price Change J 
• Interaction 
Note: The figure displays the contribution of the respective component to the total change 
in PO and P2, respectively, in percent. The contributions add to 100. Contributions 
refer to reductions in the respective poverty indices. 
Jann Lay - 978-3-631-75365-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:52:47AM
via free access
114 BRAZIL 
Figure 4.2 displays the results of this decomposition. Factor price changes 
account for the largest share of total poverty reduction. The change in the skill 
composition of the workforce does not contribute much to poverty reduction, 
whereas the sectoral shifts are quite important, in particular for the poorer among 
the poor, as the higher contribution of the sectoral change component with regard 
to P2 indicates. This implies that households with members moving out of the 
agricultural sector escape poverty. We consider this issue in more detail later. The 
interaction component, which actually is a sum of distinct interaction components, 
hampers poverty reduction. Counterfactual simulations show that the interaction 
between sectoral movements and income changes is the most important one. It is 
negative since people move out of agriculture where their incomes would have 
increased much more than in non-agricultural sectors. 
In sum, the distributional and poverty analysis suggests that the BaU scenario 
leads to relatively little poverty reduction. Agricultural households fare quite well 
and the poverty incidence and intensity among them is reduced quite substantially. 
Decomposition analyses show that sectoral change contributes quite significantly 
to poverty reduction, although income growth is the most important source of 
poverty reduction. Micro-accounting exercises underline the importance of growth 
for poverty reduction, but we also illustrate that slight increases in inequality can 
considerably reduce the poverty reduction potential of growth in the context of a 
high-inequality country, such as Brazil. 
4.4.3. Macro results for the full liberalization and the Doha trade policy 
shocks 
The trade shocks simulated in the dynamic CGE model consist of changes in 
Brazilian tariff protection against imports from the rest of the world and of 
exogenous changes of international prices of traded goods and export quantities 
demanded by foreigners. 96 The shocks are assumed to take place progressively 
through a gradual phasing-in starting in 2005 and lasting 6 years. Table 4.7 
displays these shocks as percentage changes of the final year (2015) between the 
BaU and the trade reform scenarios. As part of the shock and to leave the 
government fiscal balance unchanged, tariff revenue losses are compensated by a 
lump sum transfer implemented as an increase in the direct taxes paid by 
households. This lump sum additional tax is the least distortionary instrument that 
can be readily used in our model, however, in practice, the Brazilian government 
may chose other forms of compensatory taxes which may alter relative prices and 
have significant income distribution effects. 
96 It should be noted that to mimic the global model results for increased demand for 
Brazilian exports and changes in international prices, we introduce a downward 
sloping export demand function as shown in equation (I) above. During a shock, for 
obvious reasons, we cannot target both prices and quantities and the shock is 
implemented by modifying both the international price index WPEindex (the price 
shock) and the intercept dt (the quantity shock). Our Brazil (single-country) model 
will then endogenously determine the quantity supplied. 
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Table 4. 7: Trade shock - Tariff reductions and international prices changes 
Own tariff reductions Change in import prices Change in export prices 
Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak 
lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha 
Cereo/Grains -100 8 2.0 2.1 16 5.9 6.0 
Oi/Seeds -100 6 2.5 2.5 14 4.8 4.9 
RawSugar 2 0.9 1.0 14 5.3 5.4 
OtherCrops -100 0 0 2 0.9 0.9 13 4.7 4.8 
Livestock -100 2 1.0 I.I 25 9.7 9.8 
RawAnima/Producls -100 2 0.4 0.4 18 6.6 6.7 
Oi/Minerals -100 0 0 0.1 0.1 2 I.I 1.3 
LightManufacturing -100 -6 0 I I.I 1.2 9 3.8 4.0 
Agri!ndustriesExp -100 -4 -1 0 0.6 0.6 7 3.0 3.2 
WoodProductsPaper -100 -6 -2 0 0.0 0.0 4 1.8 2.0 
Chemica/sOi/Pr -100 -1 I -3 -1 -0.1 0.0 3 1.4 1.7 
Meta/Minera/Products -100 -6 -1 0 0.0 00 3 1.6 1.7 
MachineryEquioment -100 -7 -2 0 0.0 00 2 1.5 1.7 
OtherServ,ces 0 0.0 0.0 5 2.0 2.2 
Construction 0 0.0 0.0 4 1.7 1.9 
TradeCommunication 0 -0.1 -0.1 5 1.9 2.1 
Pub/icServices 0 -0.1 -0.1 5 2.1 2.3 
Agri -100 0 0 5 1.5 1.5 14 4.8 4.9 
Non-Agri -100 -7 -2 0 0.0 0.1 4 1.9 2.1 
Economywide -100 -7 -2 0 0.1 0.1 5 2.2 2.4 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
The full liberalization scenario has the largest impacts: tariffs are completely 
eliminated and Brazil enjoys strong terms of trade gains; the other two shocks, 
representing two possible versions of the Doha negotiation outcomes, generate 
almost no own liberalization and fairly muted global prices effects. In order to 
fully appreciate their final effects, these shocks need to be mapped to the economic 
structure of Brazil. Table 4.8 presents this structure and helps in this regard. For 
instance, in the full liberalization scenario, export oriented sectors - those 
displaying high shares of export to domestic output - such as Oilseeds, Other 
Crops and the industrial sectors transforming agricultural products 
(AgrilndustriesExp which buys most of its inputs from agriculture) record 
considerable increases of their export prices. Conversely, import competing 
sectors, such as Chemicals and Oil derived products and capital goods, do not face 
high increases in their international prices. These combined export and import 
price movements result in fairly strong terms of trade gains, inducing significant 
reallocation of resources towards export oriented sectors. Additional push for this 
reallocation comes from Brazil's own liberalization which entails a reduction of 
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the anti-export bias implicit in the higher protection rates for manufacturing of the 
initial tariff structure. 
Table 4.8: Initial (year 2001) structure of the Bra=ilian economy 
I 
Tariff Sectoral Imports/ Sectoral Sectoral Exports/ DomDemof Dom 
rates imports output exports comp output 
Cereo/Grains 7 I 15 I 0 I 
Oi/Seeds 6 0 8 0 4 29 
RawSugar 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OtherCrops 9 2 3 4 8 7 
Livestock 3 0 I I 0 0 
Raw Animal Products 8 0 I I 0 I 
Oil Minerals 4 7 33 I 7 25 
Light Manufacturing 17 4 5 5 3 2 
AgrilndustriesExp 18 3 3 7 19 II 
WoodProductsPaper 9 2 5 3 7 IO 
ChemicalsOi/Pr 9 15 10 9 8 3 
Metal Mineral Products 12 5 6 5 13 11 
MachineryEquipment 19 37 27 8 20 II 
OtherServices 0 II 3 23 5 I 
Construction 0 0 0 8 0 0 
TradeCommunication 0 IO 5 13 5 2 
Pub/icServices 0 2 1 II I 0 
Agri 8 4 4 7 12 6 
Non-Agri II 96 6 93 88 4 
Economywide II 100 6 100 100 4 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
These effects are detailed in Table 4.9. The complete elimination of tariffs in 
the full liberalization case explains the large increase of imports (measured in 
volume) which, in the final year of this scenario, is 2 I% above the value in the 
same year of the BaU. Increases in imports of agricultural goods are much weaker: 
an aggregate 6% increase versus the 21 % surge of the non-agriculture bundle. The 
combination of lower initial tariffs and stronger international price increases for 
agriculture, with respect to non-agriculture, explain the difference in import 
response of these two aggregate sectors. Given their very limited scope of tariff 
reduction, the Doha scenarios imply much more contained changes of imports. 
With high elasticity of substitution in demand (currently set at 4), cheaper 
imports have the potential to displace domestic production, especially for those 
goods whose demand is fulfilled by a large share of foreign supply. For Brazil, this 
is the case for the Chemicals, and Capital goods sectors. In the full liberalization 
scenario, domestic production experiences significant market share losses in these 
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sectors; however this is not happening in the Doha cases. The competition from 
cheaper imports is also reflected - again only for the full liberalization case - in 
the decline of prices of domestic output. 
Table 4. 9: Brazil' structural adjustment, percent changes in the final year 
between BaU and trade shocks 
Demand side 
Import volumes 
Domestic demand of Price of domestic 
dom nroducts out,.ut in dom mkts 
Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak 
lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha 
Cerea/Grains -6 -3 -3 4 1 1 -2 1 1 
Qi/Seeds -18 -8 -7 5 1 1 -6 0 0 
RawSugar 0 0 0 -2 1 1 
QtherCrops 23 1 2 1 0 0 -1 1 1 
Livestock -4 1 1 3 1 1 -2 1 1 
RawAnima/Products 22 4 5 2 1 1 -2 1 1 
Qi/Minerals -6 0 1 1 -1 -1 -5 0 1 
LightManufacturing 48 0 -3 0 1 I -5 0 0 
AgrilndustriesExp 59 2 1 0 0 0 -4 0 1 
WoodProductsPaper 23 4 4 -1 0 0 -4 0 1 
ChemicalsQi/Pr 18 5 3 -2 -1 0 -4 0 1 
Meta!Minera/Product 24 3 2 -4 -1 -1 -5 0 1 
MachineryEg_ui[J'!'_e_nt_ 42 5 3 _-12 ____ -l__ -1 -6 0 1 ------- ----· ·---------
QtherServices 1 0 0 -4 0 1 
Construction -14 2 3 0 0 0 -3 0 1 
TradeCommunication -12 2 3 0 0 0 -3 0 1 
PublicServices -13 2 3 0 0 0 -3 0 1 
--·---------------- --·- --- --- -- ------ ------ ----·-----···-- -- --·· 
Agri 6 -2 -1 2 1 1 -2 1 1 
Non-Agri 21 3 3 -1 0 0 -4 0 1 
Economywide 21 3 3 -1 0 0 -4 0 1 
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Table 4.9 continued 
_J Supply side Exoort volumes Domestic outout Price of domestic Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak Full Deep Weak 
lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha lib Doha Doha 
Cerea/Grains 68 14 13 5 I I -2 I I 
Di/Seeds 60 9 8 20 3 3 -3 I I 
RawSugar 0 0 0 -2 I I 
DtherCrops 6 -3 -3 I 0 0 -1 I I 
Livestock 3 I I -2 I I 
RawAnima/Products 5 0 -1 2 I I -2 I I 
- -------- --··-····- - . ----··-· - -----· ... -·· 
Di/Minerals 26 2 I 7 0 0 -4 0 I 
LightManufacturing 159 62 61 5 3 3 -4 0 I 
Agri!ndustriesExp 30 4 4 3 I I -4 I I 
WoodProductsPaper II -1 -1 0 0 0 -4 0 I 
ChemicalsDi/Pr 9 -1 -1 -2 -1 0 -4 0 I 
Meta/Minera/Product 15 0 -I -2 -1 -1 -4 0 I 
MachinerJ.Equipment 11 -1 -2 -10 -1 -I -5 0 I 
DtherServices I 0 0 -4 0 I 
Construction 8 -I -1 0 0 0 -3 0 I 
TradeCommunication 6 -1 -2 0 0 0 -3 0 I 
PublicServices 7 -1 -2 0 0 0 -3 0 I 
Agri 22 I 0 3 I I -2 I I 
Non-Agri 21 3 2 0 0 0 -4 0 I 
Economywide 21 3 2 0 0 0 -4 0 I 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
These demand/imports side effects are linked to the supply response to which 
we now tum. For producers of exportable goods, the reduction of prices in local 
markets (~Pd) combined with unchanged or rising export prices creates incentives 
to increase the share of sales destined to foreign markets. This export response 
(shown in the columns "Export Volumes") varies across sectors and it is linked to 
the pattern of Brazil's comparative advantage and to the increase in international 
prices. Brazil's comparative advantage can be ascertained by considering the 
export orientation (Exports / Dom Output) column in Table 4.8, which highlights 
three sectors in particular: Oilseeds, Other Crops, and the Agricultural 
transformation industry. These sectors - which also enjoy large jumps in their 
international price - experience export surges. Due to the generally positive export 
price shocks, other sectors join in an overall expansion of supply to foreign 
markets. Rising export sales more than offset, or at least compensate, reductions of 
domestic sales and lead to changes observed in the columns labeled "Domestic 
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Output". Finally output price changes (in the rightmost columns) are in between 
those of domestic prices and those of export prices for the simple reason that 
output prices are a combination (CET prices) of (generally) rising export prices 
and domestic prices. 
As for the demand side, similar across-scenarios differences are observed for 
the supply side. In particular, given the closure rule for the foreign market, 
economy wide increases of import volumes are balanced by a comparable increase 
in exports.9' 
In summary, trade reforms promote a production structure specialized towards 
exportables, which in Brazil is translated in a specialization towards primary or 
agricultural transformation sectors. This agriculture export-led boom is fully 
achieved only in the full liberalization scenario, given its stronger price changes 
and the elimination oftariffs.98 
The full liberalization and the two Doha scenarios entail trade policy reforms 
that combine, in different proportions, domestic tariff abatement with external 
price and quantity shocks. It has been shown that, in most situations, unilateral 
liberalization is beneficial; however it may be of interest, especially from a 
negotiation point of view, to decompose the total effect and ascertain the shares 
attributable to domestic liberalization and to external shocks. Given the 
interactions between Brazilian domestic policies and the Rest of the World (ROW) 
policies, a decomposition exercise is path dependent, therefore the shares 
attributed to one set of policy or the other will differ according to the choice in 
their sequencing. 
For three key variables, Table 4.10 shows the effects of the total and partial 
shocks as indices calculated on the levels reached in the final year, with the final 
year for the BaU equal to 100. In the case of the full liberalization scenario and 
across all variables, own liberalization accounts for a large share of the total shock. 
Imports in agriculture actually increase more in the partial own liberalization 
shock than in the combined shock, given that the external shock drives 
international agricultural prices up. The reduction of the mentioned anti-
(agriculture-)export bias implicit in the initial protection, is also explaining the 
large share of export and real GDP effects accounted by the own liberalization 
shock. 
97 Due to the closure rule of the external account, namely the fixing of foreign savings, 
and the full employment assumption, the slightly lower expansion of the volumes of 
exports, with respect to import volumes is compensated with a real exchange rate 
appreciation which originates from rising domestic resource costs. 
98 It should be stressed that in our model trade opening only produces allocative 
efficiency gains and not other, potentially much stronger, dynamic productivity gains. 
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Table 4. JO: Effects on imports, exports and real GDP due to combined or partial 
shock (Indices, BaU = JOO in 2015) 
Demand side Supply side "Welfare" 
Import volumes Export volumes Real GDP 
Full lib Deep Weak Full lib Deep Weak Full lib Deep Weak n-L- n-L- n-L- n-L- n-L- n-L-
Combined (Own+ Rest of the world 
liberalization) shock- BaU = JOO 
Agri 105.7 98.3 99.1 122.4 100.7 100.2 102.9 100.0 99.9 
Non-Agri 121.3 103.3 102.7 121.0 102.7 102.0 100.1 1000 100.0 
Economywide 120.8 103.1 102.5 121.2 102.5 101.8 100.2 100.0 100.0 
Own shock- BaU = JOO 
Agri 107.3 98.9 99.8 114.5 100.8 100.2 102.0 100.2 100.0 
Non-Agri 113.1 100.8 100.2 116.6 101.0 100.3 100.2 100.0 100.0 
Economywide 112.9 100.8 100.2 116.4 101.0 100.3 100.3 100.0 100.0 
----- ----·-- -------·- -·--- - ----- -····· ·-
Rest of the world shock-- BaU = JOO 
···- --·------- ···-iii-i .... -- - .. 968 994 .. -99.4 .. 107.1 99.9 99.9 101.0 99.8 99.8 
Non-Agri 107.5 1024 1024 104.2 1017 1017 99.9 100.0 100.0 
Economywide 107.1 102.3 102.3 104.4 1015 101.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: For each variable, these indices are calculated as the ratio of the level in the trade 
scenarios to that of the BaU scenario for the last year (2015) and multiplied by 100. 
Decomposition results for the Doha scenarios are less clear cut. The magnitudes 
of the shocks are much smaller, however even the very low levels of domestic 
tariff abatement seem to matter for the final result. A relevant policy lesson 
emerges from the comparison of the two partial shocks panels of Table 4.10: a 
passive non reciprocating attitude may bring some advantages; however these are 
quite limited, even in the extreme case where every one in the world but Brazil 
implements full liberalization. In fact, these externally-induced benefits may be 
greatly enhanced by an active domestic liberalization reform. 
For their poverty and income distribution implications, changes in factors' 
markets are the most important aspect of the structural adjustment caused by trade 
reform. Changes in wages and sectoral employment are linked to changes of goods 
prices through the production technology and the functioning of the factor 
markets. Different production technologies are approximated by different factor's 
intensities across sectors, as shown in Table 4.4, and labor markets function so as 
to mimic realistic adjustment possibilities: skilled workers can freely move across 
all sectors, whereas unskilled ones face two segmented markets and can just 
imperfectly migrate from the agricultural to the non agricultural segment. 
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Economywide 2.0 1.7 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
121 
Cumulative Unskilled 
migration employment Wages 
Skilled Unskilled 2001-2015 2015 
Yearlv 2rowth rates mu,1ons % 
>------------·-·-
1.68 -4.04 21.51 
0.91 4.04 78.49 
~--l~6 
2.10 -3.71 21.99 
1.07 3.71 78.01 
1.32 
1.78 -3.96 21.64 
0.93 3.96 78.36 
1.27 
Table 4.11 highlights how trade shocks affect labor market structural 
adjustments. Due to its agriculture boom and its increased demand for 
"agricultural" factors of production, the full trade liberalization induces a 
significant increase in the wage rate for unskilled workers. When compared with 
the BaU, the yearly rate of growth of wage of unskilled workers in agriculture is 
0.4 percentage points higher, and this higher rate accounts for a cumulative 14 year 
growth of 34% much higher than the cumulative growth of 26% in the BaU. Given 
this wage incentive, migration decreases and about 340 thousands workers who 
were moving out of agriculture in the BaU scenario do not switch activity in the 
full liberalization case. This has some effect on the aggregate distribution of 
unskilled workers between agriculture and non-agriculture, as shown in the last 
column of Table 4.11. 
As far as the Doha scenarios are concerned, negligible effects are recorded for 
the employment structure and some weak wage increase is observed for unskilled 
in agriculture. 
4.4.4. Trade scenarios' distributional and poverty results 
Two fundamental results emerge from analyzing the micro impacts of the trade 
scenarios. Firstly, our initial hypothesis that trade liberalization, by working 
against the "natural" forces of structural change, might weaken long term trends of 
poverty reduction has been discarded. Although less people migrate towards 
higher paid non-agricultural jobs, mainly through increased agricultural incomes, 
poverty is further reduced in the trade liberalization scenarios. However, and this 
is the second fundamental result, trade reform as envisaged in the current Doha 
scenarios - but even in the hypothetical full liberalization one - is not of great help 
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in the fight against poverty and its complete eradication needs additional more 
targeted and possibly more costly interventions. 
These two sets of results are clearly illustrated by Table 4.12, which shows the 
poverty and distributional outcomes as percentage point differences between the 
trade scenarios and the BaU scenario for the final (2015) year: the full 
liberalization scenario leads to a further reduction in the headcount poverty index 
of 0.5 percentage points, whereas for deep Doha scenario the effects are almost 
negligible.99 Similarly the Gini index is reduced by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points in 
the full liberalization and deep Doha scenarios. 
Table 4.12: Poverty and Distributional impact of Trade, all households 
BaV1015 
% point di.ff. % point di.ff. 
Doha Full 
Gini 58.5 -0.1 -0.2 
PO 18.0 -0.2 -0.5 
Pl 6.6 -0.1 -0.2 
P2 3.5 0.0 -0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
As for the BaU scenario, a thorough assessment of the trade scenarios needs to 
go beyond these aggregate indicators and should rely on more disaggregate 
poverty and distributional analyses. In search of trade-induced poverty effects, the 
remaining part of this section considers an array of indicators, from growth 
incidence curves to poverty statistics estimated on specific sub samples. In 
particular poverty and distributional impacts are separately measured for the 
agricultural and non-agricultural groups, the movers and stayers, the rural and 
urban populations, the regional samples, and the groupings obtained by 
educational attainment, by land ownership, and by occupational status. 
Figure 4.3 shows the growth incidence curves for the poorest thirty percent of 
all households under the three scenarios. The curve for the deep Doha scenario lies 
slightly above the BaU curve. The full liberalization reform also shifts the whole 
curve upwards, however this shift is larger than that of the Doha case, and it seems 
to favor the poorest among the poor; in other words, full liberalization appears to 
induce an additional pro-poor distributional shift. 
99 Given that the weak Doha scenario does not produce any visible results, in this 
section we just report results for the full liberalization and the deep Doha scenarios. 
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Figure 4.3: Growth incidence curves for the BaU and Trade scenarios, poorest 30 
percent of all households 
Growth Incidmce Cwve 
0 10 20 30 
O.mulative population ranked by per capita income 
I== :~ ----- Doha I 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Table 4.13 shows the sectorally disaggregated results. Inequality for all 
households falls due to decreased inequality among agricultural households and 
lower inequality increase among non-agricultural households, although inequality 
between these two groups may have risen somewhat. Despite declining inequality 
and slightly higher per capita income growth, poverty reduction for agricultural 
households barely changes and this is due, as shown below, by the lower migration 
levels induced by the trade shocks. Indeed, in the deep Doha scenario the reduction 
in the population share of agricultural households is only very slightly below that 
achieved in the BaU. More remarkable is the additional poverty reduction for non-
agricultural households that can largely be explained by the lower increase in 
inequality, as per capita income growth is only marginally higher. 
Table 4. 13: Poverty and inequality in the Doha scenario, by sector 
All households Non-axricultural households Agricultural households 
2001 2001-15 %of 2001 2001-15 %of BaU 2001 2001-15 %of 
levels changes Bau levels changes change levels changes BaU change change 
PC income 314.9 1.5 101.5 351.9 1.3 102.1 148.3 2.4 101.3 
Gini 58.6 -0.2 194.4 57.1 0.5 81.8 56.6 -0.8 111.5 
PO 23.6 -5.8 103.4 18.6 -3.3 106.5 46.2 -14.0 101.5 
Pl 9.6 -3.1 102.7 7.1 -1.6 104.6 21.0 -8.2 102.1 
P2 5.3 -1.9 102.5 3.7 -0.9 104.3 12.3 -5.3 102.0 
Population% 100.0 81.8 3.2 98.3 18.2 -3.2 98.3 
Contr. to PO 64.4 8.6 96.0 35.6 -8.6 96.0 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Given its larger price and quantities shocks, the full liberalization scenario yields 
more significant poverty changes, as shown in Table 4.14. In contrast to the Doha 
scenario, agricultural households gain considerably from full liberalization and 
their headcount index is reduced by almost 1.5 percentage points. This sector 
specific income gains more than compensate the further (albeit small) reduction of 
agricultural out-migration. 
For non-agricultural households, the full liberalization scenario improves the 
income distribution, the Gini increases by only 72 percent of the increase recorded 
in the BaU. Growth is only slightly higher for this group of households but, as 
shown above, minor distributional shifts accompanied by slightly higher growth 
can result in significant poverty reduction. 
Table 4. 14: Poverty and inequality in the Full scenario, by sector 












change change change 
PC income 314.9 1.6 106.4 351.9 1.3 106.8 148.3 2.6 109.8 
Gini 58.6 -0.3 312.2 57.1 0.5 72.0 56.6 -0.9 117.0 
PO 23.6 -6.1 109.2 18.6 -3.6 116.3 46.2 -14.9 1080 
Pl 9.6 -3.2 108.2 7.1 -1.8 113.7 21.0 -86 107.4 
P2 5.3 -1.9 107.8 3. 7 -1.0 113.0 12.3 -5.6 107.2 
Populalion % 100.0 81.8 3.1 93.0 18.2 -3.1 93.0 
Comr. to PO 64.4 8.4 96.0 35.6 -7.6 96.0 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Trade shocks simultaneously increase agricultural incomes and reduce inter-
sectoral migration and how these two contrasting forces affect poverty outcome 
depends on the income levels (and therefore on the socio-economic characteristics) 
of those who decide to stay instead of moving. The next set of tables sheds some 
light on this issue. 
Table 4.15 shows the poverty levels and changes under the BaU and the trade 
scenarios for agricultural households who remained in agriculture. First consider 
the BaU case. Having identified those households that will not move, it is possible 
to calculate the headcount for this group in the initial year (200 l ): their headcount 
is equal to 44. l % more than 2 percentage points below the 46.2 level"" calculated 
for all 2001 (stayer and potential mover) agricultural households. This lower level 
of poverty implies that moving households are on average poorer than those who 
remain in agriculture. Accordingly, the changes in PO are 12.1 instead of 13. 7 
percentage points. In 2015, about 15 percent of the population still live in 
100 Shown in Table 4.5. 
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agricultural households. 101 The agricultural expansion following trade liberalization 
has only a minor effect on agricultural employment, by far not enough to offset the 
reduction in agricultural employment from the BaU. Accordingly, the change of 
the share of agricultural households due to trade liberalization is only minor, in 
particular for the Doha scenario. Yet, when translated in actual migrating 
individuals, this small share change means that almost four hundred thousand 
individuals - who would have become members of non-agricultural households in 
the BaU - in the full liberalization scenario remain in agricultural households. 
Despite the fact that these "potential mover households" are on average poorer 
than the typical "stayer household", as we illustrate below, poverty among 
agricultural households decreases compared to the BaU. The poor stayers hence 
gain under both trade scenarios although this gain is almost negligible for the Doha 
scenario. 
Table 4.15: Poverty impact of trade, agri stayers 








Source: Authors' calculations. 
_ Households remaining in agri 
BaU 2001-15 Doha % of 











As could be indirectly inferred from the analysis of the stayers, the group of the 
movers should experience the largest welfare gains. Indeed as illustrated in Table 
4.16, in the BaU agricultural households who become non-agricultural households 
record a 22.4 percentage points reduction in their headcount index, down from a 
considerably high, especially in comparison to the stayers group, initial level of 
56.6 percent. 
This outcome could not be derived straightforwardly from the estimation of the 
migration choice. In fact, the estimations showed that potential migrants were 
found to be poorer, in particular landless, heads, but also better educated, hence 
less poor, non-heads. The explicit quantitative measurements allowed by micro-
simulation were needed to highlight the poverty reducing role of changes in the 
sectoral composition of employment. 
IOI The initial poverty levels among those who stay in agriculture under the trade 
scenarios are almost identical to the initial levels among the BaU stayers, so we 
decided not to report them. The same holds for the movers, for whom we report 
results later. 
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The observed poverty reduction under the trade scenarios is of a moderate 
additional increase. This is due to the income increases trade reforms induce in the 
non-agriculture sectors, but also because the fewer households that still move out 
of agriculture under the trade scenarios are actually poorer. 
Table 4.16: Poverty impact of trade, sectoral movers 
Agri households who have become non-agri 
1001 levels BaU 2001-15 Doha% of Full% of 
chan es BaU chan e BaU chan e 
PO 56.6 -22.4 105.1 108.2 
Pl 26.0 -14.0 102.0 105.4 
P2 15.2 -9.4 101.7 105.1 
Population % 3.1 98.0 92.5 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
One final category needs to be examined: the non-agricultural stayers. 
Representing 80 percent of the population, this is a large group; however, given 
the negligible migration out of the non-agricultural sector observed in the data, this 
group is explicitly excluded from the migration choice. For these households, the 
full liberalization brings about an additional reduction in the headcount of 0.4 
percentage points, and through its favorable impact on non-agricultural unskilled 
wages the Doha scenario, too, makes a small but noticeable difference. 






Non-agri households before and after 
2001 levels BaU 1001-15 Doha % of Full% of 














Source: Authors' calculations. 
Up to this point, the disaggregated analysis of the poverty impacts has been 
based on sectoral affiliation and thus it has been possible to link it directly to the 
sectoral results generated by the CGE model. However, additional policy relevant 
criteria can be used to identify other groups of households and to evaluate their 
specific trade induced poverty effects. In particular, we conduct impact analyses 
for rural and urban areas, by regions, by land ownership, by educational level and 
by occupation. Obviously, all these criteria are somehow correlated to basic 
categories (and variables) included in the CGE model, for example the educational 
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level is linked to the skilled/unskilled factor types, or the region to the prevalence 
of agricultural employment. It should be noted that the criteria are not included in 
the COE analysis. Yet, by using the full household survey information we can 
generate impact profiles where household are grouped according to poverty and 
distributionally relevant correlates. 
Table 4. I 8: Poverty and inequality impact of trade, urban and rural 
Urban Rural 
2001 Bau Doha% Full% oj 2001 Bau 
Doha% Full% of 
levels 2001-15 
of BaU Bau levels 2001-15 of Bau BaU chanl!es chanl!e cham>e chanPes chanPe chanPe 
PO 19.6 -4.0 103.8 112.2 44.4 -12.1 103.1 108.2 
Pl 7.6 -2.0 103.2 110.1 20.1 -7.1 102.5 108.2 
P2 4.0 -12 103.0 109.5 11.7 -4.7 102.3 107.7 
Population % 83.7 1.3 99.5 93.2 16.3 -1.3 99.5 93.2 
Contr. to PO 69.4 3.9 96.6 35.5 30.6 -3.7 102.3 119.8 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Table 4.18 shows the poverty impact of trade by urban or rural residence. 
Interestingly, the share of urban households in 2001 (83.7 percent) is even higher, 
although not much, than the share of non-agricultural households (81.8 percent). 
Quite some households live in urban areas, very likely in urban peripheries, and 
earn their living primarily from agricultural wage-employment. Actually, only 66 
percent of the agricultural households live in rural areas, while 5 percent of the 
non-agricultural households live in rural areas. The micro-simulations that 
generate the results of Table 4.18 also take into account rural-urban migration by 
assuming that households migrate to urban areas if all employed household 
members leave agriculture. In the BaU, this causes the rural population to decline 
by l .3 percentage points. The urban population accounts for almost 70 percent of 
the Brazilian poor in 2001 and this share rises in the BaU by 3.9 percentage points. 
Urban poverty declines under both trade scenarios with the decline being stronger 
under the full liberalization scenario. The Doha scenario hardly affects rural 
poverty, but full liberalization decreases the rural headcount by an additional 
percentage point. Some simple calculations can give some more meaning to these 
figures: The 0.5 percentage point difference in PO in the full liberalization scenario 
means that approx. 135 000 people are lifted out of poverty. 102 The l percentage 
point difference implied by the full liberalization scenario reduces the number of 
poor people in rural areas by approx. 115 000. Considering the very small increase 
in non-agricultural unskilled wages this may be somewhat surprising, but it is the 
urban concentration that drives this result. Some more growth in urban areas lifts 
more people out of poverty than very high agricultural growth. 
102 To put these absolute numbers into perspective it should be noted that the Brazilian 
population in 2001 was approximately 165 million, of which 39 million were poor 
(27 million in urban and 12 million in rural areas). 
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Table 4. /9: Poverty impact of trade, by region 
~ 
2001 initial levels 2015 
Population % contr. to 




15PO BaUPO BaUPO 
chanxe chanxe chanxe 
North 5.7 34.0 8.2 -7.9 101.0 107.7 
Northeast 28.5 45.4 54.8 -9.3 102.6 109.5 
Southeast 43.5 12.4 22.8 -3.7 101.9 107.9 
South 15.2 14.7 9.5 -4.6 101.4 1078 
Center-West 7.1 16.0 4.8 -5.0 119.4 121.3 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Due to the regional differences both in factor endowments and specialization 
patterns, we might expect poverty reduction patterns to differ substantially 
between the regions for the BaU as well as for the trade shocks. The reduction in 
the headcount for the BaU confirms this expectation, as poverty declines more 
strongly in the Northeast, South, and Center-West, the regions with the highest 
shares in agricultural employment. The Doha round has negligible effects across 
all regions although the figures in Table 4.19 suggest a different story for the 
Center-West. Yet, a look at the changes of Pl and P2 (not reported) demonstrates 
that this strong effect is due to many households being just below the poverty line 
in this region. 1"' The Northeast, the region with the highest incidence of poverty 
where more than 50 percent of the Brazilian poor reside, benefits most from the 
Doha liberalization and about 50 000 individuals are lifted out of poverty in this 
region. In the same region, full liberalization helps about 175 000 individuals to 
escape poverty. The poor in the North, another region with worryingly high 
poverty rates, gain relatively little from trade liberalization, whereas poverty in the 
South as well as in the Center-West decreases quite substantially due to the 
importance of agricultural income for the poor in these regions. 
Table 4.20 shows the poverty changes for landowners and agricultural 
households who do not own land separately. The landowning households account 
for approximately 40 percent of the population in agricultural households. The 
differences between the two groups of agricultural households are quite striking. 
The poverty incidence among landowning households is much lower; the 
difference is more than IO percentage points. Poverty decreases quite substantially 
for both groups in the BaU. Note that we only consider households who stay in 
agriculture. Poor households who do not own land benefit little from the Doha 
round, but full liberalization brings about an additional decrease of more than I 
percentage point in the headcount (affecting almost 100 000 individuals). The 
103 This is a case that illustrates why we usually report not only the headcount index, as 
this indicator can be quite misleading in some instances. 
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Table 4.20: Poverty impact of trade, agricultural stayers by owning land 
Landowner households No land owning households 




%of of BaU 2001 2001-15 
%of 
of BaU 
levels BaU levels BaU changes change change changes change 
change 
PO 37.1 -10.5 101.7 108.0 48.5 -12.5 101.9 110.6 
Pl 16.6 -6.2 102.7 109.1 22.2 -7.4 102.3 108.4 
P2 9.5 -3.9 102.7 109.4 13.1 -5.0 102.2 107.8 
Population % 38.4 61.6 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
reason why they benefit more from both trade scenarios is that they are more 
specialized in agricultural income. This is not necessarily what one would expect, 
but it may well be that owning land provides the resources to set up a small non-
agricultural business. Noteworthy is the finding that under both trade scenarios 
poverty gap as well as severity index decrease stronger than the headcount in terms 
of the BaU change. This again has to do with the specialization of households. The 
poorer landowning households derive a higher share of their income from 
agriculture whereas the richer households (at least among the poor) earn a higher 
share of income from non-agricultural activities. 
Table 4.21: Poverty impact of trade, by educational levels 
2001 initial levels 2015 





BaUPO Hh. average tion % to PO lion% change PO change schoolinl! chantle 
<=3 16.2 52.3 35.9 16.0 -10.7 103.5 111.5 
<=5 16.9 36.0 25.7 16.6 -9.1 102.9 109.9 
<=8 20.9 21.1 18.7 20.7 -5.6 105.0 111.5 
<=10 12.9 11.3 6.2 12.9 -2.9 104.6 111.3 
>=11 33.1 9.6 13.5 33.7 -2.0 101.7 104.6 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
As Table 4.21 indicates, the educational level of the households is an important 
determinant of poverty. The headcount among households with 3 or less average 
years of schooling of the employed household members is well above 50 percent. 
This group accounts for 16.2 percent of the population but for more than a third of 
the poor. The poverty incidence among households with 4 or 5 years of schooling 
is 15 percentage points lower. For both groups with ten or more years of average 
schooling, the headcount is about IO percent. The Doha round does not appear to 
be particularly helpful for those with little educational endowment. Yet, the full 
liberalization scenario again leads to a substantial additional reduction in poverty. 
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Finally, we analyze the poverty impact of trade reform by occupational groups. 
In Table 4.22, we differentiate between wage-employed, self-employed and 
households with members engaged in both types of employment in agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities, respectively.104 In addition, there are households 
with no employed household member. One out of five poor people in Brazil comes 
from a self-employed agricultural household, and the agricultural wage-employed 
households are almost equally poor. In non-agricultural households, the difference 
between self-employed and wage-employed households in terms of poverty is not 
too pronounced. Due to their high share in the population, non-agricultural wage-
employed households account for more than a third of the Brazilian poor. Poverty 
rates are significantly lower for households who derive their income from both 
wage-and self-employment. Under the Doha scenario, all non-agricultural 
household groups gain, whereas there are only minor gains for agricultural 
households. As noted above, full liberalization however helps both agricultural and 
non-agricultural households. Interestingly, poverty in non-agricultural activities 
declines more among the self-employed, whereas in agricultural activities the 
decline is stronger for the wage-employed. As in the case of households who do 
not own land, the agricultural wage-employed households derive more income 
from agricultural unskilled labor than agricultural self-employed households. For 
non-agricultural households, it is the greater importance of skilled income for the 
wage-employed that makes poverty decline less strongly for this group. 
Table 4.22: Poverty impact of trade, by occupation 
_J 
200 l initial levels Bau 2001-15 Doha 2001-15 Full 2001-15 
Popula- % Popula- PO Popula- %of Popula- %of 
PO contr. tion % tion % BaUPO tion % BaUPO tion % 
to PO change 
change 
change change change change 
Agri wage-empl 5.6 46.2 11.0 -1.5 -14.3 -1.5 101.5 -1.4 111.2 
Agri self-empl. 10.2 48.0 20.7 -1.3 -13. 7 -1.3 101.4 -1.2 106.7 
Agri both 2.4 38.8 3.9 -0.5 -14. I -0.5 101.3 -0.5 105.5 
Notempl. 7.8 27.4 9.1 0.0 -4.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Non-agri wage 48.5 17.2 35.3 1.6 -3.1 1.6 107.2 1.5 117.4 
Non-agri self 15.9 22.7 15.3 I.I -2.9 I.I 107.9 I.I 121.0 
Non-agri both 9.6 11.5 4.7 0.6 -2.3 0.6 108.0 0.5 123.4 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
To sum up, the poverty changes under the deep Doha scenario are rather 
moderate and disappointing. With one exception, our analyses do not detect a 
particularly favorable effect on any of the poor and vulnerable groups that we have 
identified. This one exception is that the Doha scenario very slightly appears to 
favor the Northeast. Overall, income growth under the Doha scenario favors non-
104 If the number of self-employed household members is greater than the number of 
wage-employed members, the household is considered self-employed, and vice versa. 
Are the numbers equal, the households falls under the "both" category. 
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agricultural activities and, accordingly, urban areas. Since the population is 
concentrated in urban areas, some growth can already reduce poverty 
considerably, in particular if accompanied by a pro-poor distributional shift, as in 
the Doha scenario. Our analyses show that anti-poor changes in the distribution 
can easily dwarf the poverty reducing potential of growth. The income growth 
pattern under full liberalization tends to favor poor groups. Poor agricultural and 
less educated households benefit considerably more from full liberalization than 
from the Doha liberalizations. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that the economic effects of the Doha round, even of an 
"optimistic deep" liberalization scenario, are rather limited for Brazil. 
Accordingly, poverty would remain largely unaffected by this trade reform, which 
does not appear to be biased in favor any of particularly poor groups. Yet, through 
a slight improvement in the urban income distribution the Doha scenario has some 
positive effect on poverty. 
In contrast, a full liberalization scenario implies quite substantial welfare gains 
that are concentrated among some of the poorest groups of the country, in 
particular those in agriculture. Consequently, the rural poor and certain 
comparably poor regions in Brazil benefit more than proportionately. This result is 
driven by an export boom in agriculture and agricultural processing industries, 
growing labor demand and associated higher wages. Following full liberalization, 
a smaller number of workers remain in agriculture compared to the BaU. Given 
that inter sectoral migration may substantially improve the income situation of a 
household, one may expect full liberalization to weaken poverty reduction. This 
expectation is supported by the observation that moving households are on average 
poorer than those remaining in agriculture. However, this is not the case, as the 
gain in agricultural incomes overcompensates the reduced benefits from lower 
migration flows. 
The beneficial impact of the full liberalization is not limited to rural areas and 
agricultural activities. The urban poor benefit through higher incomes for unskilled 
labor also in non-agricultural sectors, which induces a pro-poor shift in the urban 
income distribution. In addition, the urban poor benefit indirectly from the gains in 
agriculture, as the pressure on non-agricultural unskilled is relieved somewhat. 
Trade reform, and in particular domestic trade reforms, may particularly help the 
Brazilian poor farmers, but only broad-based high growth will eradicate urban 
poverty. 
Whether trade can do the job of significantly raising the incomes of the urban 
poor is questionable. In this regard an important limitation of our analysis is that 
we do not assume any dynamic gains from trade liberalization. Our results might 
hence be taken as a lower bound of the welfare effects, as there is strong evidence 
of a beneficial impact of trade liberalization on productivity (Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay 2004). We also acknowledge that our representation of urban labor 
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markets may be too simple to evaluate the precise effects on some particularly 
poor groups in urban areas, e.g. in informal activities. 
The trade policy implications for Brazil are clear-cut. As Brazil does not lose 
from the possible Doha scenarios and even slightly gains, there is no reason to 
oppose such an outcome of the negotiations. Furthermore, our analysis suggests 
that Brazil and especially the Brazilian poor can substantially gain from own 
liberalization. An obvious complementary policy to a trade policy that favors the 
agricultural sector is to enable poor households to participate in agricultural 
growth. In the Brazilian context, an important means to do so is to provide access 
to land. 
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4.6.1. Additional tables 
App. Table 4.1: Estimation results, mover-stayer mode/for heads 











Coef Err. z P>lzl [95% Con[ Interval] 
dedu 0.419 0.278 1.510 
age -0.044 0.005 -9.490 
ddworkown -1.123 0.319 -3.520 
dcess -0.825 0.327 -2.530 
dprop -0. 736 0.172 -4.280 
dgregiol 0.593 0.202 2.930 
cons -1. 708 0.178 -9.580 -





























educational dummy for IO or more years of schooling 
dummy for own-consumption workers 
holding ceded land 
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App. Table 4.2: Estimation results, mover-stayer model/or non-heads 
Number of obs 16737 
Wald chi2(6) 293.58 
Prob> chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.152 
Log pseudo-likelihood= -1282.4805 
Robust Std. 
Coef Err. z P>[z[ 
dprim3 0.782 0.229 3.410 0.001 
dsecl 0.633 0.298 2.120 0.034 
dsec2 0.597 0.324 1.840 0.066 
exp 0.101 0.023 4.340 0.000 
exp2 -0.002 0.000 -4.270 0.000 
gend -0.759 0.188 -4.030 0.000 
preta -0.500 0.336 -1.490 0.137 
ddnonrem -0.849 0.171 -4.960 0.000 
ddworkown -1.731 0.307 -5.640 0.000 
dprop -1.839 0.462 -3.980 0.000 
headnagr 1.122 0.167 6.710 0.000 
headmover 2.468 0.374 6.610 0.000 
cons -4.369 0.298 -14.640 0.000 -























9 years of schooling 
11 or 11 years of 
schooling 
12 years of schooling 







































holding own land 
household head in non-
agricultural sector 
head has moved out of 
agriculture. 
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App. Table 4.3: Estimation results, wage/profit equations 
Wage/profit equation for agriculture unskilled 
Number of obs 22699 
F( 11, 3209) 419.53 




Coef Err. t P>itl 
edu 0.084 0.003 27.270 0.000 
exp 0.047 0.002 29.900 0.000 
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -28.780 0.000 
gend -0.858 0.018 -46.640 0.000 
preta -0.138 0.027 -5.050 0.000 
parda -0.171 0.016 -10.490 0.000 
nnonrem 0.043 0.009 4.790 0.000 
drn -0.129 0.049 -2.620 0.009 
drne -0.339 0.025 -13.590 0.000 
drs 0.150 0.032 4.720 0.000 
drew 0.225 0.036 6.210 0.000 
_cons 4.079 0.040 102.470 0.000 
Wage/profit equation for non-agriculture unskilled 
Number of obs 96993 
F( 16, 6514) 1710.86 




Coef Err. t P>ltl 
edu 0.008 0.003 2.840 0.004 
edu2 0.006 0.000 33.350 0.000 
exp 0.069 0.001 88.200 0000 
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -68.950 0.000 
gend -0.590 0.006 -102.830 0.000 
preta -0.148 0.011 -13.460 0.000 
parda -0.143 0.007 -21.910 0.000 
dun -0.190 0.013 -15.020 0.000 
drn -0.501 0.106 -4.710 0.000 
dune -0.450 0.011 -40.590 0000 
drne -0.710 0.033 -21.800 0.000 
drse -0.229 0.029 -7.960 0.000 
dus -0.069 0.011 -6.470 0.000 
drs -0.171 0.029 -5.950 0.000 
ducw -0.123 0.013 -9.420 0.000 
drew -0.383 0.054 -7.040 0.000 
_cons 4.494 0.020 227.760 0.000 
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Wage/profit equation for skilled 
Number of obs 35696 
F( 16, 6514) 995.20 




Cuef Err. I p 111 /95% Cun[ Interval/ 
edu -0.060 0.007 -9.140 0.000 -0.073 -0.047 
edu2 0.009 0.000 30.520 0.000 0.009 0.010 
exp 0.063 0.002 39.830 0.000 0.060 0.066 
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -22.990 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
gend -0.515 0.009 -55.410 0.000 -0.533 -0.497 
preta -0.277 0.024 -11.570 0.000 -0.324 -0.230 
parda -0.214 0.011 -18.600 0.000 -0.236 -0.191 
dun -0.153 0.023 -6.760 0.000 -0.198 -0.109 
dm -0.520 0.099 -5.260 0.000 -0.714 -0.326 
dune -0.408 O.Dl8 -22.390 0.000 -0.443 -0.372 
dme -0.796 0.044 -18.130 0.000 -0.882 -0.710 
drse -0.276 0.055 -5.030 0.000 -0.384 -0.169 
dus -0.146 0.017 -8.600 0.000 -0.179 -0.113 
drs -0.317 0.052 -6.030 0.000 -0.4 I 9 -0.214 
ducw -0.122 0.023 -5.210 0.000 -0.168 -0.076 
drew -0.108 0.098 -1100 0.270 -0.301 0.084 
_cons 5.278 0.043 122.680 0.000 5.194 5.363 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: 
edu: years of schooling 
edu2: edu squared 
exp: age minus schooling 
exp2: experience squared 
gend: female I 
preta: black 
parda: mixed black 
number of non-remunerated household members nnonrem: 
d*: regional dummies with r (u) for rural (urban), n north, ne northeast, s 
south, cw center-west. 
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App. Table 4.4: Estimation results, labor market segmentation 
Wage equation for testing segmentation hypothesis (unskilled) 
Number of obs 119692 R-squared 0.5021 
F( 47, 7228) 1232.3 RootMSE 0.68619 
Prob> F 0 
Robust Std. 
Coe[. Err. t P>1tl £95% Conf lntervail 
dpriml 0.194 0.007 26.4IO 0.000 0.179 0.208 
dprim2 0.343 0.008 41.420 0.000 0.327 0.359 
dprirn3 0.540 0.0IO 55.020 0.000 0.521 0.560 
dsecl 0.637 0.012 53.890 0.000 0.613 0.660 
dsec2 0.878 0.otl 81.940 0.000 0.857 0.899 
dter 1.464 0.019 78.220 0.000 1.428 1.501 
exp 0.058 0.001 83.820 0.000 0.056 0.059 
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -69.420 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
di -0 . ./69 0.028 -16.510 0.000 -0.52./ -0 . .//3 
d2 0.063 0.056 1./.10 0.256 -0.0./6 0./72 
d3 -0.0JI 0.024 -0 . ./70 0.6./0 -0.059 0.036 
d-1 -0.238 0.017 -13.710 0.000 -0.272 -0.204 
d5 -0.070 0.017 -4.030 0.000 -0./04 -0.036 
d6 -0.722 0.028 -26.200 0.000 -0. 776 -0.668 
d7 0.226 0.049 4.610 0.000 0.130 0.322 
d8 -0.033 0.012 -2.700 0.007 -0.058 -0.009 
d9 0.024 0.016 1.530 0.126 -0.007 0.055 
d!0 0.020 0.023 0.890 0.374 -0.024 0.065 
di! 0.124 0.019 6.520 0.000 0.087 0.162 
dl2 0.049 0.013 3.880 0.000 0.024 0.074 
dl3 0.135 0.015 9.230 0.000 0.l06 0.164 
dl5 0.077 0.009 8.540 0.000 0.059 0.094 
dl6 0.093 0.007 13.020 0.000 0.079 0.l07 
dl7 0.208 0.012 18.080 0.000 0.186 0.231 
carteira 0.330 0.006 57.810 0.000 0.318 0.341 
seasonal -0.125 0.017 -7.260 0.000 -0.158 -0.091 
dse 0.088 0.009 9.660 0.000 0.070 0.l06 
arrend 0.116 0.043 2.720 0.007 0.032 0.200 
poss -0.148 0.055 -2.720 0.007 -0.255 -0.041 
cess -0.278 0.041 -6.760 0000 -0.359 -0.198 
prop 0.077 0.023 3.350 0.001 0.032 0.122 
dworkown -0.138 0.021 -6.670 0.000 -0.179 -0.097 
nnonrem 0.037 0.007 5.570 0.000 0.024 0.050 
gend -0.531 0.006 -89.070 0.000 -0.542 -0.519 
preta -0.144 0.0IO -14.800 0.000 -0.163 -0.125 
amarela 0.3IO 0.054 5.740 0.000 0.204 0.415 
parda -0. 135 0.006 -22.770 0.000 -0.147 -0.124 
dun -0.144 0.012 -12.120 0.000 -0.167 -0.120 
dm -0.312 0.044 -7.0IO 0.000 -0.399 -0.225 
dune -0.422 0.0IO -40.2IO 0.000 -0.443 -0.401 
dme -0.573 0.020 -29.350 0.000 -0.611 -0.534 
drse -0.223 0.021 -10.730 0.000 -0.264 -0.182 
dus -0.081 0.010 -7.960 0.000 -0.IOI -0.061 
drs -0.142 0.024 -6.000 0.000 -0.188 -0.095 
ducw -0.081 0.013 -6.460 0.000 -0. !05 -0.056 
drew -0.141 0.026 -5.350 0.000 -0.193 -0.089 
isourban2 -0.081 0.049 -1.660 0.098 -0.178 0.015 
_cons 4.461 0.017 269.920 0.000 4.429 4.493 
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Wage equation for testing segmentation hypothesis (skilled) 
Number ofobs 35696 R-squared 0.4503 
F( 47, 7228) 357.69 Root MSE 0.75121 
Prob> F 0 
Robust Std. 
Coe£. Err. p !II £95% Cun{ Interval£ 
dpriml 0.200 0.040 5.050 0.000 0.122 0.277 
dprim2 0.239 0.038 6.290 0.000 0.165 0.314 
dprim3 0.425 0.037 11.490 0.000 0.352 0.497 
dsecl 0.490 0.037 13.140 0.000 0.417 0.563 
dsec2 0.766 0.035 22.190 0.000 0.698 0.834 
dter 1.484 0.036 41.620 0.000 1.414 1.554 
exp 0.067 0.002 43.160 0.000 0.064 0.070 
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -26.140 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
di -/1.-1/7 /1./52 -2.7-1/1 /1./1/16 -//. 71-1 -/1.//9 
d2 /1.-199 /1./76 2.8-1/1 0.005 /1./5-1 0.8-13 
d3 0.2/6 0.21/ /.02/1 0.306 -0./98 0.630 
d-1 -0.3/9 0.065 --1.870 0.000 -0.-1-17 -0./90 
d5 0./135 0.052 /1.690 0.-193 -0.066 0./36 
d6 -0.0-18 0./83 -0.260 0.792 -0.-107 0.31/ 
d7 0.345 0.073 4.720 0.000 0.202 0.489 
d8 0.195 0.033 5.970 0.000 0.131 0.259 
d9 0.133 0.037 3.630 0.000 0.061 0.205 
dlO 0.214 0.035 6.140 0.000 0.146 0.282 
di! 0.280 0.036 7.670 0.000 0.208 0.351 
d12 0.135 0.034 3.940 0.000 0.068 0.203 
dl3 0.066 0.034 1.980 0.048 0.001 0.132 
dl5 0.264 0.031 8.630 0.000 0.204 0.324 
d16 0.185 0.015 12.670 0.000 0.157 0.214 
di? 0.110 0.015 7.260 0.000 0.081 0.140 
carteira -0.059 0.012 -4.940 0.000 -0.083 -0.036 
seasonal -0.705 0.213 -3.320 0.001 -1.122 -0.289 
dse -0.254 0.025 -10.000 0.000 -0.304 -0.204 
arrend 0.627 0.191 3.280 0.001 0.252 1.002 
poss -0.085 0.341 -0.250 0.802 -0.754 0.583 
cess -0.014 0.230 -0.060 0.952 -0.465 0.437 
prop 0.391 0.062 6.350 0.000 0.270 0.512 
nnonrem 0.039 0.017 2.340 0.019 0.006 0.072 
gend -0.473 0.009 -50.400 0.000 -0.492 -0.455 
preta -0.257 0.024 -10.910 0.000 -0.303 -0.211 
amarela 0.255 0.069 3.680 0.000 0.120 0.391 
parda -0.209 0.01 I -18.640 0.000 -0.231 -0.187 
dun -0.168 0.022 -7.470 0.000 -0.212 -0.124 
dm -0.635 0.102 -6.230 0.000 -0.835 -0.436 
dune -0.396 0.018 -21.520 0.000 -0.432 -0.360 
dme -0.784 0.040 -19.360 0.000 -0.863 -0.704 
drse -0.368 0.055 -6.730 0.000 -0.475 -0.261 
dus -0.161 0.017 -9.470 0.000 -0.194 -0.127 
drs -0.414 0.055 -7.580 0.000 -0.521 -0.307 
ducw -0.153 0.023 -6.510 0.000 -0.199 -0.107 
drew -0.224 0.096 -2.330 0.020 -0.413 -0.035 
isourban2 -0.028 0.D78 -0.360 0.723 -0.180 0.125 
_cons 5.007 0.040 123.880 0.000 4.928 5.086 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: The rows in italics indicates agricultural sectors. 
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Center-West Rural 62 
Distrito Federal 82 
Urban Rio de Janeiro 80 
Rural Rio de Janeiro 72 
Southeast 
Urban Sao Paulo 84 
Rural Sao Paulo 69 
Urban Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo 66 




Source: Authors' calculations based on Paes de Barros (2004). 
App. Table 4.6: Model-GTAP sector mapping 
Model Sectors I GTAP 5 Sectors 
Cereal Grains POR WHT GRO 
OilSeeds OSO 
RawSugar C_B 
OthCrops VF PFB OCR WOL FRS FSH 
Livestock CTL 
RawAnimalProducts OAP RMK 
OilMinerals COL OIL GAS OMN 
LightManufacturing CMT MIL PCR TEX WAP 
AgrilndustriesExp OMT VOL SGR OFO LEA B_T 
WoodProductsPaper LUM PPP 
ChemicalsOilPr P_C CRP 
MetalMineralProducts NMM I_S NFM FMP 
Machinery Equipment MVH ELE OME OTN OMF 
OtherServices GOT WTR ELY OFI ISR OBS ROS OWE 
Construction CNS 
TradeCommunication TRD CMN OTP WTP ATP 
PublicServices OSG 
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App. Table 4. 7: GTAP sector labels 
GTAP 5 Sectors 
PDR Paddy rice LUM Wood products 
WHT Wheat PPP Paper products. publishing 
GRO Cereal grains nee P_C Petroleum, coal products 
V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
OSD Oil seeds NMM Mineral products nee 
C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet l_S Ferrous metals 
PFB Plant-based fibers NFM Metals nee 
OCR Crops nee FMP Metal products 
CTL Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses MVH Motor vehicles and parts 
OAP Animal products nee OTN Transport equipment nee 
RMK Raw milk ELE Electronic equipment 
WOL Wool, silk-wonn cocoons OME Machinery and equipment nee 
FOR Forestry OMF Manufactures nee 
FSH Fishing ELY Electricity 
COL Coal GOT Gas manufacture, distribution 
OIL Oil WTR Water 
GAS Gas CNS Construction 
OMN Minerals nee TRD Trade 
CMT Bovine meat products OTP Transport nee 
OMT Meat products nee WTP Water transport 
VOL Vegetable oils and fats ATP Air transport 
MIL Dairy products CMN Communication 
PCR Processed rice OFI Financial services nee 
SGR Sugar ISR Insurance 
OFD Food products nee OBS Business services nee 
B_T Beverages and tobacco products ROS Recreational and other services 
TEX Textiles OSG Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health 
WAP Wearing apparel OWE Dwellings 
LEA Leather products 
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5. Conclusions, policy relevance, and future research 
The main message of the country studies included in this dissertation is that the 
poverty and distributional impact of external shocks and economic policies 
depends very much on the exact nature of the shock as well as the structural 
characteristics of the country in question. Hence, there are no policy blueprints. 
This may sound trivial, but often enough have policy prescription been based on 
oversimplifying assumptions without taking into account country-specificities. 
One such case is the belief that the poor in developing countries in general would 
benefit from trade liberalization through increased demand for unskilled labor.'°' 
The Colombian and the Brazilian case studies very well illustrate that the impact 
of trade liberalization on poverty and the distribution of income depends on the 
structure of protection in place and how it is modified, i.e. the nature of shock, as 
well as a number of country characteristics, in particular the functioning of the 
labor market and the sectoral and skill composition of the workforce. In sum, the 
studies demonstrate that country-specific empirical research can provide policy-
makers with insightful analyses to take better-informed decisions. 
Of course, three country-studies cannot provide the empirical basis, on which to 
judge whether globalization, or some of its many facets, are good or bad for the 
poor. The analyses may however suffice for the general tentative conclusion that 
globalization, at least in the Latin American context, is neither good nor bad; 
rather it entails threats and opportunities. In addition, what appears to be a threat at 
first sight may actually be seen as an opportunity, given the right policy. 
Trade liberalization in Colombia, for example, has increased inequality through 
a rising wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled. If educational policies 
however allow labor supply to adjust to this increase, productivity gains would be 
distributed more equally. The case for better policies to make a difference is even 
stronger in natural resource abundant countries, in particular during boom phases, 
as illustrated by the Bolivian study. In the latter, current public expenditure 
policies were even found to aggravate negative side-effects of the resource boom. 
A worrying tendency, to which there is no obvious policy response, is the increase 
in informal employment that is identified in both the Bolivian and the Colombian 
case. If the informal sector involves negative externalities, for example in terms of 
human capital accumulation, this increase can harm long-term development 
prospects. 
A fairer world trading system is been by many as an important component of a 
comprehensive development strategy, as reflected by the adopting the attainment 
of an "open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory" committed to "good governance, development and poverty 
reduction as one of the Millennium Development targets. Even non-governmental 
I 05 The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and early 1990s are another case of 
fairly similar policy packages applied to a number of countries, whose problems only 
appeared to be the same at first sight. For a critical view on these programs see 
Collier and Gunning (1999). 
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organizations seem to put great hopes in particular into the effects of cutting-down 
agricultural subsidies in rich countries. For Brazil however, the preceding chapter 
suggests that the gains for the poor from a new development-and-poverty-focused 
round of multilateral trade negotiations would be rather limited. This finding is not 
limited to the Brazilian case. The other country studies included in Hertel and 
Winters (2005) also point to moderate effects of a "Doha Development Agenda". 
In some countries, poverty even increases slightly. Among the reasons why 
liberalizing agricultural trade does not help the poor as much as expected is that, in 
some countries, higher world market prices are not transmitted to poor farmers, 
while urban households suffer from the price increase. 106 Such findings again 
demonstrate that the poverty and distributional impact of economic policies 
depends on a whole range of country-specific factors and that assessing these 
effects requires very disaggregated analyses. 
In terms of methodology, the chapters demonstrate that the "two-step" or 
sequential approach provides an appropriate framework to link policies or external 
shocks to poverty and distributional outcomes. This approach first analyzes the 
impact of shocks on "distributional drivers", such as changes in prices and factor 
remunerations, as well as employment shifts between different types of activities 
or sectors. Using a CGE model in this first stage, allows for a detailed analysis of 
the transmission channels of the shocks at the "macro" level. In the second step, 
the final distributional outcome is assessed using a microsimulation model that 
takes into account the complexities of the income generation process through 
modelling individual decisions. 
The sequential approach brings together two strands of literature, applied CGE 
models, on the one hand, and poverty and distributional analyses, on the other, 
which were largely separated from each other. While CGE analyses tend to suffer 
from being too stylized and not being well informed by micro data, poverty and 
distributional analyses are often merely descriptive and lack an assessment of the 
causes of distributional change and the related transmission channels. The 
sequential approach attempts to get the best out of these two "modeling worlds". 
Its main advantage is that while it remains tractable both at the macro and the 
micro level, it allows for sufficiently detailed and disaggregated analyses. 
The microsimulation models based on household income generation models 
provide a powerful tool to assess the final distributional impact of changes in 
"distributional drivers", as illustrated by the validation exercise in the Colombian 
chapter. Modeling decisions at the individual level implies that household 
heterogeneity is not only represented in terms of factor endowments and 
consumption patterns. The welfare implications of discrete changes in individual 
behavior, such as labor market entry or sectoral movements, can thus be taken into 
account. The impact of individual transitions out of agriculture in the Brazil study 
demonstrates the possible magnitude of these discrete individual changes on 
106 This is shown by Nicita (2005) for Mexico as well as Arndt et al. (2005) for 
Mozambique. 
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household welfare. Here lies the major advantage of such microsimulation models 
vis-a-vis traditional CGE analyses based on representative household groups. 
The shortcomings of the income generation models are discussed at length in 
each of the chapters and only one major problem should be reconsidered here. It 
concerns the simulation of occupational transition based on state comparisons. The 
income generation models for Colombia and Bolivia implicitly assume that the 
estimated propensity to have a certain occupational status, i.e. to be inactive, or to 
be employed in the informal/formal or agricultural/non-agricultural sector, is 
closely related to the propensity to change occupational status. Whether this 
assumption holds true is an empirical question, which could (and possibly should) 
be addressed using panel datasets. The Brazilian model relies on employment 
histories and therefore avoids this problem, but the type of information used 
reflects to a certain extent short-term behavior. 
The Brazilian and the Bolivian chapter use CGE models to trace the 
transmission channels and quantify the magnitude of the effects of the respective 
shock. Although widely applied, these models have been criticized for a number of 
reasons. Analytically, most CGE models rely on the neoclassical framework, 
although the influence of the "structuralist" school (Taylor 1990) has led to the 
incorporation of a number of structural characteristics and rigidities in most 
developing country applications. Which structural characteristics to consider and 
how to precisely model rigidities, e.g. on factor markets, hence differs between 
country applications and the research question at hand. The models in this 
dissertation make an attempt to capture in a realistic way some country 
characteristics that are key for understanding the transmission of the respective 
shock. This includes for example the modeling of the gas sector and the related 
investment flows in the Bolivian model as well as the labor market segmentation 
in the Brazilian model. Clearly, the two models have their shortcomings. 
Assuming, for example, neoclassical price setting in the case of traditional 
agriculture in the Bolivian model, is at best a very rough approximation of reality. 
In fact, modeling of the rural sector is unsatisfactory in most applied CGE models. 
Disaggregated input-output data for agriculture are typically not available and 
agricultural surveys suffer from a lot of problems related to measurement, 
seasonality, and temporary shocks. In addition to data gaps, the insights from 
agricultural household models regarding non-separability of production and 
consumption decisions in rural households (Singh et al. 1986) have not yet entered 
standard models.107 More research effort also needs to be dedicated to modeling the 
informal urban sector. Its heterogeneity in terms of technology, import penetration, 
and export orientation needs to be addressed. This implies to incorporate the 
knowledge on the linkages between formal and informal activities into applied 
107 See Lofgren and Robinson ( 1999), who integrate a rural household model into a 
standard CGE model, for an exception. 
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models. '0' However, even with all these improvements, eventually the results of a 
CGE model will be driven by the assumptions made."" 
Econometricians challenge the empirical relevance of applied CGE models on 
grounds of the calibration technique based on very restricted functional forms, 
typically (nested) CES functions. McKitrick (1998) shows the choice of the 
functional form to make a considerable difference in the results. Yet, in the 
developing country context, data to estimate these functions is typically not 
available and the calibration approach overcomes these data restrictions. 
Furthermore, it is well known that model results are very sensitive to the assumed 
trade and production elasticities. Harrison et al. (1993) therefore suggest to 
perform systematic sensitivity analyses and to provide confidence intervals for the 
results. The CGE analyses in this dissertation, as most CGE model applications, 
perhaps do too little sensitivity analysis and rely too much on parameters 
"typically assumed in the literature". 
Yet, an assessment of the validity of CGE model results also depends on the 
purpose of the model. If the analysis is expected to provide a precise numerical 
estimate of the effects of a specific policy change, the above criticisms have to be 
taken very seriously. In contrast, if CGE models are seen as a rather stylized, yet 
empirically underpinned, analytical tool to better understand the transmission 
channels of a shock through counterfactual analysis and approximate their relative 
importance, the critique is less relevant. In this dissertation, CGE models are 
considered such a tool. This is not to say that the numbers resulting from CGE 
models are without meaning. They should be taken as the results of a model, given 
a specific set of assumptions. Claiming that CGE modeling experiments would 
yield "real world forecasts" appears to be exaggerated. 110 
Instead of using a CGE model, the Colombian study relies on secondary 
sources and additional descriptive analyses to construct the counterfactual 
scenarios of "distributional drivers" that can be linked to trade reform.111 Linking 
ex-post econometric studies on the impact of policies or shocks on "distributional 
108 See Grimm and Giinther (2006) for a recent study on formal-informal linkages in 
Burkina Faso and a short literature review. 
I 09 See de Maio et el. ( 1999) and the reply by Sahn et al. ( 1999) for an exemplary 
discussion on specific aspects of CGE models applied to developing countries. These 
aspects include the macroeconomic and labor market closures as well as the 
assumption on price setting mechanisms. De Maio et al. ( 1999) challenge the results 
of a study by Sahn et al. ( 1997) on the poverty impacts of structural adjustment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as reflecting only the assumptions made in the CGE models, and 
not reality. 
110 Admittedly, the CGE applications in this dissertation, in particular the Brazilian 
chapter, sometimes tend to treat the numbers as being "forecasts". 
l l l A similar approach is followed by Nicita (2005) who uses his results on price 
transmission of changes in world market prices in Mexico to simulate the possible 
effects of trade liberalization on household welfare based on a simple income 
generation model. 
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drivers", such wages or prices, to household income generation models seems to 
be a promising approach for future research. Quite some studies have examined 
e.g. the imr,act of trade liberalization on the distribution of wages and 
employment. 12 The micro analyses in this dissertation have demonstrated that 
looking at the impact on wages and employment alone does not say much about 
final distributional outcomes. Increasing female labor market participation 
provides an example for the complex relationships between employment and 
wages, on the one hand, and the changes in the distribution of per capita incomes, 
on the other. Labor market entry of females from poorer households typically 
worsens the distribution of wages, but may improve welfare of those poorer 
households considerably. Of course, identifying the effects of a specific shock ex-
post is not trivial and requires data with the variation across sectors, regions, 
and/or time that allows for doing so. 
The approach of the Colombian chapter basically combines two "reduced-
form" models; a reduced-form model that links trade and labor market outcomes, 
and a second one that links labor market outcomes and household income. 
Therefore the exact pathways through which the shocks affect distributional 
outcomes remain unclear and counterfactual experiments cannot be conducted in 
such a framework. This would be possible in a general equilibrium model that 
incorporates heterogeneous individuals. As argued in the introduction, building 
such an applied model based on a "full-blown, micro-based general equilibrium 
theory of income distribution and income inequality"111 does not seem to be 
feasible for developing countries. 
Eventually, the appropriate methodology will depend on the shock or policy to 
be examined and the data available. Data availability and quality is of central 
importance to measuring progress towards the Millennium Development goals and 
to the type of analysis conducted in this dissertation. Applying macro and micro 
simulation models implies working with different types of data sources including 
national accounts and primary surveys. The experiences gathered during this 
research hints at large systematic discrepancies between these different sources. As 
building Social Accounting Matrices for distributional analysis requires the use of 
household survey data, applied CGE modelers have also noted the considerable 
inconsistencies between the two data sources (Round 2003, Robilliard and 
Robinson 2003). The remainder of this conclusion therefore argues in favor of 
taking data issues much more seriously and putting them at the heart of the 
research agenda in development economics. 
Deaton (2005) illustrates the scope of the problem. Consumption estimated 
from surveys is typically lower than consumption from the national accounts by 
approximately 20 percent, with regional differences. Survey income is on average 
less than 60 percent of GDP. More worrying than these static comparisons are the 
differences in growth rates. According to the surveys, average annual real per 
112 See Arbache et al. (2004) and Winters et al. (2004) for reviews. 
113 Quote from James Heckman on the back cover ofBourguignon et al. (2005). 
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capita consumption growth in the 1990s has been 2.3 percent if the simple average 
is computed and 1.9 percent if log growth rates are regressed on a time trend. 
National accounts give growth rates of 3.8 and 4.5 percent, respectively (Deaton 
2005). Even if the distribution remains unchanged, consumption growth as 
measured by the surveys would be too sluggish to make a dent in poverty 
reduction, while growth measured by national accounts would reduce poverty 
substantially. 
Deaton (2005) provides a discussion of the reasons behind the discrepancies 
and points to differences that result from differences in definitions, e.g. regarding 
items to be included into consumption, and differences in meeting those 
definitions, e.g. in measuring production."' National accounts are known to 
capture production for own consumption, which constitutes an important share of 
production in poor countries, only to a limited extent. In general, national 
accounts, in contrast to surveys, are more likely to capture larger transactions than 
smaller ones (Deaton 2005). As these small transactions are those reflecting the 
living standards of the poor, Deaton (2005) concludes that poverty can only be 
measured using household surveys. However, understanding the relationship 
between growth, inequality and poverty will require a reconciliation of macro and 
micro data. 
In light of these findings, the discipline dedicates astonishingly little effort to data 
issues. The main problem of basing empirical research on these obviously flawed 
datasets lies in the fact that the reasons for these differences are likely by to 
systematic. Yet, as biases are systematic, they can and should be investigated. The 
described data inconsistencies are not a technical question of interest to insiders, 
but a key problem when progress towards the Millennium Development Goals 
needs to be measured: Where is the point of setting quantitative development 
targets ifwe lack the means to measure them? 
114 See also Robilliard and Robinson (2003) and Ravallion (2001b). 
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